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Editor’s preface
This book is not, unlike many other edited volumes, a mere collection 
of papers presented at a conference. It is the result of several years of 
scholarly cooperation. Two academic events held at, and financially sup-
ported by, University College London (UCL) set the course for compara-
tive (and in many cases, collaborative) research. Most of this work only 
started after a preparatory workshop in 2016 and a bigger conference 
in 2017, entitled ‘Comparative Approaches to Informal Housing Around 
the Globe’. In my introductory lecture to the second event, I presented 
this project jokingly as a sort of academic partner agency, and I instantly 
realised that not everyone was enthused at the idea of forming pairs with 
other scholars. For many, luckily, it did work quite well. Several chapters 
in this book (hopefully) demonstrate how productive, joyful and stimu-
lating collaborative work can be.
There was, of course, some fluctuation. During the work on com-
parative studies, a few scholars dropped out, but, at the same time, com-
pletely new projects joined in. I would like to thank all the scholars who 
took part in this somewhat risky venture, not only those whose compara-
tive projects were chosen to be used in this collection, but also all those 
who joined our discussions without contributing a publishable study.
Likewise, I would like to thank everyone who supported this long-
term project. Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite co-organised the first work-
shop, and Akosua Bonsu helped me with the organisation of the 2017 
conference. I would also like to thank Alan Smart and Alan Gilbert for 
their helpful advice during the preparation of the event.
When I came up with the idea for this book, many colleagues 
and friends encouraged me, most notably my UCL colleagues Wendy 
Bracewell, Axel Koerner and Alena Ledeneva. The FRINGE research cen-
tre at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at UCL became 
my operational base. I’m grateful for the funding provided by the UCL 
European Institute, UCL’s Global Engagement Fund and Octagon Small 
Grants Fund and from FRINGE. Moreover, UCL allocated a Laidlaw 
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scholarship to this research project. As a result, Fengzhuo Yang, a History, 
Politics and Economics student, took part in the 2017 conference and the 
research for the introductory chapter of this book.
Many thanks to the anonymous reviewer for the encouraging and 
incredibly helpful comments. Last but not least, I would like to thank 
Chris Penfold from UCL Press for all the good advice along the way, from 




Towards critique and differentiation: 
Comparative research on informal 
housing
Udo Grashoff and fengzhuo Yang
Various sources indicate that up to a quarter of the world’s urban popu-
lation lives in precarious neighbourhoods such as shanty towns, favelas, 
barriadas, bidonvilles, bustees, kampungs or gecekondular. Such a wide 
variety of forms, found in different political and social contexts, is indic-
ative of the complexity of urban informality, and invites comparative 
approaches.1 But only a few scholars have engaged in rigorous compari-
sons beyond the ‘comparative gesture’ of light-touch references to differ-
ent contexts made thus far.2 As one scholar aptly lamented, ‘promising 
edited collections, which take care to juxtapose case studies from differ-
ent parts of the world, still do so without allowing them to engage … with 
each other’.3 Likewise, many conceptual studies include a comparative 
argument but use examples mainly for illustrative purposes, and do not 
examine them comprehensively. Often, studies rather hint at compari-
sons than fully realising them. But it is not our intention to sneer at col-
leagues for not having hit the target. Instead, this introductory chapter 
presents various examples of good practice. It surveys existing compara-
tive studies on informal housing, to provide a sense of how far compara-
tive research has come, and asks how the method of comparison has been 
used in different disciplines as a way to understand differences, to dis-
cover unexpected similarities and to differentiate (and sometimes even 
subvert) previously held assumptions. The survey begins with paired 
comparisons and progresses toward more complex approaches such as 
multi-case analysis and typologies. It also specifies where the studies of 
this volume contribute to the field of research.
2 CoMparatiVE approaCHEs to inforMaL HoUsinG aroUnd tHE GLobE
1.1 Paired comparisons
The basic comparative operation works with two entities, and such a 
straightforward approach can be easily denounced as reductive. Colin 
McFarlane and Jennifer Robinson, for instance, have levelled the criticism 
that even the most rigorous of existing comparative methodological con-
ventions reinforce a ‘narrow range of comparisons through a continuing 
quasi-scientific approach inappropriate to the multi-dimensional, contex-
tual, interconnected, and endogenous nature of urban processes’.4 They 
have a point here, but the very simplicity of paired comparison is also its 
great strength. While it is true that paired comparisons work with binaries, 
they don’t necessarily reinforce them. As the following examples demon-
strate, paired comparisons can reveal surprising similarities as well as illu-
minate differences. And they don’t have to be superficial or simplistic.
A seminal example is Alan Gilbert’s paired comparison of informal 
housing in Valencia (Venezuela) and Bogotá (Colombia).5 His article 
scrutinises the countries’ respective political, social and economic con-
texts to understand why low-income housing areas became established in 
different ways in the two cities: land occupation as the main approach to 
informal housing in Valencia, and illegal subdivision of land in Bogotá.6 
Gilbert’s study analyses a variety of factors such as the role of patronage, 
reactions of landowners and the police, state regulation, situational fac-
tors such as elections, and many others. Such scrutiny makes clear that 
informal practices emerged according to the different opportunity struc-
tures. The comparison reveals how well adjusted to the respective local 
power relations the different informal strategies were.7
Another comparison that examines different outcomes of analogous 
practices is a 2004 study of life in informally subdivided residential and 
commercial buildings in São Paulo (Brazil) and Johannesburg (South 
Africa). In both locations, the authors find people living in cramped con-
ditions with poor sanitation, lighting and ventilation, and lack of privacy. 
The differences seem to be largely a result of different kinds of people 
resorting to that informal practice. The authors find more social cohesion 
(including family ties) among squatters in São Paulo than among the 
inhabitants of disused buildings in Johannesburg, who are ‘mostly transi-
tory single males’. In addition, the existence of influential urban housing 
movements in Brazil is considered to be conducive to the improvement 
of informally subdivided buildings – in contrast to Johannesburg, where 
squatters have little voice.8
Such comparisons indicate that similar practices are often shaped 
significantly by the local context, often with the effect that differences 
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stand out. A study of informal settlements in Dhaka (Bangladesh) and 
Ankara (Turkey) illustrates this. In both countries, people in informal 
housing were found to have a similar economic status and to perform 
most of their daily activities outdoors. But the physical outlook and spa-
tial structure of bustees and gecekondular differ remarkably. Bustees are 
densely populated, consisting of temporary structures built out of poor 
materials, and tenancy is insecure and expensive: their dwellers pay 
higher rents per square metre than any middle-class family. Gecekondu 
settlements, by contrast, are both more permanent and spacious. Most 
residents, note the authors, have ‘more open space than a middle income 
household in the urban area in some Turkish cities’.9 The diverging 
degrees of freedom are associated with property relations. Whereas gece-
kondu inhabitants are more or less owners of their houses, bustee dwell-
ers are predominantly tenants without rights.10
One spirited example of bridging great distances is Amanda Dias’ 
comparison of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and favelas in 
Brazil.11 Based on the assumption that both of these informal settlements 
establish a specific ‘intellect of the margin’ (dominated either by mili-
tancy or by artisan and intellectual activities), the French anthropologist 
compares several aspects of social structure in the two countries, such as 
self-perception, communal activities and internal governance, and finds 
many similarities. She observes that those living at the margins of the 
city and the state identify affirmatively with the informal settlement and 
try actively to build a community culture. Both have problems with inter-
nal management but they are different. Inhabitants of both settlements 
also differ in their perception of temporality.
Whereas Dias’ comparison ultimately arrives at theoretical conclu-
sions, for other comparative studies theory is the starting point.12 In a 
study led by assumptions of post-Fordist theory, Dutch sociologist Hans 
Pruijt ties the distinct trajectories of squatting in Amsterdam and New 
York to macro-structures, namely the urban regime relying on market 
forces in the US, and the Dutch way of state intervention and redistribu-
tion.13 According to Pruijt, the urban regime in New York – which is less 
conducive to squatting – has led to the widespread co-optation of hous-
ing movement groups that mainly act as service providers, in contrast 
to Amsterdam, where squatters embarked on a more proactive strategy 
dubbed ‘flexible institutionalisation’, due to the more squatter-friendly 
context there.14 While such a theory-led approach can account for the 
fact that squatting faded away in New York whereas flexible institutional-
isation kept the subversive potential of the movement alive in Amsterdam 
(as evidenced by its ‘willingness to cause disruption’), this argument was 
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limited to the 1970s.15 A decade later, during a second wave of squatting 
in New York, the self-understanding of these squatters was similar to that 
of the squatters in Amsterdam.16 The different contexts, however, once 
again caused diverging outcomes. Confronted with the stricter protection 
of property in the US, squatting in New York was characterised by con-
cealment, relative isolation and avoidance of privately owned buildings. 
Moreover, rigorous comparison would reveal a different attitude towards 
social housing projects. In Amsterdam, there was more acceptance of 
such projects, due to a more reliable, transparent and participatory pol-
icy safeguarding the affordability of new housing, and indeed there was 
also more official recognition of the squatters’ interests (in relation to 
rehousing, for instance).17
Pruijt’s research also shows that paired comparisons carry the risk 
of producing simplified dichotomies. For example, Justus Uitermark 
pointed out that Pruijt’s emphasis on contrasts between the Netherlands 
and the US led to a downplaying of internal conflicts and divisions within 
Amsterdam’s squatting movement.18
A decade later, Pruijt reshaped the comparison and approached it in 
a more holistic way. Instead of mainly looking at the occurrence of squat-
ting, as such, he sought to measure and grade the influence of squatting 
on urban policy, as well as the extent of cultural and economic changes 
brought about as a result of squatting. Pruijt developed a four- stage 
model by identifying different degrees of influence of squatter move-
ments on society.19 Furthermore, a closer look at the history of housing 
movements in New York revealed a synergetic dynamic of autonomous 
and institutionalised movements. The activities of autonomous squatters 
faced substantial restrictions, but their actions opened up opportunities 
for institutionalised groups. Conversely, official programmes such as 
‘homesteading’ helped legitimise squatting.20 As a whole, Pruijt’s com-
parative research illustrates the remarkable potential of comparisons for 
a nuanced understanding of the local dynamics of informal housing in 
different cities of the Global North.
Likewise, a couple of similar studies have used comparative 
approaches to analyse striking differences in Europe. In view of the hun-
dreds of legalised squats in Berlin (as opposed to just a few in Madrid), 
one study asks why legalisation of squatting is so different in the two 
European cities. The authors identify two main factors: the squat-
ters’ political strength and their attitude towards legalisation. Militant 
resistance against evictions put Berlin’s squatting movement in a strong 
position and facilitated straightforward negotiation. A high number 
of squatters finally accepted the option of legalisation provided by the 
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state. Conversely, resistance in Madrid remained isolated, most squatters 
rejected any kind of negotiation with the state, and the few legalisations 
that took place involved a tedious and long-winded procedure.21
An important aspect of research on informality focuses not on 
informal practices, as such, but on policies. Current tendencies towards 
the criminalisation of squatting are the focus of a relatively recent 
essay that includes a few comparative elements. According to the 
authors, anti-squatter discourses in England and Wales, as well as in the 
Netherlands, have given rise to moral panic. But, in the United Kingdom 
(UK), criminalisation of squatting has mainly been driven by fear of prop-
erty theft, whereas in the Netherlands the main factor has been xenopho-
bia. Even more pronounced are differences between British and Dutch 
discourses in defence of squatting. In the UK, ‘supportive discourses’ 
emphasise the vulnerability and homelessness of the squatter popula-
tion. In the Netherlands, defenders of squatters frame them as informal 
providers of cultural and social services.22
While most scholars in the Global North focus on Western Europe, 
few have dealt with informal housing in Eastern Europe. In his doctoral 
thesis, historian Peter Mitchell broke new ground with his comparison 
of squatting in the divided city of Berlin during the 1970s and 1980s. In 
both the east (the German Democratic Republic, or GDR) and the west 
(the Federal Republic of Germany, or FRG), policies of urban renewal 
were similar, and squatting emerged almost at the same time in inner-city 
neighbourhoods. But the comparison found fundamental differences: 
‘Whereas squatting in the GDR was practised covertly and individually 
(or as a familial undertaking), in the FRG it was undertaken overtly 
and collectively. Often tacitly tolerated by the local authorities in East 
Berlin, the history of squatting in West Berlin was, by contrast, rooted in 
conflict.’23
One might be inclined to ascribe the differences to the different 
political regimes – the eastern dictatorship and the western democracy. 
The comparison of squatting in Leipzig and Leiden in Chapter 4 of this 
publication, however, questions such simple causality and suggests that, 
even in different political and social contexts, squatting practices can be 
very similar.
Comparative inquiry is often driven by ideas that stem from exper-
tise on one particular area. Eliza Isabaeva’s study in Chapter 5 of this 
volume is based on extensive fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan, and she refers 
to similar processes of collective land occupation in neighbouring 
Kazakhstan to deepen our understanding. A study from 1965 embarks on 
a similar strategy. It contrasts the chaotic and disastrous demolition and 
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deportation policy towards a squatter settlement in Manila in 1963 with 
the straightforward process of resettlement of squatters in Hong Kong at 
the same time. The author identifies the different political regimes and 
administrations as the main cause of this stark contrast. Whereas colo-
nial rule in Hong Kong facilitated a consistent policy, the division of inter-
ests rendered Manila’s administration ineffective to a large extent.24
Striking differences between countries in the same region are also 
the starting point for a comparative analysis of slum-upgrading in Africa. 
While international development finance is undoubtedly a fundamental 
supporting factor, it worked well in Harare (Zimbabwe) but not in Kampala 
(Uganda). The success of slum-upgrading in Harare can be associated 
with more supportive policies at city level, and the Zimbabwean constitu-
tional right to housing. Moreover, occupation of mainly  privately  owned 
land in Uganda made interventions more difficult than in Zimbabwe, 
where most of the squatted land belonged to the state.25
A related topic is unauthorised construction. Rachelle Alterman and 
Inês Calor explore the significant ‘twilight zone between legal and illegal 
development’ in their comparison of enforcement of building codes in 
Portugal and Israel. They analyse detailed differences in the strictness of 
the regulations and the efficiency of the enforcement system in the two 
countries, and offer a number of lessons to be learned from both sides. 
It is particularly the systematic, detailed and precise analysis of policies 
and outcomes that characterises this study.26 In Chapter 8 of this book, 
they take this a step further and discuss the transfer of the concept of 
informal housing from the Global South to the North.
Quite a few existing studies find the same phenomenon to be the 
result of different processes. Just such a paired comparison that bridges 
great geographic and cultural distances to uncover astonishing similari-
ties is the 2010 collaborative study on different forms of informal hous-
ing in Hong Kong and Canada.27 The authors compare rooftop squatters 
in Hong Kong and squatters occupying basement apartments in Calgary, 
and ask how these two prosperous cities deal with the two forms of ille-
gal housing. In both cities, they find a similar policy of selective tolera-
tion, with redefinitions of legality and little initiative for reinforcing the 
law on the part of the state. And, in both places, the lack of collective 
action among those living in unauthorised housing facilitated such a pol-
icy. Similarly, in their examination of several political aspects, Clarissa 
Campos and Miguel Martínez point out similarities between squatting 
movements in Brazil and Spain in Chapter 6 of this volume.
Last but not least, informal housing has a historical dimension that 
is worth exploring. It represents ‘probably one of the oldest informal 
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practices that evolved in conjunction with the institution of property 
rights’.28 Solutions such as legalisation or temporary toleration of infor-
mal housing rely on Roman law, which had provisions for accommo-
dating the interests of squatters. Historical comparisons can highlight 
similar processes in distinct periods, and support a sober and pragmatic 
attitude towards informality.29 Olumuyiwa Adegun provides one exam-
ple of this approach with his comparison of shanty towns in nineteenth- 
century Europe and twentieth-century Africa in Chapter 9 of this book.
1.2 Comparisons of formal and informal housing
Hernando de Soto’s advocacy of land titling as a means to alleviate pov-
erty has unleashed a lively debate around that idea and practice.30 Com-
parative approaches are being used in this debate both in opposition and 
affirmatively. Economists Sebastian Galiani and Ernesto Schargrodsky 
studied a squatter settlement in the outskirts of Buenos Aires where 
legalisation remained incomplete. This provided the authors with the 
opportunity to compare squatters living in precisely the same context 
with, and without, land titles. The comparison did not entirely confirm 
de Soto’s optimistic expectations regarding accumulation of capital, but 
showed that squatters with titles carried out significantly more building 
work on their homes. Moreover, their legal status correlated with pos-
itive effects on life and health. Hence, the authors conclude: ‘In sum, 
entitling the poor increases their investment both in the houses and in 
the human capital of their children, which should contribute to reduce 
poverty in future generations.’31 One might add, titling made them more 
supportive of capitalism. Interviewees with titles declared to hold more 
‘market beliefs’ than their neighbours without land titles.32 Rodrigo Sal-
cedo’s study of the last major slum in Santiago de Chile, based on inter-
views with inhabitants of a former illegal settlement, observes a similar 
‘transition toward a middle-class identity’. Most interviewees wanted to 
leave the past behind, as they are ‘tired of participation and just want to 
live a more private or intimate life’.33
By contrast, many comparisons of formal and informal housing 
question the negative reputation of informality and challenge the dichot-
omy itself. David E. Dowall argues that Karachi’s informal ‘housing deliv-
ery system may not reach the high quality levels found in the planned 
areas, but it is far more efficient and demand responsive’.34 Two Turkish 
architects even go a step further in comparing standard-type social hous-
ing and informal housing in Istanbul. Using a number of parameters such 
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as architectural design, infrastructure and socio-cultural and environ-
mental factors, the authors highlight the ‘spatial richness and identity’ 
of informal housing and suggest lessons to be learned for future social 
housing projects.35 In a similar vein, Theresa Williamson’s comparison 
of life in favelas and condominiums in Chapter 7 of this book challenges 
stereotypes around informality and questions the formal vs informal 
dichotomy.36
At least partly based on comparisons is also a thought-provoking 
essay by legal scholar Carmen Gonzales, which takes issue with De Soto’s 
ideas. Sceptical of the claim that privatisation and the free market will 
solve the problem of the urban poor, she points to colonias in Texas and 
other US states. Gonzales considers these formally legal settlements with 
comparably low standards of living not an ‘exotic transplant’ from the 
South but a rational response to a shortage of affordable housing and ine-
quality. With reference to a number of disadvantages of land-titling pro-
grammes in Colombia, Gonzales argues that it is not the legal title as such 
that matters most, but tenure security. She also argues that the neoliberal 
perspective overlooks other effective mechanisms, such as participation 
(‘creativity of the poor’), social solidarity and active state intervention. 
In addition, Gonzales highlights two aspects of Latin American law that, 
in contrast to the Northern dogma of absolute property rights, benefit 
the poor. The Colombian constitution, for instance, recognises the right 
to dignified housing, to education, to health care and a healthy environ-
ment. Moreover, the ‘social function doctrine’ ‘obligates landowners to 
use land in ways that are affirmatively beneficial to the community’.37 
Such a legal perspective is no doubt limited, because, in practice, many 
Colombians do not benefit from the law due to a lack of resources, poor 
implementation and great inequalities in wealth and land ownership. 
But even though her article is not entirely comparative, it exemplifies 
the potential of the comparative methodology to provide a thought- 
provoking impulse.
1.3 Triple case studies
Studies that draw conclusions from three case studies are as detailed as 
paired comparisons but allow for more complexity. A classic example of a 
triple case study is Anthony and Elizabeth Leeds’ analysis of the political 
attitudes of squatters in Brazil, Chile and Peru. The authors use compari-
son to refute ethnocentric assumptions of Anglo–American scholars about 
supposedly apolitical inhabitants of informal settlements by examining 
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the interaction between squatters and the polity. They contrast Brazilian 
favelas (where individual channels of favours and exchanges of interest 
were much more important than political parties or unions) with Peru-
vian ‘barriadas’. In the case of Peru, several factors – such as competing 
political actors (not unselfishly) mobilising and promoting squatters, a 
bureaucracy set up to deal with informal housing, and the presence of 
various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – provided the option 
of flexible use of external connections. The authors note that these flex-
ible patronal relationships facilitated the administrative and physical 
incorporation of informal settlements into the city in Peru. Conversely, 
the tight interlacing between political parties and squatters and the high 
degree of organisation into formal community associations provided 
inhabitants of Chilean informal settlements with fairly direct access to 
promotion and support, but in the long run these political affiliations 
proved to be vulnerable to political change such as Pinochet’s putsch in 
1973.38
Another comparative analysis of three locations examines policy 
responses to informal housing in Guangzhou (China), Mumbai (India) 
and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). Assuming that policies are largely shaped by 
four factors (government relations on different levels, electoral politics, 
municipal finance and the capacity of civil society), sociologist Xuefei 
Ren assesses the entrepreneurial capacity of these local governments. In 
India, where local municipal power is minimal and civil rights are deeply 
entrenched, the authority has to rely on private capital to rehabilitate 
slum settlements and often combines responsibilities of slum-upgrading 
with rights of commercial development. This method is often ineffective, 
as self-interested developers tend to put minimal resources behind the 
upgrading project. In Guangzhou, by contrast, local municipal power 
is strong, and civil society weak. Here, the authority adopts a heavy-
handed removal policy. This approach, however, is equally ineffective, in 
the sense of the high cost to the government of resettling the displaced 
households. The Brazilian model, however, allows a combination of slum 
regularisation and toleration. Local municipal power is moderate and 
civil society strong. The fight for votes makes toleration and rehabilitation 
the best choice for the state, especially prior to elections. Less pressure on 
balancing municipal revenue and expenditure makes the periodic lump 
sum required to make peace with the favela settlers an acceptable, and 
even effective, investment.39
Ren’s study is also a good example that underlines the crucial 
importance of case selection for the outcomes of comparisons. If situa-
tions are very similar, one is likely to uncover only subtle nuances, such 
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as in the case of Andreas Suttner’s study of squatters’ role in the change 
from modern to postmodern urban policies in Berlin, Vienna and Zurich 
during the 1980s. In all three cities, squatters had a similar countercul-
tural motivation and used independent media and militancy as means of 
mobilisation. The resulting conflicts with ruling political parties and the 
ways of dealing with squatting differed only slightly.40
1.4 Multi-case studies
Although grounded on a massive empirical basis, multi-case studies tend 
to be abstract, and generalisations are often limited by exceptions. A 
comparative macro-perspective can nevertheless produce fundamental 
insights and stimulate new research. Two multi-case studies on European 
squatting illustrate this.
In his ‘configurational analysis’ of squatted social centres in Europe, 
Cesar Guzman-Concha highlights three contextual factors – resources, 
grievances and political polarisation – whose interaction influences 
the strength of squatter movements. Two broad patterns emerge from 
the study, which includes 58 European cities. In some parts of Europe 
(mainly in the South), a combination of severe grievances, sufficient 
resources (such as large leftist communities) and closed or unresponsive 
institutions resulted in strong movements. In the European North, strong 
squatter movements emerged due to robust far-right parties, despite 
scarce resources and less grave social problems.41
Another multi-case study focuses on changes over time. Miguel A. 
Martínez López and Gianni Piazza analyse European squatting move-
ments as part of international protest waves, and verify some degree of 
simultaneity, albeit the length of the cycles varies mainly due to internal 
factors (such as changes in the national law, urban mega-events or politi-
cal change). In Southern Europe, exemplified by three Spanish cities and 
Rome, they detect the occurrence of three main ‘cycle-stages’ of squatting 
(always beginning earlier in Rome than in Spain). In Central/Northern 
Europe, by contrast, there were rather uneven developments in cities 
such as Berlin, Copenhagen and Paris.42
Sociologist Brian Aldrich provides a comparable macro-perspective 
on informal housing in Asia. His study compares the transformation of 
squatter settlements into formal housing in six metropolises. By the end 
of the Second World War, all megacities had a high proportion of squat-
ter settlements, and oligarchs dominated local politics. But, whereas 
in Hong Kong, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur almost all dwellers of the 
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informal settlements had been rehoused, there were still large numbers 
of squatters in Bangkok, Djakarta and Manila. The author attributes the 
differences mainly to the degree of unity among the elite and the squat-
ters’ organisational mobilisation.43 Other factors, such as the differences 
in the wealth of those cities, are neglected though, which confirms that 
this type of comparative research (asking why similar processes have dif-
ferent outcomes) requires comprehensive scrutiny of the respective con-
texts if it is to generate deep insights.
While these studies take the category of squatting for granted, 
another team of researchers uses the comparative approach to question 
the category of informality. The authors ‘ask whether the shantytowns 
along the rail tracks in Kolkata, the relatively well organised self- 
constructed neighbourhoods in Mexico City, the consolidated and nor-
malised ‘post-gecekondu’ … areas in Istanbul, the rich residential areas 
in Belgrade constructed during the transition period between the socialist 
and the neoliberal regime … or even China’s urbanised villages should all 
be called “informal settlements”, only because they fulfil certain aspects 
of informality in their production process’.44 Informal housing appears 
in their discussion in two fundamentally different forms. Self-help hous-
ing with strong political organisation is subsumed under the rubric of 
 ‘popular urbanisation’, while less participatory processes mainly domi-
nated by market mechanisms and commercialisation are dubbed ‘plotting 
urbanism’. The distinction is part of a typology of urbanisation processes.
The next section discusses a few typologies with a focus on informal 
housing only.
1.5 Typologies
Typologies systematise heterogeneity. They tend to emphasise differ-
ences and are, to some extent, an end in themselves. But typologies can 
also be used as a springboard for exploration and as an analytical tool.
One typology of informality, developed by geographer Richard 
Harris, is very comprehensive. Its aim is no less than the systematisation 
of the global diversity of informality (with a strong focus on informal 
housing). Harris distinguishes five different modes of informal urban 
development: latent (informality unregulated by the state); diffuse 
(individualised small-scale action); embedded (organised informality 
that remains quiet and rather covert); overt (organised informality that 
is visible); and dominant (where the informal practice is established as 
routine).45
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Such a global typology is rather exceptional. Most typologies are 
more specific to a certain context. The result of inductive analysis of local 
diversity, they deepen the understanding of specifics of the region under 
study but their findings are not necessarily transferable to other parts of the 
world. An example from the Global North, Hans Pruijt’s typology of West 
European squatting, illustrates this. He distinguishes five configurations 
based on their different goals: deprivation-based, entrepreneurial, con-
servational, political squatting (in the narrower sense) and squatting as a 
housing strategy.46 By defining a set of possible configurations, the typology 
outlines the possibility space of squatting in the Global North. In practice, 
these configurations overlap, and are rarely present at the same time. This 
might be one reason why Pruijt’s model has been referred to by quite a few 
scholars but has been rarely made productive as an analytical tool so far.47
Two typologies classify informal housing in the Balkans. Sasha 
Tsenkova, scholar of planning and international development, distin-
guishes four types: squatter settlements, settlements for refugees and 
vulnerable people, improved squatter settlements, and illegal subur-
ban subdivisions. She finds that some are of relatively good quality, and 
only two can be classified as substandard.48 Similarly, the four types that 
Suditu and Vâlceanu distinguish in their study point to a similar hetero-
geneity of informal housing in post-socialist Romania.49
While these typologies are developed to systematise existing knowl-
edge, others have been used as starting point for further research. One 
example is a typology of informal tenure in Egypt developed by Ahmed 
Soliman. This expert on architectural engineering distinguishes three 
main types: ‘semi-informal’ (informal residential development on pri-
vately owned agricultural land), ‘squatter settlements’ (development on 
state-owned desert land) and ‘ex-formal’ (illegal construction or develop-
ment on land whose ownership is in doubt). There are also 12 sub-types. 
This refined typology is being used to quantify the occurrence of these 
types in Cairo and Alexandria, providing a more precise understanding of 
the diversity of informal tenure in Egyptian cities.50 In a related project, 
Ahmed Soliman and Hernando de Soto have used this typology to analyse 
the relationship between the housing delivery system and the economic, 
social and political conditions in Greater Cairo, Alexandria and Tanta.51
With reference to Soliman, Mike Davis has drafted a general typol-
ogy of slums, which is, in his own words, ‘an analytic simplification that 
abstracts from locally important features for the sake of global compa-
rability’.52 His candid self-criticism points to a fundamental problem of 
typologies: the more abstract they are, the bigger is the risk of imprecision.
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Architect Nezar AlSayyad has used a typology to contrast the rela-
tionship between squatters and the state in Latin America and the Middle 
East.53 He distinguishes four types of squatting: gradual (spontaneous 
and individual), communal (collective), mobilising (instigated by polit-
ical groups) and generated (organised by authorities in return for elec-
toral gain). Supported by examples from Colombia, Venezuela and Peru, 
AlSayyad suggests that squatting in Latin America, where squatters tend 
to associate their demands with certain political forces and form their 
own voice, is typically of a generated or mobilised type. By contrast, in 
the Middle East, squatting is a ‘gradual, politically unobtrusive process’ 
in which the state remains rather indifferent. Drawing examples from 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, AlSayyad stresses that squatters take advantage 
of the opportunities on offer and invade unused land spontaneously. He 
attributes the different behaviour of squatters in Latin America and the 
Middle East to distinct political cultures – that is, to ‘a broad system of 
values and norms that govern individual and collective conduct within 
the community and toward the state’.54 The dichotomy he suggests is not 
unproblematic, though. Spontaneous land invasions are by no means a 
unique feature of squatting in the Middle East. And the degree of mobili-
sation of Latin American squatters varies widely. AlSayyad’s comparative 
study brings to mind once again that emphasising contrasts bears the risk 
of overgeneralisation.
An example of a typology made productive for a multi-case analysis 
in the Global North has been provided by Robert Gonzàlez, Ibàn Díaz-
Parra and Miguel A. Martínez López.55 In a book chapter on squatted 
social centres (SCCs) in Europe, the authors postulate the existence of 
four configurations. They differentiate abolitionism (anti-capitalist moti-
vation against property), communalism (creation of communal life), 
pragmatism (meeting urgent housing needs) and unitarianism (combi-
nation of all forms of squatting). Their analysis examines the changing 
occurrence of these configurations of SCC in nine European cities over 
several decades. The comparison reveals a diversity of dynamics. In some 
cities, such as Paris and Rome, the first SCCs were mainly concerned with 
housing and paved the way for radical political squatting. In other places, 
such as Madrid and Barcelona, SCCs were initially motivated mainly by 
anti-capitalism and the quest for alternative living; SCCs with the main 
goal of housing emerged only later. Moreover, the comparison confirms 
that different cycles of squatting can be associated with changes in the 
political context, and indicates a trend towards ‘more hybrid or moderate 
forms of squatting over the decades’.56
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In Chapter 3 of this volume, Aguilera and Smart develop a nuanced 
typology of different policies of toleration of informal housing around 
the globe. Their work is also both a result of thorough analysis of existing 
studies and a tool for further investigation.
The last example in this brief survey points to the great potential 
of typologies to open up new perspectives. Jason Jindrich’s comparative 
study of historical informal housing in the US and informal housing in 
different locations in the Global South fascinatingly demonstrates how 
a typology can serve as a tool for comparison and both subvert conven-
tional views and bridge the Global North–South divide.57 Depending on 
the degree of tenure, Jindrich distinguishes five types of squatters (rang-
ing from ‘squatter-owner’ with almost complete assurance of their ten-
ure, to squatters experiencing short ‘fugitive-tenure’, with no aspirations 
of ownership). He then assigns examples from the South (mainly Latin 
America) and from the US to each tenure type. Even if one were to object 
that dimensions of squatting in nineteenth-century US and contemporary 
squatting in Latin America are incommensurable, anecdotal evidence 
no doubt challenges the dominant stereotype of the land- hungry squat-
ter on the US frontier as well as De Soto’s praise of US policies of pre- 
emption. Jindrich’s examples illuminate manifold similarities between 
today’s informal housing in the Global South and past squatting in the 
US. The historical comparison results in a relaxed and unagitated view 
on squatting. Jindrich questions the ‘pathologizing of modern squatter 
colonies in the Global South’ by highlighting the fact that initially squat-
ted neighbourhoods in the US have ‘become indistinguishable from the 
surrounding urban fabric’.58
1.6 Lessons?
At the heart of comparative inquiry there is a genuine curiosity about 
other cultures. At the same time, comparative research often questions 
the laws and institutions (and their related values and practices) at 
home. Comparisons tell us not only something new about another region 
but also about ourselves. More often than not, comparative research is 
motivated by the noble aim of drawing lessons from other experiences 
and to develop ideas for improvement. There is, however, a risk of over-
stepping the mark and/or remaining within the limitations of one’s area 
of expertise. Take as examples Anders Corr’s impressively knowledge-
able book on squatting and rent strikes worldwide, which conceptual-
ises informal housing/squatting predominantly as social protest, or Mike 
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Davis’s somewhat apocalyptic but astute stocktaking of the global ‘infor-
mal proletariat’.59
It might be promising to open up new perspectives by bringing 
‘“Third World” questions to bear on “First World” processes’, as Ananya 
Roy has suggested.60 In this vein, Thomas Aguilera has emphasised the rel-
ative success of onsite interventions by NGOs in the Global South to advo-
cate the normalising and regularising of slums as an alternative to removal 
and rehousing in Northern ‘slums’ (that is, migrant dwellings in Paris and 
Madrid).61 So far, the North seems to be unwilling to learn from the South 
in this regard. Nevertheless, confronting a phenomenon with an equiva-
lent in a different part of the world holds remarkable critical potential.
Even if not every idea falls on sympathetic ears, drawing lessons 
from experiences elsewhere is always worth a try. One differentiated 
example is a study by legal scholar Juanita Pienaar, who draws lessons 
from Latin America for informal housing in South Africa. For this, she 
follows a two-step approach beginning with a comparative exploration 
of informal housing in a few countries with generally similar situations 
but different policies. Starting off with an analysis of land-use planning 
in three Latin American countries and Zimbabwe, Pienaar singles out 
a number of problematic experiences, such as the overly complicated 
and expensive planning procedures in Peru, the lack of supervision in 
Mexico and the exclusion of informal institutions from planning pro-
cesses in Zimbabwe. She attributes the failure of housing projects for 
the poor to the overlooking of factors such as location and urban acces-
sibility. By contrast, she suggests drawing lessons from the Chilean plan-
ning approach, which offers flexible standards, public participation and 
promotion of mixed development, to reorganise and improve the South 
African planning system.62
Knowledge transfer often requires a reflected approach based on 
a critical review of existing terminology. As Rachelle Alterman and Inês 
Calor highlight in Chapter 8 of this volume, the informality concept of the 
Global South is not easily transferable to the North. Both authors discuss 
various challenges and constraints for knowledge transfer from the Global 
South to the North and suggest a differentiated approach. They argue that, 
in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
countries, where actions in the built environment are regulated through 
a closely knit web of land, planning, housing, environmental and other 
laws, the concept of ‘informality’ must be trimmed down to a shape and 
size that can be accommodated within the rule of law.
Another kind of lesson is the type that historical actors learn from 
others. While practices around housing are enrooted in local contexts, 
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by their very nature, there is a certain exchange of ideas and practices, 
particularly in the Global North. Travelling squatters contribute to this 
exchange.63 But perhaps even more important for cross-fertilisation is 
the media. As Bart van der Steen has shown, Dutch squatters provided 
a model for squatters in Germany and elsewhere during the 1970s and 
1980s, but the idea of squatters from Amsterdam instigating riots in 
other cities is a myth. Rather, media played a crucial role in the dissemi-
nation of news.64
In this volume, two case studies explore the transfer of squatting 
practices within the context of the Global North. In Chapter 10, Iain 
McIntyre traces links between squatting actions in Australia and Great 
Britain immediately after the end of the Second World War. In Chapter 
11, Jakob Warnecke analyses the appropriation of typically leftist squat-
ting practices by right-wing activists in Germany during reunification 
and afterwards.
True comparative research is a big challenge, and, in this sense, this 
collection of comparative studies is just another attempt. As the focus of 
this book is on the method, it does not promote or defend any specific 
thesis or concept. Some authors here use the concept of informality as a 
heuristic category. Others turn to notions more suited to the respective 
context, such as squatting, illegal housing or self-help housing. In pursuit 
of a pragmatic approach, most chapters are more explorative than affirm-
ative, and assume a critical stance.
The structure of the book follows a similar logic to that of this intro-
duction. Chapters 1 and 2 set the scene. In Chapter 2, Alan Gilbert makes 
the case for comparative research, based on his experience in Latin 
America. Chapters 3–6 provide examples of paired comparisons, which 
highlight how versatile and productive this approach can be. The authors 
of Chapter 3 devise a typology of policies of toleration, based on a paired 
comparison of informal housing in Paris (which stands for the Global 
North) and Hong Kong (an example of the Global South). Chapter  4 
compares urban squatting in an Eastern communist regime (GDR) and 
a Western democracy (the Netherlands), and challenges stereo types 
about housing in a dictatorship and a democracy, respectively. Chapter 5 
explores the uncharted territory of informal settlements in Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan. The authors of Chapter 6 introduce a rather unconven-
tional angle by comparing squatting movement structures in Spain and 
Brazil (instead of focusing on favelas). Chapters 7 and 8 problematise the 
notion of informal housing from two different angles. While Chapter 7 
engages in a critical discussion of formal and informal housing (with a 
focus on housing in Rio de Janeiro), Chapter 8 explores the intricacies 
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and pitfalls that the use of the notion of ‘informal housing’ entails in the 
Global North, with a particular emphasis on consequences for urban 
planning and judicature. This chapter and Chapter 9, which offers a his-
torical comparison of urban slums in nineteenth-century Europe and 
shanty towns in Africa today, both use comparisons predominantly to dis-
cuss possible lessons for policymakers. Chapters 10 and 11, by contrast, 
explore lessons historical actors have learned. The author of Chapter 
10 examines links between post-war squatting in Britain and Australia, 
while Chapter 11 analyses the adoption of traditionally leftist squatting 
practices by the radical right in Germany.
Many arguments can be raised against comparison. Apart from 
technical obstacles, such as language barriers, geographical distances 
and work in teams, several factors impede global comparisons. The phys-
ical appearance, the persistence and the scale of informal housing differ 
greatly from one place to another. The reactions of the authorities are 
divergent as well. Southern policymakers consider informal housing a 
permanent economic problem, whereas authorities in the North treat 
squatting as a transitory political problem. Different property regimes 
add to the complexity.
Moreover, the variety of notions for housing strategies that do not 
(entirely) comply with the law testify to the diversity of the topic. Apart 
from informal housing, squatting and illegal housing (which are the 
main terms used in this volume), there are many other concepts, such 
as unauthorised housing, unlicensed housing, self-help housing and 
auto-construction, to name just a few. Some can be used interchange-
ably, and others cannot.
Notwithstanding the many obstacles, Thomas Aguilera and Alan 
Smart have suggested ‘developing a more systematic comparative anal-
ysis’ of informal housing around the globe, for instance, ‘by compiling 
well-documented regional studies and subjecting them to rigorous com-
parison’.65 This book takes their appeal to heart.
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Illegal housing: The case 
for comparison
alan Gilbert
2.1 The value of comparative research
Comparative work complicates the task of research, but has the great 
advantage of discouraging overgeneralisation. All too often, academics 
are wont to draw conclusions from experience in a single city – making 
generalisations about the whole of Latin America, for instance, or some-
times about cities across the globe. A major strength of comparative 
research is that it constantly forces the researcher to recognise that every 
city is different. Observation that what happens in one city does not auto-
matically happen in another constantly reminds the researcher to think 
harder about underlying processes. And, when there is a common pattern 
and a similar process across cities, we know for certain what we know.
Comparative work also avoids many of the dangers of transferring 
ideas from one city to another. Models and theories based on a single 
city or country are dangerous, because too many researchers manipulate 
their findings to match the model rather than adapting the model to real-
ity. How many times has urban reality in a poor country been distorted to 
fit a model based on either Burgess’s or Hoyt’s models based on Chicago, 
or the national urban hierarchy criticised because it did not match the 
rank–size rule based on the distribution of cities in the US?
The application of models from one city to another without account-
ing for the differences between them has long been common housing and 
urban planning practice. Has building British-style council estates helped 
solve the housing problems of poor cities elsewhere? And, did building 
the equivalents of British new towns in the Global South help resolve the 
regional problems of those countries?1
 i LLEGaL HoUsinG: tHE CasE for CoMparison 23
Having conducted comparative work on housing and urban prob-
lems since the mid-1970s, I have learned a great deal about the vir-
tues and difficulties of this form of research. My comparative work has 
included studies of informal housing in Bogotá, Mexico City and Valencia 
(Venezuela), rental housing in Caracas, Mexico City and Santiago 
(Chile), backyard renting in Cape Town and Johannesburg, housing sub-
sidy programmes in Chile, Colombia and South Africa, and overviews of 
rental housing in the Global South.2 A few of my doctoral students have 
added to this spread of experience by conducting comparable studies in 
other cities.3
2.2 Illustrations
The kinds of insights that have arisen from my comparative work on 
informal housing that might have been missed using other approaches 
include the following examples.
the form of illegal housing
In his statement orienting the subject matter for the 2017 conference 
‘Comparative Approaches to Informal Housing Around the Globe’, Udo 
Grashoff asked: ‘Why is illegality found in every country of the world but 
is far more common in poorer nations – for example, why are planning 
rules upheld in most developed countries but ignored in the poorer dis-
tricts of low-income cities and sometimes in the richest areas too?’ The 
simplest answer to that question refers to differences in state attitudes, 
which, in turn, are strongly influenced by income levels and the cost 
of land. Governments in developed countries are more able to provide 
social housing, and home owners can obtain finance to buy formal hous-
ing. In poorer countries, informal housing acts as a safety valve. Given 
enormous housing deficits and the state’s inability to house its popula-
tion, a politically expedient way of avoiding conflict and maintaining 
economic growth is to permit informal settlement. Land is a political tool 
used by many clientelist politicians and sometimes even by autocratic 
leaders to keep society ticking over.4 Generally, it has worked to keep 
social protest to a minimum – albeit at the cost of producing large areas 
of semi-serviced, environmentally damaging, peripheral and sometimes 
dangerously located settlements.
The form of informal housing shares many similarities across much 
of Africa, Asia and Latin America and in the last couple of decades even in 
24 CoMparatiVE approaCHEs to inforMaL HoUsinG aroUnd tHE GLobE
Southern Europe and the border areas of the United States.5 These com-
mon elements are that the housing is built on land that lacks title and 
which has often been occupied against the wishes of the owners and/
or the authorities. The land occupied is usually marginal, either in the 
sense of distance from employment and formal housing areas or in terms 
of terrain, too often built on hillsides or close to river courses and liable 
to natural disaster. When occupied, it is typically land of little economic 
value, and not infrequently it is owned by the state.
Homes are typically built through some degree of self-help, with 
the owners organising construction, although very often with the help 
of paid labour and advice from knowledgeable friends and family.6 The 
buildings lack planning permission, and, more importantly, the settle-
ments begin without any services or infrastructure. Electricity, water, 
roads and schools arrive slowly, often the result of petitioning the author-
ities, but delivery is highly dependent on the capacity of the government 
or the private sector to provide those services. The occupants of these set-
tlements are universally poor, but, contradicting conventional wisdom, 
are usually people who have lived for some time in the city. New migrants 
typically rent accommodation or share the homes of longer-established 
kin. Some self-help settlements are undoubtedly ‘slums’, but many 
more, particularly in Latin America, are zones with a proven capacity for 
improvement.7 The fact that brick-built homes with most kinds of service 
and infrastructure dominate in once-flimsy settlements is testament to 
that fact. I dislike the term ‘slum’ and would encourage readers to avoid 
it as far as possible, because it denigrates all who live in poor settlements 
and conjures up all kinds of negative stereotypes.8
The similarities between informal settlements conceal many signifi-
cant differences. My comparative work in Latin America and South Africa 
has helped demonstrate that the means by which the poor obtain land dif-
fer considerably between countries and even between cities in the same 
country. In Venezuela, the invasion of land has long been very common; 
but in Bogotá, Mexico DF and Quito, invasions have seldom been permit-
ted and illegal subdivisions have long been the normal method of acquir-
ing land; in Santiago, land invasions were common up to 1973, but have 
been rigorously opposed ever since.9 The specific form of land occupation 
that develops in any city depends on the local pattern of land ownership, 
the price of peripheral land, the attitude of the political authorities, the 
political organisation of the poor, the physical nature of the terrain and 
the pace of urban growth. The differences in forms of land occupation 
between Bogotá, Mexico City and Valencia (Venezuela) in the 1970s, and 
indeed the variations within them, are apparent in Figure 2.1.
 i LLEGaL HoUsinG: tHE CasE for CoMparison 25
Figure 2.1 Varying forms of irregular land occupation in Bogotá, 
Mexico City and Valencia. Source: Alan Gilbert and Peter M. Ward, 
Housing, the State and the Poor: Policy and Practice in Three Latin 
American Cities © Cambridge University Press, 1985. Reprinted with 
permission.
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In his original statement relating to the June 2017 conference, Udo 
Grashoff asked: ‘What can we learn from comparisons of illegal housing 
construction at the outskirts of, say, Warsaw, Izmir and Buenos Aires?’10 
My research suggests that the processes determining the form of illegal 
housing are locally defined. The building manual in Bogotá is stored in 
the heads of local bricklayers and plumbers. They build their own houses 
using the techniques they have learned on the local building sites. They 
then pass on that knowledge to friends and relations, often using their 
own skills to help others build their homes. Because skills are learned 
locally, they are culturally specific. This explains why self-help housing 
in many Chilean cities looks very different from that in Caracas, Lima 
or Rio. One housing minister in Chile told me that the wooden self-help 
homes in Santiago are the outcome of local know-how; while, in other 
parts of Latin America, people have experience of building in brick, ‘here 
in Chile we are carpenters’. The same presumably applies in South Africa 
where virtually the whole of Khayelitsha settlement in Cape Town is built 
of wood and corrugated iron; virtually everything is single- storey.11 No 
doubt lower per-capita incomes explain something of the difference, but 
local know-how appears to be the key factor.
rental housing
Much of the literature and most government policy documents generally 
assume that in developed countries most people own their homes. How-
ever, comparison soon reveals some notable exceptions. In 2016, owners 
accounted for only 43 per cent of households in Switzerland and 52 per 
cent in Germany.12 In the largest cities, very few Germans or Swiss own 
their own homes: 11 per cent in Berlin, 14 per cent in Geneva and 23 per 
cent in Zurich.13 Today, rates of ownership are sometimes even falling; 
in the US, the proportion of owner households fell to a 50-year low of 62 
per cent during 2016.14 In major cities of that bastion of home ownership, 
tenant households sometimes constituted a substantial majority: in New 
York and Los Angeles, 69 per cent and 62 per cent respectively.15
In developed countries, most wealthy people own their home while 
poorer groups rent or share. By analogy, because most people in poor 
countries are poor, logic would suggest that the majority should rent. 
However, this is not the case. Rates of home ownership in most of the 
poorer countries in the world tend to be higher than that in many devel-
oped countries: 87 per cent in Thailand, 73 per cent in Chile and 81 per 
cent in Mexico, compared with 63 per cent in the UK.16 In much of Africa 
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and Asia, the dominance of ownership is largely due to the higher pro-
portion of people living in the countryside; few people in rural areas 
rent their home, they typically live in flimsy self-help housing. In highly 
urbanised regions, such as Latin America, and in many cities in Africa 
and Asia, people occupy their own homes, the result of illegal or irregular 
forms of settlement.
Within poorer cities, the assumption that most of the rich own and 
the poor rent or share is undermined by the process of illegal settlement. 
Recent figures from Latin America show that ownership, whether for-
mally documented or not, tends to be the preserve of both the better-off 
and the poorest.17 The rich have access to mortgage financing and the 
poor are prepared to live in self-help housing. It tends to be younger fam-
ilies with middling incomes that rent. While incremental housing is ubiq-
uitous in the Global South, it is not an option that is available equally 
to every family. In some cities, governments prevent access to public 
land, the usual target of land invaders, and in other cities, private own-
ers protect their land from invasion. In many cities in China, India and 
Zimbabwe, the eviction of self-help settlers is commonplace.18
In apartheid South Africa, evictions were frequent and land inva-
sions were prohibited. After 1985, however, the state lost control of the 
‘African’ townships and land invasions became common. Similarly, in 
Chile, land invasions were common in the 1950s and increased in num-
ber up to 1970 when the main political parties encouraged their sup-
porters to occupy land as a means of acquiring votes in an increasingly 
fevered election campaign.19 The military government that removed the 
socialist administration of Salvador Allende in 1973 was determined to 
prevent future invasions.
The availability of free land has an important effect on tenure 
choice. In the metropolitan areas of Brazil, the proportion of home own-
ers ranges from a high of 74 per cent in Belém and Manaus, where inva-
sions have been possible, to a low of 48 per cent in the Federal District, 
where they have long been prohibited.20 In Ecuador, land invasions are 
common in lowland Guayaquil but infrequent in highland Quito. The 
result is that many more poor people live in their own house in Guayaquil 
than in Quito (Figure 2.2). Ownership among the poor (deciles one and 
two) is higher among the poor than among the rich in the former, but the 
pattern is reversed in the latter.
Comparison shows that generalisation can be dangerous and that 
satisfactory explanations of tenure patterns demand knowledge of local 
house price/income ratios, land markets, mortgage systems and state 
policy. Recent experience in England also suggests that tenure patterns 
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can change quickly over time; the rate of home ownership fell from a 
peak of 71 per cent in 2003 to 63 per cent 10 years later.21 If house prices 
rise much faster than incomes, aspirant owners are forced to remain as 
tenants or sharers.
Landlord and tenant
Unlike the stereotypical view of the British or North American slumlord, 
and the reality of large-scale landlordism in a ‘Third World’ city such as 
Nairobi, few landlords across the globe seem to own many properties.22 
But the nature of landlords varies considerably. In some countries, like 
Germany, commercial companies own much of the rental stock, and in 
other parts of Europe various forms of social housing are important.23 The 
small landlord is a significant presence everywhere but dominant in Latin 
American cities. And, while a few landlords are prosperous, landlords are 
drawn from every social class and a majority are poor. The only common 
ingredient among landlords is that they tend to be older than their ten-
ants, many relying on the rental income to finance their retirement.
The form of rental housing also varies considerably. The better-off 
typically let flats in formal housing areas. Poorer landlords tend to live in 
self-help areas and many accommodate tenants in rooms or flats created 
in their own home. Many parts of consolidated self-help in Bogotá con-
tain more tenants than owners.24 In some places, however, the landlord 
rents out space in the backyard. As noted earlier, this was commonplace 
in Chile when the military regime banned land invasions and removed 
many of the existing settlements25 and in South African cities during, and 
since, the apartheid regime.26 But informal renting has also developed 
in a variety of forms elsewhere: in the backyard council homes of South 
Figure 2.2 Home owners in Ecuador by household income decile. 
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Africa, in the informal settlements of Tanzania and Kenya and in the 
rented plots in India (thika tenants).27
If, as it appears, tenants are almost universally younger than own-
ers or landlords, valid generalisations then begin to break down. In social 
housing, many tenants are elderly. In the past, most migrants to cities 
moved into rental accommodation, but, where city-ward migration has 
continued over several decades, new arrivals already know someone in 
the city with whom they can stay. But even then, differences appear. In 
West Africa and in Mexico, space is normally found for relatives. But, in 
Bogotá, young adults are more likely to rent rooms. In Santiago, allegados 
(sharers) are almost always relatives;28 in Soweto, South Africa, most are 
strangers.29
Common values
Returning to Udo Grashoff’s pre-conference statement, he also asked 
whether squatting is ‘a devious route to Capitalism? To what extent is 
the goal of informal housing in Latin America to acquire property rights? 
Is the squatters’ attitude to property different in the South (and perhaps 
East) and in the North-West?’30 My research suggests that most people 
want to acquire property across the globe and that attitudes in Latin 
America are most certainly pro-ownership. When I have included the 
question in surveys, the poor have answered universally that they want 
to be owners. When I posed this question to owners in poor settlements 
in Bogotá, few had any doubts that ownership was a good thing.31 One 
owner spoke proudly of the ‘glory of the house’, another asserted that 
‘he who has a house is a king’ and a third claimed that ‘anything pur-
chased is worth it’. When presented with a list of the specific advantages 
of ownership, two answers dominated the replies: 60 per cent referred 
either to the benefit that ownership brought in terms of having some-
thing to leave to the children or to the security that it offered for one’s 
old age. As one owner put it, ‘for those with nothing, to have a secure 
roof for oneself and the children is a good investment’. Their replies 
were similar to those one might expect from owners in Britain. Is owner-
ship a universal value? When I have talked with ministers of housing in 
Latin America about a policy for renting, they have frequently suggested 
that I do not understand local cultural values – everyone wants to own! 
This is as integral to Brazilian, Chilean or Colombian culture as it is to 
that of the British. Elsewhere, I dispute that opinion, arguing that the 
desire for ownership has largely been created by governments and the 
construction industry.32 Governments have offered subsidies and cheap 
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mortgages to aspirant owners. ‘The virtues of ownership have also been 
peddled by commerce, advertising and the building industry. It is part of 
the consumer society that promises everyone a home, a car and a televi-
sion, and one that in an environment of rising house prices offers gener-
ous economic rewards.’33 In any case, as I have already shown, wanting 
to own and the ability to do so are not the same thing. And what are we 
to make of Germany, where some of the world’s most materialistic citi-
zens are content to park their BMWs and Mercedes outside their rented 
homes – or the Swiss, who hang their cuckoo clocks on rented walls?34 
The desire for a secure, safe and comfortable home is universal and is 
not the same thing as home ownership. Even superficial comparisons 
demonstrate that fact.
Learning from others
Grashoff asks whether ‘squatters in different parts of the world learn 
from each other? To what extent is there a global transfer of experiences 
and practices?’35 My answer is that such learning is rare. Organisers of 
informal and illegal housing settlements are opportunistic and seldom 
students of what happens elsewhere. Indeed, there are few possibilities, 
and little time and money, for them to do so. They rarely, if ever, attend 
international conferences to compare notes. And would they learn much 
if they did? Informal housing developers need to understand the nature 
and dynamics of the local land market and what the authorities will tol-
erate or even encourage. Is there a local politician who wants to obtain 
support, who will persuade the police to turn a blind eye if an invasion 
takes place? Clientelism and populism play a key role in permitting infor-
mal settlement, and local circumstances count for everything.
Grashoff also asks whether ‘it would be interesting to test existing 
attempts to systematise illegal housing (such as typologies) which work 
well in certain regions regarding their usefulness in different parts of the 
world’.36 In general, my answer to this is positive. Indeed, it is current 
practice for UN Habitat, Cities Alliance, the multilateral development 
banks and numerous NGOs to include other cities’ experiences (with 
upgrading, titling and general housing policy) in their advisory and loan 
programmes.37 But, of course, there are dangers with the communication 
of such knowledge. De Soto’s trumpeting of the idea that giving infor-
mal settlers title deeds will automatically solve the problem of shelter in 
poor cities constitutes a very simplistic approach.38 Similarly, employing 
the typology of the slum is less than helpful insofar as it can stigmatise 
groups already marginalised in many ways by policymakers.39
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But, even when experience elsewhere would be useful, many of 
those who design policies fail to study that experience. While the inter-
national advice is that evicting informal settlers should be avoided in 
most cases, because it tends to make the housing situation worse, gov-
ernments in China, India, Zimbabwe and several others have proceeded 
to evict thousands of such people.40
It is also true that, even when they accept advice in designing their 
housing and urban policies, most authorities in the South have tended 
to look in the wrong places. I have long complained that the authori-
ties in the Global South tend only to consider experience in the Global 
North. The list of transfers is long: architectural tastes (for example, 
English style, then Californian, more recently postmodern); master plans 
designed by influential European architect–planners like Karl Brunner, 
Le Corbusier and Otto Koenigsburger; social housing for rent, new cities 
(Abuja, Brasilia, Ciudad Guayana, Dodoma and Islamabad); and shop-
ping malls, fast-food restaurants, gated communities and CCTV cameras 
(virtually everywhere).
Few lessons have been learned from places where conditions are 
similar. It is only recently that learning from appropriate sources has 
become more common in the planning field. The spread of Bus Rapid 
Transit systems from Curitiba to Bogotá and thence to cities in China, 
Mexico, South Africa and even to Europe and North America is a rela-
tively new and generally welcome phenomenon.41
2.3 Meaningful comparison
A major problem facing comparative research is the danger of superficial-
ity; it is difficult to steer a safe path between the desire for generalisation 
and the need for detail. Sufficient detail can only be assured by con-
ducting case studies ‘in-depth’, something which ‘is difficult to do … on 
more than a few cases’.42 Apart from anything else, too many case studies 
simply produce too much information to assimilate. Even if the material 
can be understood by the researcher, it is difficult to convey the neces-
sary details to a reader without writing at far too great a length. Only 
by exceeding the tolerance of most publishers is it possible to provide 
enough explanation for the reader to understand the processes operating 
at the individual city level while concentrating on cross-city comparisons.
LSE Cities, part of the London School of Economics, has compiled 
detailed statistics on the form and structure of a number of cities across 
the world. They argue that: ‘Behind the statistics of global city growth 
32 CoMparatiVE approaCHEs to inforMaL HoUsinG aroUnd tHE GLobE
lie very different patterns of urbanisation, with diverse spatial, social 
and economic characteristics that dramatically affect the urban experi-
ence’.43 Given such variations, any comparative study faces a fundamen-
tal question: what is the basis of a good comparison? In my opinion, some 
comparisons make sense, whereas others do not. In general, it seems sen-
sible to concentrate on similar rather than totally dissimilar phenomena 
or processes. The principal reason for making a comparison is to shed 
light on how some common process produces different kinds of results in 
different places, or to examine why different processes produce similar 
results. If both processes and results differ, is there much point in the 
comparison? If, for example, we were to compare the housing situation 
of New Yorkers with that of Australian aborigines living in the Outback, 
would we learn anything very useful about housing or homelessness?
In this regard, I differ profoundly in my view from the authors of 
more recent efforts at comparative urban research insofar as they are too 
eager to compare like with unlike. For example, Robinson’s argument 
that ‘the comparative gesture can be applied to all cities as long as a rigor-
ous methodology is adopted in the comparison conducted’ is inherently 
risky.44 Dupont et al. advocate a similar argument: ‘We adopt the same 
approach as other scholars engaged in comparative urban research … 
by rejecting the position of incommensurability: the often unarticulated 
assumption that no comparison is possible across cities that are regarded 
as substantially differentiated not only by their levels of development, 
but also by cultural or policy context, economic system or political envi-
ronment’.45 Fortunately, they did not follow that premise when conduct-
ing their own research; their own urban examples – Rio de Janeiro, Cape 
Town, Chennai, Delhi, Durban and Lima – share many commonalities.
My own approach has consistently followed Abu Lughod’s advice 
that there must always be a basis for ‘legitimate comparison’.46 In com-
paring three North African cities, she looked ‘first at what they have 
in common, then at the major differences among them, and, finally, at 
the common processes (applied in variable degrees) which have led to 
the wide and very real differences which we now find’.47 As such, I find 
Robinson’s advice problematic, viz: ‘A very important analytical change 
in defining a new repertoire of comparative practice is to abandon the 
hopeless effort to apply a quasi-scientific rigour to case selection based on 
attempting to control for difference across cities’.48 Perhaps perversely, 
given their earlier comment on the issue, Dupont et al. made strenuous 
efforts to compare like with like in their own comparative study.49 My own 
preference for ‘quasi-scientific’ rigour remains strong, and I commend 
the efforts of several scholars for persisting in this ‘hopeless’ effort.50
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Conducting comparative research is a complicated process and 
the term is often used to disguise many superficial efforts at comparing 
cities.51 It most certainly does not include what Ragin calls ‘extensive, 
variable-oriented work’.52 While I have conducted just such work in inter-
national overviews, they do not constitute what I consider to be proper 
comparative research. My preferred method is to look in depth at a lim-
ited number of broadly similar cities in the style of Abu Lughod’s earlier 
recommendation. How best to do this is not easy to resolve.53 A key deci-
sion involves whether to use one team or several. The main advantage of 
using local teams is that the researchers already know a great deal about 
their own cities and often have ready-made contacts in the bureaucracy 
and in the settlements. Being known in the city is a great advantage, at 
least in those cities where there are not great schisms based on politics, 
race, religion or ideology. For an outsider, particularly a foreigner, get-
ting to know a city takes time.
However, it would be wrong to pretend that there are not difficulties 
with this approach. First, the use of separate teams, while clearly bring-
ing major advantages, does complicate the task of coordination and can 
bring conflict. I remember one sticky patch in a comparative study of Chile, 
Mexico and Venezuela over the methodology to be employed; differences 
over the balance between a quantitative approach and a more anthropo-
logical approach led to arguments. A modus vivendi might not have been 
established at all without our having shared a few drinks. There were also 
some differences with respect to policy formulation; we had a lively debate 
in our final meeting about whether a common policy could be devised for 
cities as distinctive as Caracas, Santiago and Mexico City.
A further problem is that each team is seldom as interested in the 
comparative element of the research as in the part relating to their own 
city. Why study something that is of minor importance in my city even if it 
is critical elsewhere? In conducting my research, I have usually relied, in 
part, on surveys, often employing separate teams, but always following a 
similar approach and employing a similar questionnaire in each city. The 
questionnaire would vary to reflect different conditions in each city, but 
would ensure that similar kinds of information were collected in each city. 
Unless this was carefully controlled, different local situations and differ-
ent team interests would produce substantially different data sets, making 
comparison impossible. Each team was permitted to add some questions 
to the survey, but none was allowed to eliminate any of the questions 
being asked elsewhere. They also had to use a similar method for selecting 
survey settlements and sampling within them. However, they were given 
sufficient resources to pick an additional settlement or two to reflect major 
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differences within their city. This approach meant that we could collect 
broadly comparable survey data across the three cities.
2.4 Conclusion
Despite the many methodological difficulties it poses, I have no doubt 
that comparative research is essential. It is intellectually stimulating 
because it forces the researcher to eschew simple statements of process 
by demonstrating either that in another city the same phenomenon is 
explained by different processes or that different phenomena are brought 
about by the same process. Comparison creates confusion, but it is crea-
tive confusion. It forces any investigator to think harder than they would 
have done otherwise. It certainly discourages what Walton and Masotti 
call ‘parochialism’.54
Comparison is, of course, no guarantee of good research, but inso-
far as it tends to discourage the facile conclusion, it is a strong stimulus 
to better research. If the researcher can avoid the temptation to conclude 
either that cities are wholly similar or that they are completely different, 
the full virtue of the comparative method is revealed.
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Towards a political economy  
of toleration of illegality: Comparing 
tolerated squatting in Hong Kong  
and Paris
alan smart and thomas aguilera
3.1 Introduction
In a previous collaborative publication, we lamented the lack of dialogue 
between those who study and work with squatters in the Global North 
and South. In addition to identifying ideas that cross-fertilisation could 
contribute, we sketched a research agenda for achieving productive dia-
logues.1 In this chapter, we make inroads on this agenda by developing 
analytical tools for comparison: specifically, a typology of forms of toler-
ation. If illegal squats and slums are not always comparable in the Global 
North and South in terms of history, development, population or archi-
tecture, we think that their public management has more similarities.
Toleration of practices considered illegal by a government places 
them in a grey zone; they are allowed to continue without being made 
legal.2 Toleration produces a space of shadows where a practice is nei-
ther actively repressed nor integrated into dominant norms and laws. 
Toleration opens space for self-management, where actors mutually 
adjust to avoid conflicts while preserving their own interests.3 This space 
may be temporary but can continue and stabilise situations around the 
‘status quo’ and may finally be institutionalised.4 Toleration condenses 
political, economic and social interests into a distinctive form of power, 
often quietly. Power has different faces.5 One consists of imposing and 
enforcing rules, for instance; another lets things happen without polit-
ical decision; a third facilitates and guides people’s behaviours without 
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imposing strong rules, but rather encouraging them to do something.6 
Focusing on toleration does not propose neglect of the other effects of 
policies: of course, squatters are repressed and evicted.7 They are also 
sometimes selectively rehoused in legal settlements and housing.8 
However, toleration is a key element of informal housing in diverse situa-
tions. Its importance has been recognised, but has not received the close 
analytical and comparative attention we undertake here.
Toleration has many different meanings, diverse enough that one 
must wonder if the same thing is being discussed. The key goal of this 
chapter is to begin to identify and describe different types of toleration 
and their consequences. Toleration can be explicit and bound by clear 
rules, even if those rules conflict with formal laws. Or it can be implicit 
and problematic to the extent that no one wants to make the practice 
public or open. Given such variations, our goal here is to propose a typol-
ogy of toleration to facilitate comparative perspectives on informal hous-
ing and other kinds of extra-legality.
Comparing two cases, Paris and Hong Kong, we identify key differ-
ences between types of toleration. Even in one city, toleration varies in 
time, space and scope.9 Toleration is rarely found in isolation from other 
forms of regulation, nor is it commonly stable. Instead, it is often coupled 
with repression (to prevent uncontrolled expansion of informal housing) 
and selective legalisation.10 Toleration is situated between eradication/
demolition and legalisation, but is simultaneously entangled with, and 
influenced by, those other types of regulation.
A useful typology needs conceptualisation so that a set of relatively 
distinct types can be identified, rather than an incommensurate set of 
categories loosely tied together by a common name. Initially, our collab-
oration risked being the latter, as we started thinking about a typology of 
toleration from our own distinct field and disciplinary perspectives. Our 
working hypothesis is that, before we can explain why governments tol-
erate informal housing, we need to understand in more detail how they 
tolerate.
At the beginning of our investigations, we both began from the ques-
tion of the persistence of squatting, respectively in Hong Kong and Paris. 
Smart conducted several years of ethnographic research between 1982 
and 2001 on the development, lived experience, regulation, clearance 
and resettlement of squatters in Hong Kong. He was particularly struck 
by the continued existence of squatters, in a context where they seemed 
doomed to eradication due to the high value of and demand for the land 
they occupied, combined with the apparent absence of restraints on the 
authoritarian colonial government. He first explained this phenomenon 
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in local terms: what accounted for the continued occupation of valuable 
land, despite the government’s interest in regaining control? A series of 
papers then sought general explanations for why illegal activities per-
sist.11 While his analysis sprang from fieldwork in Hong Kong and later in 
post-reform China, it also involved wide reading about illegality to iden-
tify diverse reasons for why states so regularly fail to end illegal activities. 
This effort produced a typology of five different fundamental, but not 
mutually exclusive, reasons for illegal persistence.12
Asking why European cities were still squatted at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, Aguilera addressed the issue of the governabil-
ity of squatters. He showed that informality was co-produced by public 
policies that alternately repressed, legalised and tolerated it.13 Through 
a comparative ethnographic political economy of the relationships 
between administrations and squatters, he examined why squatting was 
tolerated. Going beyond the idea that toleration results from government 
failure, he explored the extent to which this triptych was inseparable and 
examined the different kinds of outcomes that variation in these options 
produces. There is toleration and even legalisation when some condi-
tions combine. When squatters develop socio-cultural projects – when 
they negotiate with bureaucrats and officials and do not become militant 
on global issues – they can be tolerated and sometimes legalised.14 He 
identified conditional mechanisms to explain distinct outcomes: long-
term or short-term legalisation, inaction, deportation and eviction.
As we realised that we were asking the same questions, using com-
mon conceptual tools and observing strong commonalities in Europe and 
Asia, we decided to confront the diversities of toleration and the polit-
ical economies of public management of squatters. This chapter brings 
together Smart’s exploration of toleration with Aguilera’s work on the 
political strategies for governing squatting. In the first section, we pres-
ent the questions we asked to operationalise our effort to bring together 
somewhat disparate research approaches. Then, we present the Hong 
Kong and Paris cases and compare them. Finally, we conclude with a dis-
cussion of the implications of the comparison.
3.2 Comparing toleration of squatting in the Global 
North and the Global South
In this chapter, we try to use the same concepts to talk about the toler-
ation of squatters in Europe and Asia. Doing so requires precautions to 
control the comparison of what might be considered as incomparable by 
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some scholars.15 We see two major preliminary tasks required to develop 
a useful typology of different forms of toleration.
First, we are not writing in a vacuum. As explained in the introduc-
tion, toleration has been studied as one of the forms of public manage-
ment of squatting, and we believe it is useful to approach the important 
spectrum between repression and legalisation as varying degrees of 
repression and encouragement. If, at one extreme, we have the rare situ-
ation of complete suppression of informal housing, at the other we have 
the complete erasure of any distinction between housing that was ini-
tially built or occupied illegally and those units developed legally. Both 
extremes are rare, and share the absence of any toleration of illegality in 
housing. The types of toleration discussed in the case studies can be set 
out along this spectrum, beginning with complete repression and moving 
towards full legalisation. Since both repression and full legalisation are 
the two poles from which toleration is absent, starting with a spectrum 
between them is useful.
The second task is to identify factors that seem to influence which 
forms of toleration apply in particular times, places and contexts. Based 
on our empirical research and the abundant literature, we have seven 
questions that help us with our comparison:
• Who tolerates? Actors and their relationships matter. Many actors 
intervene in the governance of squatting: courts, political par-
ties, national or local governments and supranational authorities 
(European Union/EU) or NGOs, private landowners and, above 
all, the squatters themselves who participate in local governance.16
• Who is tolerated? Types of target matter. There is an important 
diversity of squatters (in terms of resources, goals, sociological 
profiles, activities and so on)17 that elicits a broad range of reac-
tions from public authorities, including differences in terms of tol-
eration. In some countries, people who are clients of a politician 
or party are protected when they invade land, while non-clients 
are repressed.18 Sometimes, exemptions are made for war veterans 
or the disabled. Often, the elite are able to realise unauthorised 
building with impunity.19
• What is tolerated? Details matter. We distinguish between situa-
tions where all kinds of structure are equally tolerated (unrestricted 
toleration) and those where only specific constructions are accepted 
(restricted toleration). The details of what kinds of construction are 
more accepted by authorities (such as mobile homes or tents that 
can be displaced without demolition) will vary from case to case.
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• Where might squatters be tolerated? Space matters. Geogra-
phers and anthropologists have shown that squatters are pushed 
towards the suburbs, where they are supposed to be more tol-
erated, at least for a while, even in Europe.20 Squatters’ location 
influences the political agenda and the types of political reac-
tions.21 The question of where squatting is tolerated results in var-
iations – from the absence of any distinctions between different 
places (open toleration), which very rarely (if ever) applies, to the 
much more common situation in which unauthorised construction 
or occupation is tolerated in particular kinds of space (abandoned 
and decrepit buildings or marginal, un-serviced land on steep hill-
sides, in marshes or on the floodplains of rivers, or land owned by 
political opponents). Geographic discrimination usually privileges 
the powerful, facilitating encroachment on common land by land-
lords, for example, or tolerating the fencing-off of public land in 
areas where the mansions of the powerful border national parks or 
beaches. Places matter.
• When is it tolerated? Time and political cycles matter.22 The mat-
ter of when squatting is tolerated reveals a distinction between 
regimes: timing may be irrelevant (atemporal toleration) or, con-
versely, there may be periods during which squatting is more likely 
to be accepted or a blind eye is turned. In more mobile illegalities, 
such as street vending,23 this contrast may vary over the daily or 
weekly cycle so that the illegal activity is more tolerated when it is 
less in conflict with traffic or other uses (off-peak toleration), but 
this is unlikely in the case of housing. Here, the difference seems 
to operate on a longer timescale. There are some periods when 
squatters have better chances of being tolerated, such as during 
electoral campaigns or economic crises. Generally speaking, in 
some parts of the world, squatting seems less repressed during 
economic downturns, when unemployment is higher and land 
or buildings are in less active market demand. We can call this 
type ‘downturn toleration’ or ‘slump toleration’. By contrast, in 
Europe, it seems the recent economic crisis (combined with waves 
of migration) has provoked increasing eviction, because govern-
ments fear an invasion of refugees and a saturated labour market. 
There are also protective measures, such as in France, whereby 
the law officially forbids evictions in winter (although this prohib-
ition is usually flouted). During electoral campaigns, right-wing 
pol icymakers may evict high numbers of squatters to secure votes 
for their side. Left-wingers often prefer evicting at the beginning 
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of their mandate. There are also patterns where temporal vari-
ation is not cyclical, but follows a more linear path. Frontiers 
are often settled by squatters without property rights – as in the 
American West and the Amazon – but, once developed or incor-
porated within conventional administrations, a strong property 
rights regime is usually installed. Governments may also grant 
such rights to those who had previously squatted.
• Why are squatters tolerated? Rationalities matter. We refer here 
to the rationalities of toleration. Asking why obliges us to find 
causal mechanisms that push some actors to accept the presence 
of squatters. A political economy perspective says that actors have 
interests to act beyond legal constraints. We explore such interests 
and ask how they are defended. At this point, we can defer to the 
labels developed for the typology of persistent illegalities.24 Market 
toleration occurs when governments acknowledge the inability of 
enforcement to end lucrative markets where demand is strong, and 
thereby do not devote the resources that would be necessary to 
control them. Ambiguous toleration is where the public considers 
legitimate an activity that the government defines as being  il legal, 
such as informal transportation in some Southern countries or 
smoking cannabis in many Northern countries. Toleration here is 
the result of reluctance to anger citizens or voters who do not want 
to see resources used to clamp down on practices they do not think 
should be illegal in the first place. Managed toleration applies to 
situations where governments benefit from an illegal activity (for 
instance, being able to exploit undocumented migrants who can 
be deported at any time, thereby generating revenues from taxing 
the companies that profit from them). In Paris, the Municipality 
enjoys electoral and political advantage by tolerating artists who 
contribute to the vibrancy of neighbourhoods.
• How is it tolerated? Strategies and implementation matter. Exam-
ining the question of how squatting is tolerated enquires into the 
processes involved in producing toleration, such as the strategies 
used by both public administrations and squatters, as well as the 
tools employed to tolerate practices normally forbidden. How 
squatting is tolerated also brings us into the domain of effective-
ness, since some procedural approaches are less likely than others 
to achieve the goals of the regulators. The ubiquitous problem of 
unintended consequences is also closely linked to how regulatory 
goals are pursued.
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Based on these seven questions, we examine successively Hong Kong 
and Paris, before comparing them. It might be objected that two cases 
is inadequate for such an endeavour, since they lack sufficient diversity. 
However, this assumes that each case represents only a single pattern. 
Instead, what we have found is that there is considerable difference over 
time in any location. These variations offer insights into patterns and pro-
cesses, which, in turn, generate a matrix. Using only our own empirical 
research, this matrix has many empty cells, which this book helps to fill.
3.3 Hong Kong: Toleration as balancing government 
property interests with the need for housing
This section outlines the context, then isolates several key forms of toler-
ation for closer analysis.25 Housing has always been scarce and expensive 
relative to income in Hong Kong, but got out of control after the Sec-
ond World War and the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 
1949. The population in June 1949 was 1,857,027, up from 600,000 in 
1945; by 1950, it might have been 2.4 million. Legal housing could not 
meet the massive demand. The number of residents per domestic floor (a 
subdivided apartment originally intended for one family) was 18.144 in 
1950, compared to 16.428 in 1939 and 9.05 in 1934. By the end of 1949, 
the number of squatters had risen to 300,000 from 45,430 in June 1949. 
The number peaked in 1982 at about 800,000.26
Before the 1954 Squatter Resettlement Programme, the main effort 
was to eradicate illegal occupation of land and illegal building on agri-
cultural land. Squatters increased in number not because of a positive 
desire to tolerate them, but due to insufficient administrative capacity 
to destroy illegal structures or to facilitate the construction of afford able 
housing. We can call this situation ‘repressive incapacity’. It is concep-
tually situated close to the repression pole of our spectrum of (non-)
toleration. However, after China objected to the neglect of squatter fire 
victims in 1951, and a riot broke out when their comfort mission to the 
homeless was stopped at the border, a pattern we call ‘reluctant tolera-
tion’ emerged. Basically, those who were able to build and occupy their 
squatter dwellings before discovery were allowed to stay until the land 
was needed for development. The government was constrained in its use 
of uncompensated demolition by resistance and by the threat that vio-
lence could destabilise the geopolitical situation, in a context where an 
anti-imperialist Communist Party was in power just across a border seen 
as indefensible. The CCP rejected Britain’s claims to Hong Kong as the 
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product of an ‘unequal treaty’, but tolerated the colony for its economic 
and political advantages ‘until the appropriate time’, unless the British 
abused its Chinese subjects.27
Between 1949 and 1954, the Hong Kong government experimented 
with various policies and programmes to deal with squatters and regain 
control over scarce urban space. Efforts from 1952 onwards at aided 
self-help in the form of licensed areas (regulated self-help housing) and 
cottage areas (small stone houses) could not solve the problem, because 
the low-rise format of these homes meant they produced less housing 
than they displaced. After a series of massive squatter fires, a solution 
was finally adopted comprising seven-storey public housing blocks pre-
senting very low amenities and high density. This lead to the Squatter 
Resettlement Programme, which, after the 1966 and 1967 riots, was 
transformed into a broad low-income public housing system that now 
houses about 45 per cent of the population. Given the high value of land 
in Hong Kong, and its centrality to government revenues (because all 
land is government owned and leased out), officials avoided any situa-
tion whereby squatters could believe they had property rights, or could 
effectively claim squatters’ rights through ‘adverse possession’. The 
solution was to resettle occupants of squatter dwellings, not ‘owners’. A 
situation developed in which, if a squatter house was erected, and furni-
ture and family members moved in, it was provisionally tolerated. Such 
toleration ended if the government needed the land, or if the occupants 
were discovered to have rebuilt using permanent materials or expanded 
the building envelope.28 At various times, all squatter structures were 
surveyed and registered, and more were officially tolerated until the 
land was needed for development. This survey was always declared to 
be a final amnesty, after which any new squatters would not be eligible 
for permanent public housing, instead receiving – at best – a space in a 
licensed area (later called ‘temporary housing’). However, the govern-
ment’s continuing inability to prevent the growth of existing and new 
squatter areas meant there were repeated ‘last’ amnesties, until 1984. We 
characterise these patterns as ‘conditional toleration’: squatters are toler-
ated if they meet certain conditions. The emphasis in Hong Kong was on 
‘when’: the timing of the moving-in, of the survey of the structure, and of 
the temporal limitation of ‘only until’ the land was needed.
The regulatory regime changed fundamentally in 1984 when a sur-
vey of all squatter occupants was conducted. Subsequently, only those 
who had been registered in this survey were eligible for resettlement 
in permanent public housing. Combined with the effective end to new 
squatting, this created an institutional ‘ratchet’ in which the number 
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of squatters who were eligible for rehousing could only go down, not 
up.29 We call this ‘exclusionary toleration’. This shift challenged the idea 
of avoiding registering squatters to prevent any appearance of prop-
erty ownership or squatters’ rights, and was made possible by political 
changes related to the 1984 agreement to hand Hong Kong over to China 
in 1997.30 However, other factors also came into play. The squatters’ 
potential for resistance to clearance without rehousing, combined with 
the vulnerable geopolitics of a British colony on the margin of communist 
China, meant that, in the 1950s, resettling them in housing of minimal 
space (96 sq. ft. for a family of six) and amenities (shared bathroom and 
kitchen facilities) was the easiest way for the government to achieve its 
ends. Toleration of squatters prior to resettlement also helped preserve 
social and diplomatic stability. Yet the government resisted adopting the 
eventual solution. It took a series of disasters to teach it that resettlement 
in multi-storey public housing was the best way to resolve the dilemma.31
The key issue around Hong Kong’s treatment of squatters is that, 
unlike much of the Global South, it has never legalised informal housing. 
The government’s persistence has always taken the form of toleration 
without entitlement ‘for the time being’, and the influences and paths 
of development for Hong Kong have always been exceptional. Almost 
always having budget surpluses, Hong Kong has never relied on supra-
national institutions like the World Bank for finance, and therefore has 
never felt the need to follow their preferred development strategies such 
as self-help sites and services projects as a replacement for public hous-
ing, or the formalisation of informal housing. Budget surpluses have 
minimised the direct influence of London, except when geopolitics and 
domestic concerns in Britain have demanded responses from the colonial 
government. Local concerns were the most important influence on deci-
sions affecting squatters – particularly the fact that all land was Crown-
owned and thus central to revenues. Giving title to squatters, or allowing 
activities that could lead to the recognition of squatter rights under com-
mon law, would have immense implications for the real estate-based 
nature of government budgets. These local concerns had a much greater 
impact than the prescriptions and preferences of any global agency, with 
the exception of London and the Colonial Office, whose commands had 
to be followed (if they could not be avoided, evaded or deflected).
While there was an overall logic of preventing squatted land from 
becoming the permanent or legal property of the squatters, this varied 
over time and space. Of interest here is the category of ‘squatters on 
land not required for development’. Most of this land was in the New 
Territories (the primarily rural parts of the land leased for 99 years from 
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Imperial China in 1898). All squatters in the urban areas around Victoria 
Harbour were intended to eventually be cleared.32
Prior to 1967, squatters were primarily seen as problems. Since 
they could not be induced to return to China, and since eradication was 
impossible for practical reasons, resettlement was reluctantly accepted. 
However, this was not done for the welfare of the squatters, but to meet 
the core governmental interests of making land available for develop-
ment and generating revenues. The 1966 and 1967 riots changed this 
situation, resulting in greater concern about the gap between govern-
ment and society, and improving social services to create loyal citi-
zens.33 The new Governor, Murray MacLehose, undertook reforms that 
included converting Squatter Resettlement into a broad low-income 
public housing programme, with access both through squatter resettle-
ment and a waiting list for those below income cut-offs. The size and 
quality of public housing were substantially improved. What is missing 
in the literature is serious consideration of the policy possibility that 
some squatters might have been given formal tenure and encouraged 
or required to improve their dwellings. This would have been a sharp 
departure from all prior practice.
Toleration kept squatters in a liminal state between repression and 
legality. Any compensation received on clearance would vary according 
to the policy at a given time. For example, squatters needed to have a cer-
tain number of years’ residence in Hong Kong (usually seven) to qualify 
for permanent public housing; in the early decades, there were no units 
for single or two-person households. They were also prevented from 
improving their dwellings, thus creating hazardous conditions.
In 1970, the Governor raised concerns over conditions in squat-
ter areas, and particularly in areas not required for development. The 
Colonial Secretary, second in the governmental hierarchy, offered two 
approaches to the problem. The first was to ‘accept as a very major change 
of policy that all squatters would be resettled’. The second, apparently 
even more radical, was to ‘give the squatters some form of title to lots 
on this unwanted land, and allow them to build (with their own money 
if they have it) NT [New Territories] ‘village type’ houses on patterns 
approved by the Building Authority’.34
The concerns expressed by the Governor about these alternative 
approaches are enlightening. Regarding the first, three difficulties were 
identified. Clearance and resettlement are ‘compulsory, and it is distaste-
ful to use such powers for other than a public purpose’. More problemat-
ically, ‘experience tells us that other squatters would take over the area 
in a flash in the absence of development. We could not keep them off 
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without the danger of a degree of violence’. Finally, they would ‘have to 
be assigned a resettlement priority which could only be at the bottom of 
the list. It would be a long time (if ever) before we got around to reset-
tling them’.35 The problems of the second approach, titling squatters, 
were framed as practical in nature: finance for improvements, provision 
of services such as water and electricity and the risk that many squatters 
given title ‘would simply sell the house and land for a quick capital gain 
and squat somewhere else’.36 The first approach, resettling all squatters, 
was also ‘impractical’, and only possible in the long term, prior to which 
the problem of alleviating conditions in squatter areas would remain.
The 1971 Housing Board paper resulting from these discussions 
focused on the second approach. Consultations with squatters alleg-
edly found them to be ‘unanimously opposed to the idea’. Objections 
included beliefs that the scheme would reduce fire risk, but not the dan-
ger of landslides. The predominance of steep hillsides as the location of 
remaining squatter areas (particularly in the urban areas) meant that 
reconfiguring them would require tricky site formation. Furthermore, 
since some squatter huts were ‘owned by up to half a dozen families’, this 
would make redevelopment ‘very complicated and the existing squatters 
fear[ed] they would lose out to outside speculators’. The squatters were 
also worried that the scheme ‘would benefit only rich squatters and rack-
eteers, who would exert pressure on them to sell out their huts’. Others 
saw the plan as a ‘Government device to extract money from them, since 
they already [had] a high degree of security of tenure’.37 How represent-
ative these cited comments were, and how they might vary among differ-
ent kinds of squatter areas, is unknown. Certainly, the comment about 
informal security of tenure would seem not to apply to most urban squat-
ters but only to rural squatters in areas unlikely to be redeveloped in the 
short term.
The Resettlement Department’s concerns about the plan were that 
the village-type housing would be of a much lower density than either 
existing squatter areas or resettlement blocks, and thus result in considera-
ble loss of housing stock. It therefore favoured a third approach, of enlarg-
ing an existing programme for squatter area improvements. No mention 
was made of providing title or of encouraging the squatters themselves 
to improve their dwellings. The emphasis would be on  environmental 
improvements, such as the provision of water standpipes and electricity, 
better paths and public lighting, and so on. Interestingly, the Resettlement 
Department also argued against resettlement of squatter areas not needed 
for development, stating that those who suggest this:
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… tend to overlook the fact that such areas represent a very val-
uable public asset. These squatter areas use land, which would 
otherwise be wasted, to house large numbers of people at minimal 
public expense. The housing is not ideal, but from the point of view 
of the occupants it has great advantages … If such housing can be 
raised to a tolerable standard by a comparatively modest outlay on 
footpaths, etc. the community is getting an excellent bargain in that 
large numbers of people are being housed in what is virtually public 
housing at a cost far lower than the cost of housing similar numbers 
in resettlement accommodation or other forms of public housing.38
This is a much less radical proposal of improvements to the squatter areas, 
based on toleration that is no longer as reluctant as earlier, but recognises 
the temporary advantage of squatter areas as holding zones in the con-
text of limited governmental ability to provide housing, without provid-
ing secure tenure or allowing squatters to improve their dwellings. Given 
its limitation to marginal terrain, we call this ‘residual toleration’. This 
proposal was ultimately adopted. However, it is informative to examine 
briefly the discussions that emerged around this approach.
In response to the Housing Board paper, Dennis Bray, the District 
Commissioner, New Territories, wrote on 4 May 1971: ‘What seems to be 
required is a procedure under which a tolerated squatter would be offered 
proper land tenure provided he reconstructed his building in accordance 
with some minimum standards.’ The ‘type of tenure to be granted for 
the improved buildings should be as generous as is required to stimulate 
rebuilding’. After noting that the finance for any improvements would 
be private, he wrote that the ‘effect on housing will be that the quality 
building on land now occupied by tolerated squatters will improve so that 
the poorest people who occupy some of these huts will move to property 
which will, in relative terms, become less attractive. We must however 
make sure that they are not allowed to sell out their rights and re-erect 
new squatter huts which will then be tolerated’.39
Space does not allow a full account here of how the squatter area 
improvement plan switched from dramatic shifts in approaches to more 
modest reforms for merely physical improvements without any change 
in tenure. Briefly, more radical ideas were sidelined, and in 1980 a series 
of disastrous landslides were highlighted in the media. New plans for 
squatter areas not needed for development but located on ‘dangerous 
slopes’ necessitated new forms of intervention through eventual reset-
tlement of these areas. In the meantime, physical improvements could 
reduce disasters, and thus the risk of bad publicity for the government. 
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In preparing these plans, it was useful, albeit not strictly necessary, to 
survey the occupants and not just the structures. It still seems likely 
that the changing geopolitical situation – in which, from the beginning 
of the Sino–British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong in 1982, 
both sides had a shared interest in sustaining social stability and political 
calm – made it possible to consider a solution to the squatter problem 
that would have been unthinkable only a decade before. But no archival 
evidence has yet been located to support this hypothesis, and any such 
documentation may have been lost in the destruction of files before colo-
nial transfer.40 The genealogy from squatter area improvement plans to 
landslides accompanied by media attention to a squatter occupancy sur-
vey to the eventual ‘final solution’ by a ratchet of exclusion seems the 
best explanation. Toleration changes in this context, with an emphasis 
on questions about ‘who’ (those resident during the Squatter Occupancy 
Survey in 1984) and ‘where’ (in areas not needed for development and 
not on dangerous slopes). While this shares some similarities with condi-
tional toleration, the nature of the conditions led to an inexorable shrink-
ing of the numbers of tolerated squatters and the exclusion of any new 
residents – in other words, exclusionary toleration.
3.4 Paris: Conditional toleration as the node  
of the differential government of illegal housing
There is a high diversity of squatters in Paris Region. Some people occupy 
squats (the occupation of a vacant building without the authorisation of 
the owner), while others live in informal slums (illegal and collective 
occupations of vacant land accompanied by self-built housing without 
access to basic services and infrastructure). This distinction encompasses 
different social realities and forms of political regulation.41 In previous 
work, Aguilera has emphasised a ‘differential government’ of squatting 
that could come close to the aforementioned ‘conditional toleration’.42
informal slums in paris region (1930–2016): a combination  
of evictions, repressive incapacity, selective policies  
and public inaction
Informal slum settlements began to grow as a massive, visible and con-
centrated phenomenon in the 1930s, when Spanish and Portuguese 
workers were recruited by national governments to be used in the labour 
force. After decolonisation, Algerian workers then migrated during the 
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1960s (to provide manpower). They settled at the periphery of French 
cities in slums, during a period of housing scarcity, pushing national and 
local authorities into a situation of reluctant toleration. By the end of 
the 1960s, 75,000 people were living in slums in France (62 per cent of 
whom lived in Paris Region). Of these slum-dwellers, 75 per cent were 
migrants, according to 1966 data from the French Ministry of the Inte-
rior. In 1970, after the first National Rehousing Plan, 45,000 people were 
still living in slums.
Social Catholic activists and NGOs worked inside slums and 
put pressure on the government to rehouse families in social hous-
ing, while squatting in buildings or self-building on vacant lands. 
As a response to these experiments, some local authorities tried to 
implement small-scale selective programmes of temporary relocation 
without any regional or national coordination. Until 1966, the only 
response from the national government was the intervention of the 
police, who imposed a climate of terror on Algerian migrants, spo-
radically destroyed their houses and repressed activists. However, in 
the mid-1960s, accidental fires in the slums, in which children died, 
attracted attention from the media and local officials, who finally 
pushed parliament to pass a series of laws to eradicate slums and 
rehouse families in social housing. A selective policy was implemented 
through two different approaches. First, most non- Algerian families 
were directly relocated to social housing in the so-called banlieues 
(low-income suburbs), while Algerian families were initially relocated 
to transitory camps, where they were supposed to be ‘educated’ and 
‘re-socialized’.43 However, although the government declared that the 
last slum residents were evicted in 1976, in fact many Algerian families 
were relocated to temporary camps until the 1990s.
Slums emerged again as a mass-scale phenomenon during the 
1990s in peripheral Paris, when the end of the Socialist Bloc opened a 
new wave of migration from Eastern Europe. First considered political 
refugees, these migrants were then transformed into undocumented 
migrants by European and national legislation.44 As a result, social aid 
was reduced, the French state was no longer obliged to provide hous-
ing, and the migrants squatted on lands and built houses with precarious 
and recycled materials. In 2016, the state administration counted 19,000 
people living in 391 slums in Paris Region.45 Official data show that, in 
the last 10 years, 82 per cent of the slums’ inhabitants have been from 
Romania and 6 per cent from Bulgaria.46
Since the 2000s, there have been three overlapping levels of poli-
cies.47 At the first level, the state mainly ensures the persistence of a strong 
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repressive framework, within which the prefectures command police 
evictions, while the Ministries of the Interior and Immigration main-
tain a coercive climate around migrants, refugees and slum-dwellers. 
While President Sarkozy made this repression public when he launched 
an explicit hunt for the Roma people, evictions have grown under the 
Socialist Party national government since 2012.48 If slums persist at the 
national level, this is because the national government is unable to evict 
and rehouse everyone (in our typology: ‘repressive incapacity’).
At the second level, local administrations and municipalities try to 
respond to local conflicts with the support of NGOs. While municipal-
ities usually ask for eviction by the police, they have also implemented 
selective and temporary rehousing projects. The first project, to create 
a transitory camp (a so-called ‘insertion village’), was opened in 2007 
after NGOs protest in response to a fire caused by the precariousness of 
some of the dwellings. After this initial experiment – and despite strong 
criticism from NGOs, which denounced the selective policy and the con-
straints inside the camps – a dozen municipalities in Paris Region have 
implemented the same kind of camps. Between 2007 and 2014, these 
camps provided more than 1,500 people with emergency housing (for a 
maximum duration of five years) and have enabled some of them to find 
a permanent house and a job. Some of these projects can be considered 
part of a strategy of ‘conditional toleration’.
At the third level, in 2012, a national government department 
in charge of precarious housing and homelessness was charged by the 
Prime Minister with ensuring effective national implementation of a 
ministerial circular that obliges Prefects to provide social help with evic-
tions.49 Besides this particular mission, this administration informally 
and progressively became the national benchmark for slum policies and 
the main public interlocutor for NGOs, sociologists and local authorities. 
The Délégation Interministérielle à l’Hébergement et à l’Accès au Logement 
(Dihal, the national interministerial delegation for accommodation and 
access to housing) opened a ‘forum’ where different actors meet and 
devise new policies beyond evictions. In 2015, the Prefect of Paris Region 
complemented this work by launching a regional platform for slum 
 governance and a new regional strategy to coordinate the multiple local 
initiatives. As of 2018, this strategy was not yet completely implemented.
Thus, since the 1960s, there has been a succession of types of tol-
eration of informal slums in Paris Region, from ‘repressive incapacity’ to 
‘conditional toleration’, while some municipalities endeavour to imple-
ment selective rehousing policies.
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the conditional toleration of squatting in paris through selective 
legalisation: the institutionalisation of a municipal policy  
of socio-cultural squats
Diverse groups squat in buildings as a common mode of action, but with 
different goals.50 The modern expression of squatting in Europe emerged 
during the second half of the nineteenth century in a context of eviction 
of urban poor from the centre of Paris.51 A few activists resisted owners by 
helping poor families to leave their houses without paying the rent and to 
illegally enter new houses. Squatting was a tool to relocate poor families 
and to claim housing for the urban poor. In a second period (1945–1971), 
social Catholic activists used squatting as a civil disobedience mode of 
action to claim houses for poor and homeless people.52 Self-management 
projects also developed. In that period, squatters were mainly repressed 
by the police, but some experiments helped to put the issues of bad hous-
ing and slums on the political agenda. In a third period (1971–1981), 
radical-left activists began to use squatting to challenge public authori-
ties. Maoist squatters (Secours Rouge) squatted in the central neighbour-
hoods of Paris to resist urban renewal policies and patrimonialisation of 
large parts of the city. Some national and local representatives supported 
these groups. At the same time, in the most popular neighbourhoods of 
Paris, anarchist and autonomous activists squatted in vacant properties 
to implement radical alternatives to capitalism and appropriation of the 
city. In the end, in 1979, the police evicted all these squatters en masse, 
using violent means, during a period of fear of radical-left social move-
ments and terrorism.
During the 1980s, some artists began to squat in big vacant build-
ings to develop socio-cultural activities. Around 40 socio-cultural occu-
pied centres were opened in the south and centre of Paris, sometimes 
with the support of national and local representatives and public opin-
ion. Between 1990 and 2000, in a context of massive unemployment, the 
Housing Right Movement emerged again with the collective DAL (Right 
to Housing Association). Squatting was used alongside other tools of 
protest such as sit-ins, tent camps and the occupation of public squares. 
Squatting was a tool to rehouse poor African migrant families and to 
attract the attention of public authorities to dire housing conditions. This 
movement gained a huge audience and can be considered one of the fac-
tors that pushed the government to pass a law on housing rights in 2007: 
the so-called DALO Act (Enforceable Right to Housing) that allows home-
less citizens, or those living in substandard housing, to sue the state, via 
the courts, to be granted suitable accommodation.53
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Since 2000, the artists have been the main group of squatters in cen-
tral Paris, while the Housing Movement has been reformed with a new 
group called Jeudi Noir. Inspired by European experiments with legalisa-
tion (Amsterdam, Berlin, Geneva), artists took advantage of the election 
of a socialist mayor in Paris (Bertrand Delanoë) to instigate new kinds of 
relationships with local authorities by urging temporary formal legalisa-
tion. Between 2000 and 2015, after the first legalisation of the famous 
‘59 Rivoli’ art studio and gallery, more than 30 socio-cultural squatted 
centres were legalised by the municipality with formal temporary leases. 
Local representatives (elected deputy-mayors) began to support some 
artist collectives, which accepted the terms of negotiated agreements.
This policy shift resulted from the conjunction of three factors. 
First, a socialist administration came into the frame, with a new vision of 
what urban culture and local social activities and public services should 
be. Second, the squatters had been travelling all around Europe at the 
end of the 1990s, and from this experience they imported the idea that 
temporary legalisation (three-year leases) were possible, and in a way 
acceptable, to stabilise activities and relationships with neighbours. 
Third, at that time, some municipal bureaucrats suggested resorting to 
a commercial juridical device (Convention of Precarious Occupation) to 
temporarily legalise some squatted social centres. At the very beginning, 
this option was considered exceptional, but the Municipality of Paris’ 
Department of Culture pressured the Housing Department to accept this 
option. It soon proved itself to be a lasting solution to regulating informal 
spaces in which socio-cultural activities were carried out. Since 2001, it 
has become the main mode of municipal intervention with regard to art-
ist squatters. The Municipality of Paris has institutionalised a true pub-
lic policy, with budgetary backing: around €40 million has been spent 
on legalising (through temporary leases) and renovating more than 30 
squatted social centres.
This institutionalisation has stabilised a differential approach to the 
management of squatting. In order to be legalised, squatting must meet 
four conditions:54 (i) the building has to be safe, it must not be on the list 
of social housing projects and squatters must respect security norms; (ii) 
squatters must develop a socio-cultural project for the neighbourhood; 
(iii) squatters must create an official association to channel dialogue with 
bureaucrats, via which they pay a symbolic rent for the property; and 
(iv) squatters must be known to respect their engagements (give back the 
keys when the term of the Convention of Precarious Occupation ends). 
The result of this combination of political and technical filters is a differ-
ential treatment of squatters in the long term: artists have their squatting 
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legalised, while anarchists or precarious or migrant squatters have been 
systematically evicted from the centre towards the suburbs.
To conclude, a mix of ‘conditional toleration’ and good-enough tol-
eration is at the core of what Aguilera has called the ‘differential govern-
ment’ of squatting. The case of Paris teaches that toleration is always 
selective (conditional) and can backfire on the rest of the squatters who 
are not accepted into local governance: legalisation processes create two 
categories – the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ squatters. Toleration, then, is only 
one strategy among others, and it also produces repression, because 
repression is ever-present, always the ‘negative’ side of the coin.
3.5 A comparative political economy of toleration 
in Hong Kong and Paris
There are many differences between our two cases. The historical, social 
and political contexts are not the same, nor are the profiles or numbers of 
squatters. However, the cases converge somewhat when we look at how 
authorities tolerate squatters. Most of the types of toleration that were 
identified by Smart in Hong Kong have also been visible in Paris at one 
time or another, and vice versa. It may be useful to recap the detailed 
cases and compare the relevant features side-by-side (see Table 3.1).
Returning to the questions we asked about toleration at the begin-
ning of this chapter, we compare the two cases as a first step towards 
identifying patterns of toleration that cross the research boundary 
between the Global North and South.
• Who tolerates? In Hong Kong, the immediate actor is the Hous-
ing Department, but when implicit toleration becomes explicit, the 
decision to do so was taken by the highest levels of the colonial 
Hong Kong government (and later by the Special Administrative 
Region Government of Hong Kong, China). In France, local and 
national governments are structurally at odds on many topics, 
above all in Paris Region because of its status as the capital city. 
This conflictive multilevel governance opens the door to condi-
tional toleration strategies in both countries, because local govern-
ments endeavour to differentiate themselves from the repressive 
national state and, thus, are more likely to tolerate squatters than 
national governments. These conflicts between local and national 
authorities explain most of the apparently ambiguous styles of 
government (conditional toleration). More generally, both in 
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Table 3.1: Types of toleration
Type of 
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life of the city than 
precarious slums 
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slums are de facto 
tolerated because 
no one can evict 
squatters.
(Continued)
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Type of 
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Has never applied 
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2000s: Artist 
squatters in Paris 
+ some slums now 
in Paris suburbs.
Table 3.1 (Continued)
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Hong Kong and Paris, the relationships and tensions between local 
and national authorities are powerful in explaining the persistence 
of squatting, and will be key for comparing North and South.
• Who is tolerated? We can distinguish between more inclusionary 
forms of toleration (whereby anyone can squat if they conform 
to restrictions) and toleration extended preferentially to certain 
types of people. The latter is illustrated in the Paris case: squat-
ting among artists is legalised, while anarchists or precarious or 
migrant squatters are systematically evicted and must relocate to 
the suburbs. When municipalities allocate local rehousing projects, 
they select on human and financial criteria. In Hong Kong, while 
no one has more right to squat than anyone else, the compensation 
for eviction varies according to length of residence in Hong Kong, 
family composition and whether surveyed or not.
• What is tolerated? In Hong Kong, rebuilding a squatter dwelling 
with permanent materials ends toleration. In Paris Region, squat-
ting in a building is more difficult, but it is easier to stay silent and 
invisible (if the goal is to persist silently) than when squatting 
on land. When a slum on vacant land begins to be consolidated, 
the mayors usually enforce eviction to avoid a permanent slum 
development.
• Where may squatting be tolerated? In Paris, the geography of 
squats and slums is generally quite stable. There are no slums in 
the Paris city centre. Slum-dwellers are located in the suburbs and, 
in planned evictions, are gradually moved away from Paris itself. 
Political squatters live now in the eastern suburbs, where left-wing 
activists tend to live, while artist squatters are tolerated in the 
centre of Paris, because they are considered vectors of creativity. 
In Hong Kong, too, toleration tends to last longer in less central 
and desirable spaces. Squatters in back alleys and rooftops did not 
receive resettlement, because, when cleared, their absence did not 
make space available for development.
• When is it tolerated? In Paris, the electoral period plays a critical 
role in changes in the governance of squats and slums. Squatters 
are more likely to be tolerated during winter, for instance (a winter 
truce). Political history and cycles matter a lot. Even if they are 
very different in the North and the South, political agendas can 
be also used as a node for comparing Northern and Southern cit-
ies. In Hong Kong, the squatter structure surveys conducted as 
‘final’ amnesties affected resettlement compensation, but being 
able to move in before being discovered also influenced toleration. 
60 CoMparatiVE approaCHEs to inforMaL HoUsinG aroUnd tHE GLobE
Periods of political sensitivity, such as after the 1960s riots, also 
encouraged more toleration.
• Why are squatters tolerated? In Paris Region, some squats – 
specifically, artists’ dwellings – are tolerated and even legalised, 
because the municipalities believe they contribute to the attrac-
tiveness and socio-cultural life of the city. Some slums are tolerated 
because eviction would be too risky and costly, or because they act 
as a reserve to host other slum-dwellers evicted from elsewhere. In 
Hong Kong prior to 1984, the main reason for toleration was the 
shortage of affordable housing and the costs of resettlement. After 
1984, no new squatting was tolerated, but toleration continues for 
pre-existing squatters in areas not needed for development. About 
11,000 urban squatters still remain, due to unusually complicated 
property circumstances linked to past governmental decisions.
• How is it tolerated? In Paris Region, local authorities use more 
tacit toleration when slums are not visible in the city centre. Some 
municipalities have opened provisional (legal) camps for a few 
select slum-dwellers. Concerning squats in buildings, the Paris 
Municipality legalises artists by means of provisional leases that 
allow squatters to stay for one, two or three years in the building 
in question. There is an important diversity of forms of toleration 
that makes the question of how perhaps the most complex to syn-
thesise in a comparative framework. In Hong Kong, if a tolerated 
structure was found rebuilt with permanent materials, the tol-
erated status would be lost. Toleration was conditional on many 
factors, such as having been included in a registration of squatter 
structures, which was supposed to be an amnesty, after which no 
new structures would be tolerated. In general, toleration was con-
tingent on the concession being reversible at any time, to avoid any 
impression of entitlement or property rights.
3.6 Conclusion
A lengthy examination of different forms of toleration may seem esoteric, 
when the topic of informal housing is a life-or-death issue for millions of 
people. Yet, at the very least, analysing the idea of toleration through 
the lenses of the different who/what/why questions forces us to more 
carefully consider what we mean by the term, and how varied its forms 
can be. We also firmly believe that the very nature of informality is predi-
cated on the poorly understood processes of toleration, which support its 
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persistence between the poles of repression and legalisation. So far, we 
have stayed close to our own research areas. In these last paragraphs, we 
try to draw out broader issues and questions for the global kaleidoscope 
of informal housing.
Our comparative approach has been discussed by colleagues at 
diverse conferences and meetings. First of all, some of them argue that 
comparing squatting in the Global North and South would be impossible, 
simply because of the crucial material divergences: in the South, entire 
parts of cities could be considered as squatted, while, in the North, squat-
ted buildings or lands would just be residual, marginal and sometimes 
invisible. The quantitative difference is also used as an argument against 
the comparison: cities with hundreds of squatters cannot be compared 
with cities with thousands or millions of squatters. Finally, the sociologi-
cal dimension is often pointed out. In some contexts, many squatters are 
local residents who have been squatting all their lives, and most are the 
ordinary urban poor. In other contexts, squatters are migrants who have 
recently arrived or political activists.
We do not deny these important divergences: squatting in the North 
and squatting in the South are surely not the same human experience. 
Yet, this fact does not render such a comparison unfruitful. We argue 
that material and sociological dimensions have to be examined in a rela-
tive way. The material aspects are not central in our analysis of political 
strategies, but they matter in the sense that public opinion influences the 
governance of squatting. When squats and slums are being consolidated, 
it materially makes visible the fact that authorities are unable to govern 
the city, and thus pushes them to react. We claim that the architectural, 
juridical and material aspects can be useful in comparing North and 
South, but only if linked with politics. If not, we risk an essentialist bias. 
We also work with the sociological dimensions in a relative way – that is, 
in the way public authorities consider squatters dangerous troublemak-
ers or, on the contrary, vectors of creativity or manpower in the city. This 
focus on the political treatment of differences, and not the differences 
themselves, is a valuable node for comparison.
Our approach insists on the political dimension of squatting and, 
more precisely, on the way public authorities deal with squatters. Policy 
and politics matter – they shape social groups and individuals. This is why 
the reasons for toleration are at the core of our typological effort in this 
chapter. Understanding the rationalities of public authorities in these sit-
uations is crucial to understanding the commonalities between North and 
South, where political strategies are not so different despite divergences 
between political institutions and contexts. This chapter does not only 
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aim to explain toleration strategies in a European city and an Asian city. It 
rather seeks to open a door to the comparison of squatting and its public 
management in the Global North and South. We believe that comparing 
the different ways and contexts in which squatters are tolerated is a fruitful 
point of departure for better understanding squatting, which still happens 
in so much of the urban world at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
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Squatting in Leiden and Leipzig  
in the 1970s and 1980s:  
A comparison of informal housing 
practices in a capitalist democracy 
and a communist dictatorship
Udo Grashoff, Charlotte van rooden, Merel snoep and bart van der steen
4.1 Introduction
The historical image of urban squatting in the Global North is domi-
nated by militant activists from the 1980s engaging in confrontations 
with the authorities. This stereotype glosses over the diversity of the 
squatter population as well as the variety of ways authorities dealt 
with squatting. In contrast to the exaggerated visibility of squatting in 
the West, squatting in Eastern Europe was almost invisible and there-
fore underexplored. Moreover, scholars who conceptualise communist 
states as totalitarian regimes assume that these regimes suppressed 
scattered illegal occupations immediately and forcefully, which was 
not always the case.
This study addresses both issues through a comparison of squatting 
in Leiden and Leipzig in the 1970s and 1980s. The former was situated in 
the Dutch liberal democracy, the latter in the communist dictatorship of 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR). To explore the extent to which 
these political regimes affected the dynamics of urban squatting, three 
aspects will be systematically compared here: the urban and legal context 
in which people squatted; the strategies that squatters employed; and 
the interactions between squatters and authorities. Such a comparison 
of squatting on both sides of the Iron Curtain deepens our understanding 
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of the phenomenon, while the remarkable similarities in the dynamics of 
squatting in Eastern and Western Europe might also nuance the political 
dichotomy of dictatorship and democracy.
Historiography
This study responds to two distinct strands of research: the history of 
squatting in Western Europe and the social history of housing in commu-
nist Eastern Europe.
The literature on squatting in Western Europe is vast and mainly 
focuses on political squatting during the 1970s and 1980s in major 
metropolitan centres.1 Göran Therborn has criticised authors for being 
‘predominantly movementalist – that is, mainly interested in the mobi-
lisations, demands and battles of the movements, and not that much in 
their urban or state effects’.2 In a similar vein, Nazima Kadir has ques-
tioned the focus on militant, anarchist and metropolitan squatters, claim-
ing that it has narrowed the view of researchers. As a result, a feedback 
loop has emerged that presents a specific group of squatters as the ‘real’ 
squatters.3 Even though squatting can be considered inherently political, 
because it subverts the property regime and elicits state responses,4 such 
an approach may overlook the self-understanding of the squatters, who 
frequently presented themselves as apolitical. Furthermore, politicians, 
civil servants and police officers are often depicted in a stereotypical fash-
ion, as inherently unreasonable and repressive. Such a ‘movementalist’ 
perspective overlooks the fact that authorities responded very differently 
to different groups of squatters.
The historiography of housing within communist regimes has 
ignored informal housing for decades.5 The occurrence of illegal occupa-
tions of flats, albeit generally in secret, challenges the conceptualisation 
of socialist states such as the GDR as regimes with full control over their 
populations. The dictatorship seldom, if ever, responded to squatting 
with merciless police interventions or brutal and fast evictions. Instead, 
cautious squatters and restrained authorities entered into negotiations 
about informal housing.6
sources and methodology
Comparing squatting in Leiden and Leipzig raises a number of chal-
lenges, as these were cities of different sizes, under different regimes and 
with different political cultures. With regard to the units of comparison, 
Leiden (101,220 inhabitants in 1970) was significantly smaller than 
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Leipzig (583,885 inhabitants in 1970). However, unauthorised housing 
was not dealt with by the city administration of Leipzig, but by the Abtei-
lung Wohnungspolitik des Rates des Stadtbezirks (the housing depart-
ments of its five districts). In its comparison of government policies on 
squatting, this study focuses on these districts (mainly Leipzig-Nordost 
and -Südwest), ensuring that the compared administrational units are 
in the same range of 100,000 inhabitants. More importantly, it examines 
the dynamics that squatting evoked between squatters and authorities, 
and there are no indications that the different sizes of the two cities influ-
enced these interactions significantly.7
As to sources, a consequence of the different political regimes in 
Leiden and Leipzig is that different types of sources are used. For Leiden, 
the main source is the city’s main daily newspaper, the Leidsch Dagblad.8 
Newspapers generate and frame news through commercial and political 
filters and do not provide unbiased information. Furthermore, word-
searches have limitations as they are dependent on contemporary ter-
minology and the quality of optical character recognition technology.9 
Finally, not all squatters sought attention from newspapers. Even so, we 
hold that this method yields the most complete information on squat-
ting in Leiden – far more complete than police archives, municipality 
archives or oral histories would have done. The police only reported 
incidents when they intervened, the municipality only held records of 
‘their’ houses and extremely problematic cases, and oral histories risk 
singling out those people who still identify as squatters. Newspapers, on 
the other hand, were less selective and reported on all kinds of cases as 
they happened.
For Leipzig, other sources had to be used, because unauthorised 
housing was not discussed in the state-controlled media and there was 
no independent media. Therefore, a variety of sources were combined to 
form a comparable set of data, primarily containing files from the munic-
ipality and the secret police, complemented by oral history. The files 
belonging to the municipal housing departments cover a small but rep-
resentative number of cases. The files produced by the Ministry for State 
Security (Stasi), the secret police of the GDR, also document some cases 
of illegal housing. Often, however, the documentation of these incidents 
is fragmented and incomplete. Oral history can counterbalance these 
deficits. Thus, 10 unstructured interviews were also carried out with for-
mer squatters in Leipzig.10 Insights from other parts of the GDR help to 
make the assessment more reliable.11
With regard to differing political cultures, a challenge to our com-
parison is the different terminology used to denominate squatting. In the 
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Netherlands, the common term was kraken, which referred to pre-Second 
World War acts of burglary and later to clandestine resistance activities 
(stealing identity cards and food vouchers) during the Nazi-German occu-
pation of the Netherlands.12 Its meaning is very close to the English ‘squat-
ting’. In the GDR, the German equivalent of squatting (Hausbesetzung) was 
rarely used, as, in most cases, individual flats were occupied and not whole 
houses. Moreover, the West German practice linked house occupations to 
political actions, which was not possible in the East German dictatorship. 
People in East Berlin used the term Wohnungsbesetzung, which alluded to 
the West German practice, but in the rest of the GDR (including Leipzig), 
the practice was referred to as Schwarzwohnen. Translated literally, this is 
‘black living’, but the meaning is similar to Schwarzarbeit (undocumented 
work on the side), which referred more to the evading of state authorities 
than to the act of occupying. The term Schwarzwohnen thus expressed a 
different self-understanding of those who occupied flats clandestinely in 
the GDR. One interviewee from Leipzig underlined this difference in stat-
ing: ‘We did not squat [in] houses. It was no political action, no aggression 
and no provocation. It was basically quite natural because there was free 
living space, and we took it, that was Schwarzwohnen – that was such a 
typical GDR term that doesn’t exist anymore today.’13 It might, however, 
be possible that such a clear distinction is exaggerated and that it rather 
reflects the extent to which Western European stereotypes about militant 
squatters have come to dominate the image of squatting, thus leading to 
an underestimation of the actual similarities between house occupations 
in Eastern and Western Europe.
4.2 Setting the stage: The urban, legal and political 
context of squatting in Leiden and Leipzig
To compare the dynamics between squatters and authorities in Leiden 
and Leipzig, this first section will discuss the urban, legal and political 
context. Which factors hampered, or contributed to, the emergence of 
squatting?
two cities in disarray: built structure
During the 1970s and 1980s, both Leiden and Leipzig suffered from hous-
ing shortages of comparable dimensions. Leiden was an impoverished 
city with a run-down housing stock. In 1962, a Dutch newspaper dubbed 
the city a ‘slum champion’, because of the 3,000 run-down houses in the 
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city centre.14 In 1968, the municipality stated that a quarter of the 29,000 
houses in Leiden were of inferior quality. Hundreds of houses were offi-
cially declared uninhabitable. Affordable housing in the city centre was 
of especially bad quality. When a journalist researched the housing condi-
tions in the working-class district of Leiden-Noord, she came across fami-
lies with four children or more living in ‘small four-room houses, the living 
room included’.15 Often, wooden floors were rotting, and walls bowing or 
bulging. The problems were worsened by deindustrialisation, which set in 
during the early 1970s and left the city centre full of empty factory build-
ings, while unemployment rose.16 In 1970, 13.6 per cent of Leiden’s pop-
ulation was registered as in need of housing (referring to young people 
and especially young families living with parents while waiting for their 
own accommodation).17 In 1977, the waiting time for affordable rented 
housing administered by the municipality could be as long as four years.18
Despite the different political context, the local housing situation in 
Leipzig was similar, if not worse.19 Dilapidated houses and grey facades 
characterised Leipzig’s townscape. There were only a few stray instances 
of renovation. Just like in other parts of the GDR, there was a chronic 
shortage of living space. Approximately 70,000 inhabitants (12 per cent 
of the population) were looking for a new flat during the 1980s.20 This 
shortage was only partly a result of too little housing. A survey from 1982 
indicated that 100,000 flats (40 per cent of Leipzig’s housing stock) were 
occupied by too few inhabitants (with one person per room as the stand-
ard).21 There was no material incentive for occupants to move to smaller 
flats, as rents were incredibly cheap. Uneconomic rents also contributed to 
widespread decay and disrepair, as landlords could not afford the upkeep.
In the 1970s, the communist leadership seriously tackled the 
housing problem in the GDR with an ambitious housing construction 
programme that pledged to provide every East German with adequate 
housing by 1990. However, the prioritising of new housing curtailed the 
available manpower and resources for renovation, with unintended neg-
ative consequences. In 1984, while the construction of large new blocks 
of flats on the outskirts of the city was in full swing, the city’s authorities 
planned the demolition of 20,000 flats (8 per cent of the housing stock) 
within the next five years.22 Demolitions were often delayed for years 
due to severe problems in the planning process, and attempts to make 
the bureaucracy more effective and to regain control did not always bear 
fruit. Thus, as a side effect of radical urban restructuring, 10 per cent of 
Leipzig’s housing stock was left empty during the 1980s. Squatting often 
started where the authorities lost the overview and control of their hous-
ing stock, and then spread to other parts of the town.
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Leiden developed similar urban renewal policies, such as the con-
struction of a new residential district north of Leiden in the late 1960s, 
the Merenwijk. This ameliorated the situation slightly, but the dearth of 
affordable housing persisted as the rents were twice as high as in the city 
centre.23 As a result, many apartments in Merenwijk were left empty, and 
some of them were subsequently squatted in.24 By the mid-1970s, Leiden 
benefited from funding and the new urban renewal policies of the central 
government.25 It led to an increase of 1,200 houses per year between 1973 
and 1978.26 Even so, the housing shortage persisted. In 1979, the number of 
people registered as in need of housing was still 5,293 (5.1 per cent), while 
more than a thousand dwellings were left empty.27 It would take until the 
early 1990s before the dire state of housing stock had been overcome.
regulation of housing
In Leiden, the municipality and eight housing corporations administered 
social housing in the city, including most of the inner-city rental houses.28 
More comfortable houses, at higher rents or for sale, were designated to 
the free market. During the 1970s, the municipality acquired a leading 
role in assigning houses to people on the waiting list. Initially, only people 
who were born in Leiden or worked in the city were accepted on the list, 
and anyone under 24 could only apply if they were married. The wait-
ing list was thus particularly obstructive for single working-class youths, 
youths who wanted to live together without being married, and young 
people who wanted to live communally rather than in single apartments. 
Those who were accepted onto the list still faced long waiting times, and 
this especially created problems for young families, who often had to live 
with young children at their parents’ houses.
In the GDR, there was no free market, and housing was almost 
completely regulated by the municipality. To acquire a tenancy agree-
ment, a person had to have an official housing allocation notice 
(Wohnraumzuweisung). Generally, the authorities allocated flats accord-
ing to urgency, but even then there were long waiting times. The Leipzig 
system benefited young families and people important to the state such 
as Party officials, army and police officers, and bureaucrats. As the num-
ber of available flats was limited, all other apartment-seekers, such as 
(young) singles and divorcees, had almost no chance.
Furthermore, both cities struggled with ineffective bureaucracies. 
In Leiden, renovated houses would sometimes be left empty for months 
before they were allocated to renters. In other cases, houses were left empty 
on purpose and designated as temporary housing in case of large-scale 
72 CoMparatiVE approaCHEs to inforMaL HoUsinG aroUnd tHE GLobE
renovations. In Leipzig, delays in urban development also led to the emer-
gence of a grey area of neglected old building stock – closed for repairs 
that failed to materialise, or designated for demolitions that continued to 
be delayed. Bureaucrats even partly lost track of the building stock and 
did not always know whether a flat was occupied or not. A scenario could 
even arise in which a Schwarzwohner wanting to negotiate a lease with the 
housing department would find out that their flat had been removed from 
the register.29 The situation did not improve over time as there were no 
systematic inspection rounds, while scattered attempts to regain control 
served to demonstrate the degree of disarray within the bureaucracy.30
Legal and political context
The legal context of squatting differed markedly between the two cit-
ies. In Leipzig, unauthorised occupation of flats was considered illegal, 
whereas, in the Netherlands, squatters enjoyed a certain degree of legal 
protection.
In the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s, the act of squatting 
itself was illegal, but if a squatter’s action was successful (such as occu-
pying the dwelling for 24 hours and moving in a table, a chair and a bed) 
they enjoyed a certain amount of legal protection from immediate evic-
tion (huisrecht). This was based on a court ruling from 1914, renewed in 
1971. Private owners and housing corporations thus had to secure a court 
order to evict. During a certain period, the owner also needed to identify 
the squatters and give their names to the judge, which led squatter activ-
ists to call on fellow squatters to keep their surnames secret at all times. 
The owner could, however, also evict if they could establish that there 
were new legal renters or realistic and immediate renovation plans.31
In Leipzig, housing departments were obliged to suppress all 
attempts at unauthorised housing, since the dictatorship aspired to 
maintain complete control over all aspects of social life. Even so, the clan-
destine occupation of an apartment was only considered an administra-
tional offence. If informal occupiers were ‘caught’, authorities imposed 
moderate fines.32 The authorities subsequently had to decide whether 
the occupiers should leave, but their decision had to comply with the 
Zivilgesetzbuch (Civil Code), which stated that nobody was to be homeless 
in a socialist country. Therefore, Schwarzwohner could only be evicted if 
alternative living space was available to them. And only if squatters stub-
bornly ignored an eviction notice could they be fined more harshly.
The discourse about squatting in the two cities was also very different. 
In the Netherlands, squatters generally attracted a lot of media coverage. 
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Not only did newspapers publish articles about squatting, the squatters 
themselves also produced pamphlets, posters and magazines. No such 
public discourse existed in the GDR. Although unauthorised occupation of 
flats became a frequent issue for the housing departments of the districts 
during the 1970s and 1980s, it did not trigger any debate, either among 
those in power or between them and the Schwarzwohner. GDR citizens did, 
however, have some means to communicate with the regime, most notably 
through Eingaben (petitions). Among the grievances put forward through 
these petitions, housing was the most frequent issue.33 The extensive peti-
tioning system can, to a certain extent, be considered an equivalent to the 
public discourse in the Netherlands.
4.3 Squatter strategies: Informality, negotiation and 
occasional protest
Squatters in Leiden and Leipzig responded to the simultaneous existence 
of housing shortages and vacant spaces. In both cities, the squatter pop-
ulation was diverse, and the squatters’ varying identities and goals influ-
enced their strategies to acquire and retain living spaces. So who were 
the squatters and what were their strategies?
Motivations
In Leiden in the 1970s, a significant proportion of the squatters consisted 
of young working-class families with children who wanted to leave their 
parental homes. Some squatters stated that their marriages had suffered 
because of cramped living conditions. Even though they were eligible 
for allocation to affordable housing, they had to wait up to four years, 
while they could not afford housing outside the regulated housing mar-
ket. Apart from such cases, which Pruijt has dubbed ‘ deprivation-based 
squatting’, there were also youths who used squatting to acquire alter-
native forms of housing (see Figure 4.1).34 In the mid-1970s, students, 
working youths and political activists started to occupy places to live 
collectively. They were not ‘merely’ looking for a roof over their heads, 
but also demanded spaces where they could combine living with politi-
cal and/or creative activities. These Leiden-based squatters, among other 
activities, ran a youth shelter and a women’s social centre. Alongside 
these two groups, there were all sorts of other people who squatted, such 
as artists looking for workspaces or migrant workers who needed places 
to live and socialise.35 
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Figure 4.1 Young squatters in a bank building in Leiden. 
Photographer unknown. © Archives Leidsch Dagblad, Historische 
Vereniging Oud Leiden.
In Leipzig, there was a similar spread of motivations. The main dif-
ference was that Schwarzwohnen was not about acquiring affordable flats, 
since rents were very low in the GDR. Instead, occupiers sought spaces to 
live in on their own (see Figure 4.2). Families with children moved to big-
ger or better-kept flats, divorcees wanted to escape their often unbearable 
domestic situations, and students and apprentices sought ways to leave their 
parental homes or to evade collective accommodation in dormitories.36
There were no squatted social centres and only very few examples 
of communal living. In one exceptional case, an occupied house was 
silently turned into a meditation centre by a dozen Bhagwan follow-
ers.37 During the late 1980s, a handful of sites housed illegal bars and 
cafés, which sometimes hosted unofficial concerts and art exhibitions.38 
Youths also occupied spaces for underground culture, as the punk band 
‘Wutanfall’ (English: tantrum) did in 1983. The group occupied an attic 
flat in a house close to the city centre. When the house, which was slated 
for demolition, was vacated in November 1983, the punks moved to 
another informally occupied place in Leipzig. The band thus used squat-
ting mainly as an alternative housing strategy and did not link occupa-
tion to provocative political action.
According to the different political context, similar sets of goals were 
communicated differently. In Leiden, squatters were open about their 
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Figure 4.2 Schwarzwohner in front of ‘their’ house in Leipzig, mid-
1980s. Photo: Oliver Schoenberner © Dieter Rink.
intentions. Some were mainly seeking housing, while others sought places 
for alternative living. In Leipzig, there was no such choice. Even those 
Schwarzwohner with a hidden agenda of self-empowerment had to present 
themselves to the authorities as in need of housing only. To mention coun-
tercultural motivations would have been detrimental to their case.
strategies
The means by which squatters found out about empty houses highlight 
fundamental differences between the two cities. In Leiden, identify-
ing suitable houses for squatting became a semi-public matter. There 
was even a group of political squatters who organised a weekly kraak-
spreekuur (consultation practice), where people considering squatting 
could acquire information on where and how to do so. In Leipzig, identi-
fying empty flats was completely up to the individual in question. Usually, 
people would look for windows with no curtains, which would indicate 
that a flat was empty. Some people even informed the housing authori-
ties about unregistered empty flats hoping to get allocated one of them, 
which in some cases was successful. After having occupied a flat, squat-
ters deployed several legalisation strategies, which we compare next.
a) simulation of lawfulness
Squatting working-class families in Leiden almost always tried to establish 
formal or informal agreements with the owner, so as to secure their resi-
dence. The most common way to do so was by contacting the owner and 
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establishing short-term rental contracts. Squatters often offered to pay rent, 
sometimes even when an agreement could not be reached. Thus, the youths 
who squatted in the monastery in Zoeterwoude wired money to the order of 
nuns who owned the property, to illustrate their willingness and ability to 
pay rent. The latter refused the payment and had it transferred back.
If a house was owned by a private owner or company, handbooks 
(published by, and for, squatters) advised occupants to wire unsolicited rent 
to the owner’s account: ‘After three months of accepting rent it will be more 
difficult to get you out through a [normal] procedure.’39 Such handbooks 
also advised squatters to establish informal networks with neighbours and 
sometimes also to present themselves as regular paying tenants, so they 
could claim to have built up informal residential rights. Many squatters paid 
electricity, water and gas bills, which was possible irrespective of whether 
their house was rented or squatted in. Neither paying unsolicited rent nor 
being well connected to the neighbourhood offered strong legal protection, 
but they did improve the negotiating position of the squatters, which was 
significant, as most formal agreements were reached informally.
Many of Leiden’s squatters, and almost all of Leipzig’s squat-
ters, made every effort to appear as law-abiding as possible, and many 
(though not all of them) paid utility bills. In Leipzig, Schwarzwohner also 
often contacted the police registration office and, in most cases, had the 
address of the squatted place registered in their passport – a phenome-
non that did not arise in the liberal Netherlands, where addresses were 
not registered in passports.40
Unsolicited rent payment was a common strategy of Leipzig’s 
Schwarzwohner to secure a good negotiating position in case of detec-
tion by the authorities. Presumably, this practice was more frequent than 
occupation without rent payment, and was often carried out clandestinely 
without contacting the owner. A rumour stated that three months of vol-
untary rent payments established a tacit contract between the owner and 
the tenant. Although the rumour was factually incorrect, the common 
practice of anonymous rent payments significantly reduced the sense of 
wrongdoing among Schwarzwohner. In a number of cases, clandestine 
flat occupiers would try to camouflage the illegality by claiming they had 
acquired the flat through a Wohnungstausch (home exchange), which 
was permitted by law. Another trick was to draw up a sham sublease.
In the GDR, a large percentage (up to 40 per cent) of the old hous-
ing stock was in private ownership or held in trusts. By moving into 
these houses and establishing informal agreements with the owner, 
Schwarzwohner could circumvent the housing allocation of the state.41 
In some cases, Schwarzwohner were even able to make similar deals with 
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the housing association (‘VEB Gebäudewirtschaft Leipzig’). One exam-
ple is the case in which students and youths occupied a house south of 
the city centre in the mid-1980s. Initially, they were ordered by the hous-
ing association’s staff to vacate the premises, but after two months or so 
without any action from either side, an employee offered the youths a 
Nutzungsgenehmigung (usage agreement) so that they could stay in the 
apartment legally, albeit without full tenants’ rights.42
Unlike the situation in Leiden, such semi-formal or informal deals 
between Schwarzwohner and owners could be considered an adminis-
trative offence. The registers of financial penalties therefore contain sev-
eral names of owners who were fined in the same way as squatters when 
traced. The different property regime in the GDR with state power of dis-
position over private housing created such paradoxical situations. At the 
same time, however, it facilitated informal deals with Schwarzwohner. 
While private owners were unable to procure materials or manpower for 
renovation, they benefited from the willingness of the residents to carry 
out repairs at their own expense, thus preserving the house.
b) Voluntary repairs
In both cities, squatters would move into buildings that were officially 
classed as ‘uninhabitable’, or that had simply stood empty for a long 
time due to a delay in building plans. In some cases, the local authorities 
would then realise that these houses or flats were usable and would clear 
the squatters out in favour of other people in need of housing. In other 
cases, however, squatters could make their case for formalisation by mak-
ing repairs to the squatted property, or by claiming to do so. This became 
an important strategy of acquiring formal residence through goodwill. 
The central argument of the squatters was that they had not jumped the 
waiting list but created living space that had not existed before.
This was the central argument made by a group of youths who 
had squatted in a flat next to an old printing complex in Leiden in the 
mid-1970s. When they were given an eviction notice, they even set out 
to renovate the neighbouring house as an alternative for the new pro-
spective renters. Their action, however, was to no avail, and they were 
still forced to leave.43 In another instance, in May 1974, Leiden students 
squatted in a former monastery in the nearby village of Zoeterwoude. 
They made plans to turn the building into housing for 200 people, as 
well as spaces for artists, conferences and socialising.44 The squatters 
told the media they wanted to renovate the monumental but dilapidated 
building, and even drew up plans with a specialised non-profit housing 
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bureau in Amsterdam. However, the costs, which would have to be paid 
in part by the municipality, proved to be too high and the plan folded. By 
contrast, squatters who occupied the fifteenth-century Begijnhof in 1983 
successfully renovated it and turned it into five apartments. Not only did 
they save the building from demolition, but they were also able to stay.45
Aiming at similar outcomes, Schwarzwohner in Leipzig at times 
offered to undertake extensive renovations at their own expense. Most 
of the occupied flats were run-down, and often even uninhabitable. In 
one case, a 27-year-old man had occupied a flat that was allocated to 
someone else. He managed to convince the authorities that the flat was 
uninhabitable and that he himself was the best person to change this. 
In his petition to the housing department, he meticulously listed all the 
required repairs. The occupant planned to procure two new windows, 
a boiler, two heaters and a slow combustion stove, and underlined that 
he would pay for everything.46 Promptly, the housing apartment offered 
the Schwarzwohner a lease. In another case, in February 1988, the hous-
ing department of Leipzig-Südwest issued a housing permit to a man on 
the condition that he would install a new load-bearing wall.47 It seems 
that offering to make voluntary repairs was a more successful strategy in 
Leipzig than in Leiden, presumably due to the greater difficulties associ-
ated with renovating old housing stock.
Figure 4.3 Monastery in Zoeterwoude squatted in May 1974. The 
squatters envisaged extensive renovation work that never materialised. 
Photo: Jan Holvast. © Archives Leidsch Dagblad, Historische Vereniging 
Oud Leiden.
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c) Communicative practices
Leiden squatters frequently used publicity to acquire goodwill. By tell-
ing their stories of woe to local newspapers, they could pressure local 
authorities. As the following examples show, newspapers and the vari-
ous publications issued by squatter movements, had a direct influence on 
how events unfolded.
In the early 1970s, a large percentage of the squatter population of 
Leiden consisted of young working-class families, often with small chil-
dren. In about half of the cases, political activists offered support and 
know-how, thus increasing the chances of success. Typically, after occu-
pying a house, the squatting families were mentioned or even interviewed 
in the local newspapers as people who were desperate for living space 
and did not see any other option than squatting. Squatters and their sup-
porters also wrote letters to the newspapers, calling for help or attention. 
After positive media coverage, the municipality generally decided to help 
Figure 4.4 A student during the roof repair of a privately owned 
house in Leipzig inhabited by several Schwarzwohner, late 1980s. 
© Olav Metz. 
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the young families. They would be provided with a housing permit or 
an alternative address, even though official policy dictated that everyone 
had to respect the municipal waiting list. However, for squatting families 
to be successful, they needed to be unrelenting and in continuous con-
tact with the press. One such example of a successful squatter action took 
place in Leiden in 1970. After a family had squatted in an apartment, 
the police arrived to evict them. When the father told the police that the 
family had nowhere to go, they were offered a police cell to spend the 
night (they were explicitly not arrested). In the following days, the father 
used the local media to pressure local institutions to provide him and his 
family with a home, which eventually worked. The family was allocated 
a rental house, thus effectively jumping the queue.48
Sometimes, supporters would write to the newspaper either to 
defend squatters who were losing their dwellings or to express sympathy.49 
If media attention was less positive, squatters lost leverage. This happened, 
for example, to a young man, who squatted in a house for himself and his 
pregnant wife in 1971. After a failed squatter attempt in June 1971, the 
man had to appear in court in November, where he was sentenced to a 
fine and two weeks’ probation, because he had squatted in a total of five 
houses, as well as driving a dangerously unroadworthy car without a driv-
ers’ licence or insurance. The squatter replied that he could not pay the 
fines and that eviction and imprisonment would mean he had to leave 
his family living on the street. The newspaper depicted the man not so 
much as an individual worthy of sympathy, but rather as a petty criminal. 
Subsequently, he did not receive much goodwill from the municipality.50
In Leipzig, access to media was virtually non-existent. 
Schwarzwohner generally avoided publicity but did use the semi-public 
means of petitioning to nudge the authorities towards supporting their 
cause. The common discursive strategy in such appeals to the authorities 
was to combine appreciation of the positive sides of the regime with indi-
vidual demands. Jeremy Brooke Straughn has dubbed this strategy ‘the 
arts of consentful contention’.51 One example of this came from the town 
of Halle, close to Leipzig. In 1981, two young couples had occupied a flat 
together in the old town centre and were evicted shortly afterwards. The 
couples moved in again the very next day, and wrote a petition to the 
mayor in which they presented a dramatic description of their living con-
ditions, interspersed with quotes from Party officials denouncing hous-
ing shortages. The housing department of Halle considered the petition, 
at least partly, to be a form of ‘constructive criticism’ and allocated the 
older couple alternative living space. The other two youths, though, were 
sent back to their parents.52
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Figure 4.5 Newspaper report on squatters in Leidsch Dagblad, 22 May 
1979. © Erfgoed Leiden en Omstreken. By contrast, there was no media 
coverage of Schwarzwohnen in Leipzig. 
A fundamental difference between Leiden and Leipzig was that 
public mobilisation was impossible under the communist dictatorship. 
‘Consentful contention’ was more likely to be successful if the occupa-
tion was framed as an individual case. Any direct critique of state policy 
would backfire. In Leiden, on the other hand, there were activist groups 
that used criticism of the authorities to support working-class families. In 
May 1970, the action group Comité Woningnood squatted in two houses 
on the Lange Mare Street for two families.53 As reported in a local daily 
newspaper, the committee members explicitly stated that their action 
was not only aimed at acquiring housing, but also functioned as a ‘polit-
ical stunt’ to address the ‘ridiculous housing situation’ in Leiden.54 The 
two families, however, told the newspaper that the squatter action was 
primarily aimed at ‘getting a house’ for them and their young children. 
Both the police and the owner of the two houses refrained from under-
taking action against the squatting families. They decided that both 
families could stay, at least temporarily. Likewise, when members of the 
Socialist Party occupied the town square with tents in support of three 
squatting families threatened with eviction in June 1973, the municipal-
ity conceded that they would review their cases one more time.55
4.4 Reactions of the authorities and interaction 
with squatters
Both in Leiden and Leipzig, the authorities responded differently to the 
actions of different kinds of squatters. Why were some negotiations suc-
cessful and others not?
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Leniency
Neither in Leiden nor in Leipzig did authorities embark on a particular 
hard-line approach towards squatting. In Leiden, the municipality and 
housing corporations responded in three different ways to the rising 
tide of house occupations in the 1970s. In the first instance, they tried to 
improve their administration, so that houses were more easily allocated to 
renters and not left empty for long periods of time. This, however, proved 
difficult, because Leiden had no fewer than eight housing corporations, 
many of which had boards run by volunteers.56 Second, they put formal 
and informal pressure on squatters to incite them to leave their squatted 
residences. The municipality officially claimed to repress the squatting 
of corporation houses, since it considered such action the equivalent of 
queue-jumping. In a similar vein, the municipality denounced the occu-
pation of empty dwellings that functioned as temporary housing for peo-
ple whose houses were being renovated. It considered the squatting of 
these houses antisocial and an obstruction to renovation works.57 Third, 
the municipality and housing corporations attempted to prevent squat-
ting by rendering houses inhabitable, either by removing plumbing and/
or electrical wiring or by demolishing them altogether. This, however, 
often led to public outcries of indignation in a city where housing short-
ages were rampant.58
Nevertheless, many squatters achieved legalisation, often without 
serious conflicts. The Leiden municipality even sometimes pressured 
private owners to negotiate with squatters.59 When a group of youths 
squatted in several privately owned apartments in a newly built apart-
ment block in the city centre in 1981, the municipality stalled eviction 
measures and instead pressured the building’s project developer to offer 
rental agreements to the squatter youths, which eventually happened.60
The municipality would only start a court case against squatters in 
the most extreme cases, because they were costly and time consuming 
and often led to unsatisfying results for the municipality and housing 
corporations. Judges rarely fined squatters, but limited themselves to 
handing out eviction notices (often needlessly, because squatters rarely 
awaited the court ruling and left before an official eviction notice was 
issued).61
The formal reaction of Leipzig’s housing administration to violations 
of the legal allocation procedure was twofold. After having imposed a 
fine, the authorities had to decide if the squatters could stay. This decision 
was made on the basis of the assessment of urgency of the case. In prac-
tice, this led to outcomes that were very similar to those in Leiden. Even 
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though the language of the housing administration was uncompromis-
ing and intimidating, there was a striking discrepancy between the harsh 
rhetoric and the rather lenient practice of housing authorities. Samples 
indicate that at least half of the Schwarzwohner ultimately obtained per-
mission to stay in the property. However, not all Schwarzwohner dared to 
await this decision, moving out immediately when put under pressure.
discriminative practices
In both cities, authorities were more sympathetic to ‘deprivation-based 
squatting’ and less inclined to accept ‘alternative youths’ with more or 
less overt political motivations.
In Leiden, the municipality often accommodated families of squat-
ters, but generally thwarted squatter actions of alternative youths, because 
they considered them troublemakers. Thus, when eight youths squat-
ted in a large complex on Hooigracht Street in 1974, the municipality 
promptly responded by stating that the building would be used to house 
35 immigrant workers.62 The squatters were offered individual housing, 
but no spaces for collective living. The squatters protested, among other 
means by sleeping in front of the mayor’s house. The city council, how-
ever, remained unsympathetic to their claims.
Seven years later, an abandoned factory building was squatted in by 
unemployed youths. They claimed that they wanted to establish multiple 
small enterprises in the building, such as an art studio, a handicraft cen-
tre, a photo studio and a music studio – and a shop where these manufac-
tured products would be sold.63 The municipality, however, had already 
made plans for the building prior to the squatters’ arrival. Ironically, they 
wanted to tear down the building to make room for a regional employ-
ment office.64 After lengthy negotiations, the municipality offered the 
squatters the abandoned Harteveld complex, a former jenever (gin) dis-
tillery that was subsequently renovated to accommodate small studios. 
The squatters gladly accepted the proposal as a suitable alternative. The 
case illustrates the more sympathetic attitude of the municipality to 
‘entrepreneurial’ squatters than to those who demanded spaces for com-
munal living.
The response of Leipzig’s housing administration to squatting was, 
at first glance, more negative and less discriminative. The negotiating 
position of Leipzig squatters was, however, strengthened by the fact that 
authorities could only file an eviction notice if suitable alternative liv-
ing space was available. Hence, the housing administration’s decision 
was made on the basis of their assessment of urgency and the available 
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alternatives for the informal occupiers. In the case of a divorced shift 
worker who lived with his former wife and three children in cramped 
conditions before he occupied a flat, the housing department imposed a 
very moderate fine of only 150 Marks, and conceded: ‘Eviction is impos-
sible.’ The man was issued a housing permit.65 A young couple who had 
occupied the flat of someone who had emigrated to West Germany also 
received official approval. The man worked as a waiter and had lived in 
an 8 m2 room in his parents’ flat, while the woman had lived with her par-
ents without having her own room. A couple of days after the informal 
occupation, they married. In a discussion with the housing authorities, 
they indicated that the young woman was pregnant, which provided a 
last knock-down argument.66 In another case, it was not urgency, as such, 
but the lack of alternatives that made the housing department accept the 
unauthorised occupation. A man who had lived with his grandmother 
occupied a flat in December 1989 and ignored two eviction notices. It 
turned out that his grandmother was not willing to accommodate him 
any longer – and he was thus given permission to stay in the flat.67 
Generally, bureaucrats in the GDR perceived and treated Schwarzwohnen 
exclusively as deprivation-based squatting. Similar to Leiden, authorities 
were hostile towards, and distrustful of, alternative youths. Nonetheless, 
this did not mean they resorted to brutal repression. The two cities were, 
in fact, rather similar in their restrained responses to political provoca-
tion, as the following section shows.
Confrontations
Generally, political protest was common in Leiden and very rare in Leip-
zig. The reactions of the authorities were neutral-to-sympathetic in Lei-
den, and very negative in Leipzig. Even so, in neither city was squatting 
brutally repressed.
As we have seen, in Leiden, activist squatters often used squatting 
to draw attention to housing problems. Through short-lived theatrical 
actions, they endeavoured to exert pressure on the municipality. The 
authorities often responded sympathetically, although they did not always 
offer concrete solutions. The city’s main street, the Breestraat, was a popu-
lar setting for squatters who wished to make a statement. In March 1979, 
women occupied Breestraat Nº125, demanding that a women’s social 
centre be located there, which was eventually granted (see Figure 4.6).68 
In December 1979, approximately 50 youths temporarily squatted in a 
building at Breestraat Nº 24, decorating the facade with banners stating: 
‘Youths want to live somewhere too’ and ‘No postponement of building 
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Figure 4.6 A short-lived theatrical action against housing shortage 
and speculation on the Breestraat in Leiden, December 1979. Photo: Jan 
Holvast. © Archives Leidsch Dagblad, Historische Vereniging Oud Leiden.
plans’. The action, however, did not elicit any other response than a sin-
cere statement from the city’s alderman to look into the situation.69
When Leipzig’s Schwarzwohner acted in a similar, provocative way, 
their chances of success were greatly diminished, not least because, in 
these cases, it was not the housing department but the police and the 
Stasi that stepped in. Even so, repression was rarely brutal, as the fol-
lowing example illustrates. In May 1984, Schwarzwohner displayed 
slogans on the facade of two dilapidated houses in Erich-Ferl-Straße, a 
busy road east of the town centre. Both slogans had been taken, in an 
act of subversive irony, from the list of suggested slogans for the 1 May 
demonstrations that had been published in the official newspaper of the 
ruling Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party). 
One banner read ‘Freedom to all patriots incarcerated by the reaction’ 
and alluded to the arrest of one resident’s friends. Another five-metre-
long banner stated ‘Housing policy is the centrepiece of our social policy’ 
and was displayed on the front of the neighbouring house, which was in a 
state of collapse. The irony did not go unheeded, and it led to the instant 
removal of the slogans by the fire brigade. Three weeks later, the Stasi 
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interrogated the residents.70 The four young inhabitants, however, did 
not face criminal prosecution, and it took almost three months for the 
police to initiate eviction procedures.
Notably, the eviction only came after another provocation by the 
youths. They had displayed a notice in the window on the ground floor 
stating: ‘This house is still inhabited, don’t carry out any construction 
works. The tenants’.71 The police removed the notice and the housing 
department ordered the occupiers to vacate the premises two days later. 
The house was put under constant surveillance by the police and Stasi. 
On the day of the eviction, the young men brought their furniture out and 
started a sit-in action. For hours, they sat on the pavement of the busy road 
and waited for events to unfold. The police asked the mayor of the bor-
ough to take action, and he ordered staff to ask the squatters to leave, but 
to no avail. Meanwhile, the police also informed the Leipzig chairman of 
the Socialist Unity Party, who ordered the housing department to procure 
a lorry to remove the furniture. That afternoon, everything was loaded 
into the lorry and delivered to different locations, such as the homes of 
family members. Then the authorities cut off the electricity, gas and water 
supplies and nailed the door shut. The authorities nevertheless made sure 
that every resident had an alternative place to stay; indeed, when one of 
them could not be housed with friends or family, the housing department 
allocated him a flat.72 This example illustrates how the state reacted in 
moderation, even in this exceptional case of political provocation.
But even though the reaction of the authorities to protest and crit-
icism was softer than one might expect from a dictatorship, there was 
a fundamental difference: no matter how meagre the results finally 
were, the squatters in Leiden staged their protest with the expectation 
of achieving something. By contrast, the political protest by squatters in 
Leipzig was a desperate provocation, a fatalistic subversive act without 
any expectation of change.
Escalation
In both cities, forceful evictions were only carried out when the author-
ities feared that public order was threatened, as the following examples 
illustrate. In Leiden, there was a limited number of violent confrontations 
when political and punk youths refused to vacate buildings despite court 
orders. These incidents mainly took place in the 1980s and were, to a large 
extent, inspired by militant confrontations in Amsterdam and other met-
ropolitan cities. Thus, an eviction at a house on the Scheepmakerssteeg 
in 1983, for instance, resulted in scuffles with the police, when 50 youths 
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refused to vacate the property.73 The eviction at Breestraat 122 in 1984 
also resulted in violence, even though the eviction itself transpired peace-
fully. Punk youths had barricaded the house and laid doors, smeared with 
oil, on the staircases to make it as hard as possible for the police to enter 
or inspect the house. Even so, when the police entered the building, they 
did not offer active opposition. After the eviction, however, a riot ensued 
in a neighbouring street between police and youths, in which one of the 
officers felt so threatened that he fired a warning shot into the air.74
These kinds of confrontation remained exceptional in Leiden, and it 
is remarkable that both squatters and authorities in the city often referred 
to them as ‘Amsterdam-like situations’ in the media.75 In March 1980, after 
heavy squatter riots in Amsterdam, Leiden’s deputy mayor stated that a 
combination of ‘six years of open debate about squatting’ in the media and 
the Leiden Squatters’ League’s ‘careful’ choices of property to squat in had 
made it possible to avoid such escalation in Leiden.76 Indeed, when a group 
of squatters occupied the city council building in June 1979, in solidarity 
with other squatters threatened with eviction, the occupiers blocked the 
door but refrained from further action. Correspondingly, the council mem-
bers decided not to call the police but to leave through an open window 
and start a discussion with the activists (see Figure 4.5).77 Even in 1985, 
after a number of Leiden evictions had ended in police interventions, the 
Leiden mayor claimed proudly: ‘Never has the riot police had cause to 
intervene in the city, and it will remain that way.’78
Figure 4.7 Police and young squatters in Leiden in April 1980. Photo: 
Jan Holvast. © Archives Leidsch Dagblad, Historische Vereniging Oud 
Leiden.
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Figure 4.8 The location of the Rockpalast party in Leipzig-Lindenau in 
1981 after a raid by the People’s Police. © BStU. 
In Leipzig, there was no violence on the part of the squatters at all. 
Brutal, mass police action only occurred when the security forces feared 
disturbances or political provocation on a large scale. This happened 
in the exceptional case of a temporary occupation of an empty house 
in Leipzig-West in 1981. The purpose of the one-night squatting action 
was not to acquire housing but to throw a party. The annual ‘Rockpalast’ 
concert in Cologne was broadcast that evening on West German TV, and 
the young organisers used this as an opportunity to organise a big social 
event. The event was secretly prepared, electricity supply installed, a TV 
borrowed and the banisters mended. About a hundred youths turned up 
in joyful anticipation of watching groups such as the Grateful Dead and 
The Who in concert. By midnight, an exuberant party atmosphere had 
developed, when the police brought the event to an abrupt end.79 Police 
started to inspect the passports of the guests, and after much wrangling 
they bundled dozens of young people into army trucks, partly with force, 
and interrogated them until the next morning. Most of them only had 
to pay a moderate fine of 75 Marks.80 The police interpreted the event 
as a subversive activity. The organisers had taken their cue from West 
German squatters, and one guest had displayed leaflets at the party fea-
turing socio-critical poetry. The harsh reaction of the state was partly a 
result of this political interpretation of the event, and also partly due to 
fears that the action would reach the public sphere.
By contrast, the eviction in 1989 of a house occupied by punks 
remained peaceful. The ramshackle house in Dufourstraße had become 
a meeting place for Leipzig’s punks, but although the Stasi and the police 
were aware of this, they tolerated it for years. Apparently, they did not 
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deem the house to be a threat to public order or the political status quo. 
The authorities only evicted the residents in 1989, mainly because of the 
risk of the building collapsing. The punks toyed with the idea of blowing 
up the property, but ultimately left grudgingly, only leaving one anar-
chist flag to the rear of the house.81
4.5 Conclusion
The fundamentally different political regimes of Leiden and Leipzig 
obviously had an impact on the appearance of squatting and its treat-
ment by the two cities. In Leiden, squatting was more overt, as publicity 
would help mobilise support in many cases. In the GDR, Schwarzwoh-
nen remained a tacit and rather invisible practice. Also, in contrast to the 
occupation of whole buildings in Leiden, Schwarzwohner normally occu-
pied single flats.
At the same time, there were remarkable similarities in the motiva-
tions, strategies and official responses to informal housing in Leiden and 
Leipzig during the 1970s and 1980s. Studies of the two cities reveal a 
similar variety of motivations for squatting, and a similar discriminative 
policy practised by the authorities – prioritising deprivation-based squat-
ting and looking askance at (Leiden) or repressing (Leipzig) communal 
living. Considering this, Schwarzwohner in Leipzig almost always pre-
sented themselves as needy, since any indication of political motivations 
or alternative lifestyles weakened their bargaining position. To propiti-
ate the state, they also offered voluntary maintenance and repairs, and 
paid unsolicited rents. Squatters in Leiden applied very similar strategies. 
They, too, wired money to owners and offered voluntary renovation work.
A slight difference lies in the fact that most Schwarzwohner consid-
ered informal occupation primarily a means to an end. Generally, there 
was no ‘squatter identity’ in the GDR and no squatting for the purpose 
of acquiring spaces for politically oppositional activities. Squatters in 
Leipzig commonly displayed a willingness to legalise their occupation. 
Nevertheless, a significant proportion of squatters in Leiden also squat-
ted out of necessity and made great efforts to reach an agreement with 
the authorities. Political activists and alternative youths were thus only 
part of a much larger squatter population.
Furthermore, the general attitude of the authorities in Leipzig and 
Leiden was rather similar. Housing administrations in both cities dis-
played a marked discrepancy between a relatively harsh rhetoric and 
rather lenient practices imbued with socialist values. However, these 
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policies came into effect differently. In Leiden, local authorities were 
mainly social democrats in a bind between the ‘ideal’ of social housing 
and the reality of housing shortage. Concessions to squatters were often a 
result of media pressure. In Leipzig, the authorities were intent on restor-
ing order, but evictions were seriously hampered by the legal framework. 
The root cause of this was that the communist dictatorship highly valued 
social security and justice, which established authoritative points of ref-
erence to which the Schwarzwohner could appeal. These binding values 
made it impossible to deny the right to housing enshrined in the con-
stitution, and therefore turned out to be conducive to informal housing 
in many cases. Additionally, mismanagement facilitated unauthorised 
housing significantly (a feature that applied to Leiden as well).
To some extent, these resemblances challenge the dichotomy of 
democracy and dictatorship. However, some aspects of squatting in the 
Netherlands did not have any equivalent in the GDR, such as the possibil-
ity of public campaigns and protest. Squatters in Leiden were frequently 
supported by activists – often, the squatters were activists themselves. 
They would try to organise popular support and resort to actions such 
as picketing and occupations of streets, squares or municipal offices. 
Although they required tenacity and a keen eye for the media, such pro-
tests were often successful in the Dutch city. In the East German dictator-
ship, by contrast, charm offensives in the media or political protest were 
entirely impossible. While squatters in Leiden could use publicity to vent 
their general criticisms of housing policy, comparable intentions were 
met with harsh repression in Leipzig. There, stories of hardship could 
only hope to achieve results if addressed directly to the government, 
accompanied and supported by ideological phrases.
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Squatters and the socialist heritage: 
A comparison of informal settlements 
in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan
Eliza isabaeva
5.1 Introduction
In her article on comparative urbanism in Central Asia, Elena Trubina 
laments that there is ‘an almost total absence of comparison between cit-
ies’ in Central Asia.1 She continues that the limited research that exists 
on Central Asian cities ‘simply stands for large-scale tendencies’, illus-
trating wider processes but refraining from detailed studies of urban 
life. This chapter offers a response to this critique. It provides a detailed 
comparative study of informal housing in Kyrgyzstan’s capital city Bish-
kek and in the former and current capital cities of neighbouring Kazakh-
stan – Almaty and Astana.2 In all three cities, there exists a number of 
populous, unauthorised settlements on the cities’ peripheries. These set-
tlements and the similarities and differences between them provide the 
focus for this chapter. The comparison will point out important common-
alities between these Kyrgyz and Kazakh cities, while also highlighting 
the diverging ways in which these informal settlements have developed 
and the different interactions of squatters with authorities in pursuing 
their claimed rights. I will be examining the outcome of state–squatter 
interactions in these different contexts. Kyrgyzstan has largely taken a 
negotiation-based approach, while Kazakhstan has used violent methods 
to crack down on illegal settlements. Why did these two countries differ 
in their approaches, and how did these different policies influence the 
situation of squatter settlements?
As regards terminology, I will be using the adjectives ‘illegal’ or 
‘unauthorised’, which mainly represent the perspective of the state, when 
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discussing how these settlements emerged (that is, by occupying plots of 
land without permission to do so). By contrast, I will use ‘informal’ when 
dealing with the views and actions of settlement-dwellers.
The data I have gathered about Bishkek’s squatter settlements origi-
nate predominantly from a settlement called Ak Zhar, where I conducted 
extensive anthropological research in 2012–2013 by means of semi- 
structured interviews, expert interviews and participant observation. 
Likewise, I closely observed the work of Ak Zhar’s community leaders. 
When I discuss settlements in Almaty and Astana, I mainly rely on research 
articles and primary sources on the topic, which are available online.
5.2 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: Similar but different
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are not only neighbouring countries but also 
culturally very close to one another. People in these two countries often 
refer to each other as ‘sister peoples’ and this is always emphasised by 
the rulers of both countries. In addition, the distance between Bishkek 
and Almaty, the former Kazakh capital, is only a three-hour drive. How-
ever, the two countries differ in their political and economic situations. 
Kazakhstan is an authoritarian country with a strong presidential rule, 
whereas Kyrgyzstan has preferred parliamentary democracy since 2010. 
Furthermore, Kazakhstan is economically more prosperous than Kyr-
gyzstan, thanks to the country’s significant oil reserves.
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan both became independent after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The demise of the socialist state pushed 
both countries into a difficult economic, political and social situation. 
Unemployment rates rose dramatically as many factories and plants had 
to close down. This drove the majority of the population into poverty, 
and rural areas were hit especially hard. Impoverished rural inhabit-
ants reacted with mass migrations to the cities. During the Soviet era, 
there already existed a clear distinction between rural and urban areas, 
whereby the former were viewed as destitute and the latter as prosper-
ous.3 New arrivals to the city were called pejoratively myrki or ‘uncultured 
villagers’ in Kyrgyzstan,4 and in Kazakhstan they were perceived as risky 
and unstable newcomers who ‘find it easy to engage in excessive alcohol 
and drug abuse, violence, and crime’.5 Such negative images of incom-
ing migrants were reinforced in the mid-2000s when they seized plots in 
the outskirts of Kyrgyzstan’s and Kazakhstan’s major cities. Unauthorised 
settlements popped up in the three cities in different time periods: in 
Almaty in the early 1990s and 2000s, in Astana in the early 2000s and in 
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Bishkek in the early 1990s, early 2000s and mid-2000s. These squatter 
actions signalled a new sense of freedom as well as a different perception 
of existence after the demise of state socialism.
Samozakhvat, or land squatting, is considered illegal in both 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Those who practise squatting are called zakh-
vatchiki (literally: grabbers). Zakhvatchiki have a poor reputation and are 
commonly perceived as criminals or law-breakers. The act of samozakh-
vat is believed to create chaos in ‘orderly’ urban settings and to destabilise 
society. Obviously, the states’ reactions to this were disapproving, and both 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz authorities undertook measures to punish the squat-
ters. The punishments, however, differed between these two countries.
In Kazakhstan, the state usually resorted to physical violence, 
demolishing houses and evicting people from their dwellings. Only the 
first squatter settlements, which emerged in Almaty in the early years of 
independence, were legalised and provided with necessary infrastruc-
ture. But when the legalised settlements grew closer to the city centre in 
the early 2000s, the state reacted unsparingly.6 In Kyrgyzstan, too, the first 
settlements that emerged in the early 1990s were legalised. Later on, in 
the early 2000s and after the Tulip Revolution in 2005, the attitude of the 
state shifted towards ignoring the existence of the settlements and turn-
ing a blind eye to the basic needs and concerns of their residents. After 
large-scale public protests, which the settlements’ inhabitants staged to 
make claims for infrastructure and legalisation, this policy of neglect 
transformed into one of active toleration,7 whereby authorities not only 
facilitated the provision of water and electricity but also began to discuss 
how to integrate the settlements into the official administrative structures.
5.3 Squatter settlements in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan
In the following, I introduce three informal settlements in the three cities 
under discussion. I start with the settlement of Ak Zhar in Bishkek, where 
I conducted extensive field research, and then discuss the settlements of 
Shanyrak in Almaty and Ondiris on the outskirts of Astana.
ak Zhar, bishkek
Ak Zhar is an unauthorised settlement to the north of Bishkek, lying just 
across the city boundary. It emerged in the spring of 2005 immediately 
after the Tulip Revolution as a result of land squatting. The majority of 
the current residents of Ak Zhar, when I talked to them, did not want to 
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be called or viewed as zakhvatchiki, mainly due to the fact that they con-
sidered their action to constitute organised, orderly acquisition of land. 
They told me they had purchased plots of land or houses from a group 
of people they referred to as top bashy. As I was told, top bashylar (pl.) 
had – allegedly – connections to influential state officials, who provided 
them with information about which plot around Bishkek was ‘available’ 
for squatting.8 Having squatted in the large territory of what is today’s Ak 
Zhar, the top bashylar started distributing plots among their family mem-
bers, relatives and fellow villagers. According to the stories I heard, top 
bashylar also sold plots to other people who approached them with an 
interest in purchasing them. It is believed that top bashylar made a good 
deal of money out of illegal land sales and then vanished from Ak Zhar. 
Today, the whereabouts of top bashylar are unknown.
When people started to settle in Ak Zhar, the state agencies (includ-
ing the regional architects’ office, the department dealing with private 
residential construction, and the Kyrgyz scientific institute charged with 
city planning) came to identify the settlement as illegal because the act of 
squatting had violated the law. Accordingly, the state disavowed the set-
tlement and did not officially recognise it. Thus, in the initial years of Ak 
Zhar’s existence, dwellers lived under harsh conditions, as it remained 
disconnected from basic infrastructure such as electricity and drinking 
water, with no central heating or sewage systems. Mainstream Bishkek 
residents were largely against illegal appropriation of the city’s land and 
called on the state authorities to punish the squatters and to refrain from 
legalising their settlements.9 In this hostile environment, Ak Zhar resi-
dents initially tried to resolve their everyday problems by themselves and 
live their lives as ‘quiet encroachers’.10 For instance, they purchased pri-
vate generators to light their homes at night, and they bought bottled 
drinking water. See Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
When Ak Zhar residents gained force in terms of population num-
bers, they were able to organise a large-scale protest by blocking a strate-
gically important road in Bishkek.11 They demanded access to electricity 
and drinking water and the legalisation of Ak Zhar, which would entail 
the recognition of their properties, thus turning the occupants into 
property owners. The protesters succeeded in their bid to meet with the 
 highest-ranking officials (namely, the then-Prime Minister, Atambaev, 
and the then-mayor of Bishkek, Omurkulov), who committed to resolv-
ing their problems. While the electrification of Ak Zhar was entrusted to 
a private company, it was promised that overall responsibility for the area 
in which Ak Zhar was located would be transferred to the city of Bishkek 
and taken away from the Province of Chui, thus upgrading the potential 
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Figure 5.1 A northern part of Ak Zhar on the outskirts of Bishkek. 
© Eliza Isabaeva. 
Figure 5.2 Laying the foundation of a future house in Ak Zhar. © Eliza 
Isabaeva. 
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status of the settlement. The transfer from one municipality to the other 
(called locally transformatsiia) proved to be a protracted and onerous 
bureaucratic process, however, and the legalisation of Ak Zhar has not 
yet occurred. Nevertheless, significant steps towards legalising unau-
thorised settlements like Ak Zhar have been taken by the government. 
The Speaker of the Kyrgyz Parliament declared in summer 2018 that a 
law on legalising illegal settlements had been passed by the Parliament, 
pending only the President’s signature.12
shanyrak, almaty
In comparison with Bishkek and its population of approximately one mil-
lion inhabitants, the former Kazakh capital Almaty is home to around 
two million people, around 100,000 of whom are inhabitants of informal 
settlements.13 Although squatter settlements in the former Kazakh cap-
ital also emerged in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union,14 notably it was only after 2005 that they appeared on the radar of 
the Kazakh state authorities as an object of close inspection. It was the Tulip 
Revolution in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, in which the main participants 
were said to be poor and desperate dwellers of likewise poor and periph-
eral settlements, that changed state policy.15 When the Kazakh authorities 
became aware of the political power of these people, they changed their 
approach to the illegal settlements from indifference to repression.
In 2005, Kazakh authorities opted to instigate demolitions and 
evictions in many squatter settlements, including plans to demolish a 
considerable number of houses in the Shanyrak settlement. Although 
these measures were generally effective, they led to clashes between 
city authorities and the settlements’ residents. One day, in September 
2005, the residents of Shanyrak organised a protest, which was met 
by the special police forces, trying to disperse the protesters. In view 
of the upcoming presidential elections in Kazakhstan, the city’s mayor 
Tasmagambetov visited the protesting dwellers of Shanyrak and prom-
ised that no houses would be demolished, except those that had been 
built recently; but after the elections he began to harshly criticise the 
squatters. When demolitions took place in the settlements of Bakai and 
Aigerim, this made Shanyrak residents even more nervous, and ten-
sions rose.16 Finally, on 14 July 2006, a violent clash between police and 
Shanyrak dwellers took place. Media coverage shows bleeding police 
officers with severe head injuries as a result of being pelted with rocks. 
And worse was to come: the residents even took one of the police officers 
hostage and burned him to death. Police detained more than 20 people 
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Figure 5.3 Shanyrak residents confronting police. Photo by Anna 
Kalashnikova. © Ferghana Information Agency.
Figure 5.4 Blocking the road – an attempt to prevent the demolition 
of houses in Shanyrak, Almaty. Photo by Andrei Grishin. © Ferghana 
Information Agency.
for rioting, and four of them were later sentenced to long jail terms, being 
found guilty of organising the disturbances in which the police officer 
lost his life.17 After this violent escalation (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4), the 
authorities allowed the settlement population to legalise their properties 
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and provided communication and other infrastructures, to prevent a 
potential clash between the people and police in the future. Shanyrak 
subsequently became a new quarter in the city called Alatau.18
ondiris, astana
Astana, the new capital of Kazakhstan, founded in 1997, soon faced 
the same problems as Bishkek and Almaty. Internal migrants from rural 
provincial areas came to Astana in search of employment and better 
living conditions. Unauthorised settlements began to appear on the 
outskirts of the city. One of them, the settlement of Ondiris, emerged in 
2004 during the peak of the construction boom in Astana. Current res-
idents of Ondiris tell a story of organised squatting similar to that in Ak 
Zhar in Bishkek: that they had bought their plots of land from a woman 
who turned out to be a fraudster. She had allegedly faked property doc-
uments for the land and sold plots to many people. The authorities did 
not recognise these property documents and thus declared Ondiris an 
illegal settlement.19 Likewise, Ondiris dwellers faced many problems 
similar to the ones in Ak Zhar and other settlements. With no drinking 
water, they had to transport it from far away; they had to organise their 
own electricity supply by purchasing the necessary pylons and cables; 
there were no social infrastructures, such as schools or paved roads; 
and the legalisation of Ondiris proved to be (and continues to be) a 
long and difficult political and bureaucratic process. Whereas Shanyrak 
has now been recognised as a legal settlement and Ak Zhar is one step 
away from legalisation, it appears that Ondiris will have to continue 
its fight for official recognition for some time yet. The Astana author-
ities have promised not to demolish any homes or evict anyone from 
their dwellings. But they have also clearly stated that plots will not be 
legalised and that Ondiris residents will not be granted any property 
documents.20
5.4 The attitudes of squatters towards the state
Having briefly described three unauthorised settlements in Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan, I now want to discuss the interaction between state and 
squatters in these two countries. The authorities represent a Weberian 
perspective of the state, in which state laws are above everything else. 
While, in Kazakhstan, the state used physical as well as psychological vio-
lence to reinforce the law, in Kyrgyzstan mainly psychological violence 
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was used, based on non-recognition and neglect of needs. However, 
at the same time, squatters expanded the scope of this perspective by 
contesting it and employing different sets of appeals,21 thereby actively 
re-making supposedly static laws and likewise shifting supposedly fixed 
boundaries between the illegal and the legal.22 Thus, in both Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan, the interaction between authorities and squatters has 
shown itself to be dynamic and bi-directional rather than passive and 
unidirectional (such as top-down).
Nevertheless, the attitudes of the authorities and informal settle-
ment residents differ between the two countries. In view of the Tulip 
Revolution in the neighbouring country, the Kazakh authorities were will-
ing to go toe-to-toe with settlement residents and went as far as demol-
ishing houses. Shanyrak inhabitants in Almaty reacted aggressively and 
tried to defend their dwellings by any means possible, such as blocking 
roads, burning tyres and fighting the police. Bishkek’s peripheral settle-
ments never witnessed such harsh clashes. The Kyrgyz authorities were 
very cautious not to anger the masses of destitute people so soon after 
the Tulip Revolution. Likewise, Ak Zhar residents avoided escalation. 
Although they criticised the Kyrgyz state (institutions as well as political 
leadership) and protested by blocking the road and other means, their 
attitude was generally non-confrontational. Instead, they sent repeated 
signals to the authorities that their existence and their problems should 
no longer be ignored. Residents of informal settlements criticised the 
Kyrgyz state and blamed it for their desperate situation. This criticism of 
the government was often based on moral comparisons – for example, 
that influential and wealthy people were allowed to monopolise power 
and grab national assets in addition to improperly acquired money to 
finance their lavish lifestyles, while poor people were punished for seiz-
ing land to live on.23 In raising these objections, they tried to turn the 
state’s attention to their concerns and convince it to take action. One of 
my informants summarised their attitude concisely: ‘We want to belong 
to the state’ (in Kyrgyz: biz dele ökmöttün kishisi bolgubuz kelet). I also 
heard people saying ‘What else can we do [to accelerate the legalisation 
process]?’ or ‘What else is expected from us?’ (in Kyrgyz: dagy emne kyly-
shybyz kerek?). There was a desire for the state on the part of Ak Zhar 
residents, then, when it turned its back on the people by refusing to 
accept and recognise the settlement. Their questions revealed a readi-
ness to integrate into the state’s structures if they were allowed to stay 
in Ak Zhar. This pragmatic attitude made it easier for the Kyrgyz state 
authorities to negotiate with Ak Zhar’s people on the terms of inclusion 
and recognition.
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Ak Zhar’s population also showed a willingness to bear a part of 
the costs related to legalisation and the provision of infrastructure. For 
example, when the budget allocated for electrification was depleted, the 
residents were asked to raise their own money and finance the acqui-
sition of additional pylons and cables. Furthermore, each household 
bought its own electricity meter. Residents also raised money for drafting 
the master urban plan for Ak Zhar – an important precondition for the 
legalisation of the settlement – and each household contributed 500 KGS 
(approximately $10 US at that time) to pay the relevant fees to the archi-
tects’ office of Chui Province. In this sense, the politics of negotiation and 
active toleration of the Kyrgyz state turned Ak Zhar dwellers into contrib-
uting citizens. The manner in which the Kyrgyz state acted – employing 
no physical violence while still rejecting Ak Zhar residents – made the 
settlement population ‘yearn’, in a sense, for the state.
In Kazakhstan, by contrast, state violence against Shanyrak resi-
dents – which turned out to be costly, both financially and in terms of 
human life – had resulted in the state single-handedly providing the nec-
essary infrastructure for the settlement’s residents and legalising their 
properties, thereby asserting its one-sided power relationship with the 
people.
Correspondingly, a subtle difference between informal  settlement- 
dwellers in Bishkek, Almaty and Astana can be seen in one particular 
strategy with which they tried to argue their right to housing. In both 
Kazakh cities, residents of unauthorised settlements turned to the then 
Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev personally as the ultimate 
merciful figure that would protect ordinary people. For example, when 
evictions were conducted in the settlement of Bakai in Almaty, residents 
carried poster-sized portraits of Nazarbayev to prove ‘their citizenship 
and loyalty to the state, trying to avert forced eviction’.24 Similarly, in 
Astana, an elderly woman named Nesipgül Uiabayeva, whose little shack 
was scheduled to be demolished, glued 91 portrait photos of Nazarbayev 
onto it, in the hope that this would stop state representatives taking 
action against her. As Uiabayeva explained:
Why did I put up portraits of our president? Because our function-
aries no longer fear God, they fear no one; may they now fear our 
president. The president’s politics ensured that folk lived well, that 
our future looked promising, that it was on a high level. And they 
[the functionaries] are evicting us onto the streets by taking away 
our own land.25
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By turning to Nazarbayev, the woman was attempting to make him into 
an ally of her cause. As both cases demonstrate, for residents of informal 
settlements in Kazakhstan the country’s president represented an entire 
state apparatus. More than in the judicial system, in state agencies or 
in state officials, people believe in the ‘justice’ provided by Nazarbayev 
personally. In Ak Zhar, similarly, dwellers wrote numerous petitions 
directed to individual politicians whom they took to be personifications 
of the state. At the same time, it is common to hear ordinary Kyrgyzstani 
citizens say that they openly admonish the president or prime minister 
and show dissatisfaction with their decisions. In Kyrgyzstan, similarly 
to Kazakhstan, the state is commonly associated with individual politi-
cians  – that is, there is a personified perception of the state. However, 
while in Kazakhstan this personification paves the way to a ‘king-like’ 
veneration, Kyrgyzstan is much more pluralistic in this respect. Kyrgyz 
citizens thus have a variety of personalities at their disposal, to whom 
they can appeal and whom they can ‘revere’.
In the understanding of ordinary Kazakhstanis and Kyrgyzstanis, 
a strong state is one that can guarantee unity, stability and order.26 This 
Soviet understanding of a state is often tied to the rule of the strong 
leader.27 But, as there is no such strong leader in Kyrgyzstan, the state 
in Ak Zhar is often perceived as weak or even absent, and Kyrgyzstanis 
frequently complain about lack of leadership. However, that apparent 
weakness does not necessarily lead to negative outcomes for Kyrgyzstani 
citizens. In the Kazakh case, a strong state has used its power to violently 
crush the people’s demands for inclusion and better living conditions, 
whereas, in the Kyrgyz case, contested power relations have made nego-
tiations, compromise and inclusion possible.
Although in authoritarian Kazakhstan (until recently, ruled by a 
single leader for almost three decades)28 there exists an obvious struc-
tural continuity between the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet state, one 
may argue that pluralistic Kyrgyzstan, paradoxically, has remained more 
committed to the values of the socialist past. This commitment first and 
foremost expresses itself in a sense of responsibility for ensuring the well-
being of its citizens – including the provision of housing – to which the 
inhabitants of unauthorised settlements can also appeal. The stronger 
role of public opinion gives the squatters scope to invoke the socialist 
legacy and remind the state authorities of the socialist traditions of tak-
ing care of citizens and attending to their needs. In doing so, people in 
Kyrgyzstan can gain leverage over the ruling leadership and the way pol-
itics play out in the country. Because there is demand and pressure from 
106 CoMparatiVE approaCHEs to inforMaL HoUsinG aroUnd tHE GLobE
the people, the Kyrgyz state often acknowledges its responsibility to pro-
vide its citizenry with housing, even if it is acquired illegally.
The living conditions of many people in Ak Zhar during the time 
of my research were far from decent. But at least the state did not evict 
people from homes, and even extended basic material infrastructure, 
actively negotiating the terms of inclusion and recognition. Conversely, 
in Kazakhstan, the authoritarian regime has cracked down on opposing 
public opinion, projecting the image of an unassailable state with its 
strong leader Nazarbayev at the helm.
5.5 Conclusion
At one time, Soviet member states Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan shared 
a similar history and path of development. Even in the early years of 
independence, their socio-economic and political problems and their 
nation-building efforts were comparable. However, their development 
trajectories began to diverge. Kazakh leadership has established a strong 
authoritarian rule, with Nazarbayev being an irreplaceable president 
since 1991,29 whereas Kyrgyzstan is now governed by its fifth president, 
elected in 2018. Unlike Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan went through two pop-
ular revolts, which put an end to the authoritarian ambitions of the first 
two presidents. These episodes of unrest have given the Kyrgyzstani peo-
ple a sense of their transformative power. Although residents of Ak Zhar 
perceive this power as well, as their statements and actions testify, their 
overall stance is ambiguous. In their protests, the people of Ak Zhar also 
showed how much they longed to be considered a part of the state – to 
be included instead of excluded. The Kyrgyz authorities acquiesced and 
began to negotiate the concrete terms of recognition and inclusion, 
searching common ground with Ak Zhar dwellers.
The absence of physical violence towards the dwellers of squatter 
settlements in Kyrgyzstan, in contrast to the violent confrontations in 
Kazakhstan, is an important difference. Although both countries once 
lived under the paternalistic Soviet system, the Kyrgyz state has suc-
ceeded in building a more productive relationship with dwellers of ille-
gal settlements – and thereby in committing to central elements of the 
socialist welfare system, such as the right to housing. From this, one may 
arrive at the paradoxical conclusion that the more pluralistic post-Soviet 
societies have, in some way, remained closer to the socialist past than 
societies ruled by unyielding authoritarianism in the Soviet tradition. In 
this interpretation, it is the existence of political power-sharing and the 
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right to free public expression that allowed Kyrgyzstani squatters to exert 
pressure on the state by invoking the country’s socialist past and ‘remind-
ing’ state authorities of exemplary socialist traditions.
The experience of informal housing in Kazakhstan was very differ-
ent. After an initial phase of inaction, it was the revolutionary turmoil 
in Kyrgyzstan that prompted the Kazakh authorities to openly confront 
squatters and illegal land occupation. This was supposed to bring a 
return to order and establish the superiority of law above all else in soci-
ety, but it provoked violent reactions from those affected by eviction and 
demolition. As the case of the Shanyrak settlement shows, such a con-
frontation has led to dire consequences: evictions, demolitions, injured 
law- enforcement officers and even loss of human life. Only afterwards did 
the Kazakh authorities agree to formalise Shanyrak and provide material 
as well as social infrastructure, but firmly within a top-down approach. 
Conversely, in the case of Ondiris, the Astana authorities have exerted 
psychological violence by refusing the squatters’ requests for acknowl-
edgment and for legalisation of the settlement. As such, authoritarian-
ism not only fosters violence, which makes negotiations and consensus 
difficult or even impossible. Authoritarianism can also constitute (and 
simultaneously disguise) a clear break from the more laudable achieve-
ments of the socialist past by silencing the voices of former Soviet citizens 
and their nostalgic claim-making. As the case study of Shanyrak shows, 
this does not exclude the possibility that even authoritarian regimes can 
eventually make concessions to their citizens – but only after the failure 
of violence.
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Squatting activism in Brazil and 
Spain: Articulations between the right 
to housing and the right to the city
Clarissa Campos and Miguel a. Martínez
6.1 Introduction
There is an abundance of studies on squatting published over the last two 
decades.1 There is little consensus about the boundaries of the subject 
itself, with different expressions of informal dwelling and urban settle-
ments, illegal occupations of land and buildings, tenure insecurity and 
substandard housing, and even some aspects of homelessness all falling 
under the umbrella of squatting. Against this backdrop, we will argue 
that a) squatting practices, defined as unauthorised occupations of land 
and buildings, predominantly indicate structural inequalities and injus-
tice deeply rooted in the prevailing housing markets and policies, and b) 
the more politicised and activist expressions of squatting represent the 
most explicit challenge to housing oppression.2
This chapter compares specific forms of squatting in two metropoli-
tan areas from the Global South and North, respectively – Belo Horizonte 
(Brazil) and Madrid (Spain). We elaborate our comparison by taking into 
account the features of the state and world–regional contexts (Brazil and 
Spain, on the one hand, and Latin America and Europe, on the other) 
without limiting ourselves to the first-hand data collected from the two 
cities. Furthermore, we frame our analysis according to a political econ-
omy approach by asking: what can we learn from squatting that may 
help us understand the mechanisms of oppression and the limits of the 
capitalist production and governance of cities?3 This does not entail a 
blunt assumption about the homogeneity of global capitalism – which 
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would render any comparison unnecessary. Rather, we aim to illumi-
nate how the different varieties of urban neoliberalism are contested by 
squatting practices and movements in both the Global South and North. 
This justifies our focus on squatting activism as opposed to examining all 
the situations involving informal or illegal urbanism. Squatters contest 
urban inequalities according to different strategies, resources, contex-
tual opportunities and contentious interactions with the authorities and 
property owners. Prior comparative research has paid only scant atten-
tion to all these aspects, and has hardly, if at all, incorporated the squat-
ters’ activism into the picture.
As we substantiate here, both land and building occupations are 
tightly connected by activism, especially in the Brazilian context. This 
runs counter to the current view of urban squatting worldwide as being 
characterised by a landscape featuring almost exclusively favelas. We 
also note that housing injustice under the rule of speculative and finan-
cial capitalism motivates squatting actions and claims, but these go 
beyond the housing question in both Brazil and Spain. Occupied houses, 
social centres and vacant land at the urban core, as disparate as they may 
appear, are all driven by grassroots expressions of the ‘right to the city’.4 
Despite the formal attempts to include the right to the city in some legal 
regulations, squatters’ radical politics provides a material manifestation 
of that right. Finally, by discussing how different policies and negotia-
tions related to squatting occur in each context, we aim to disclose the 
extent of squatters’ empowerment through very demanding and some-
times desperate direct action when housing and cities are subject to pow-
erful capitalist interests. Legalisations of squats and land occupations are 
quite controversial issues, but it is even more noticeable that they usually 
remain concealed from public view.
This research is based on data collection and analyses that were 
conducted independently by each author, except for two weeks of shared 
fieldwork study in the city of Madrid where we conducted five inter-
views and eight site visits (in November 2018). Miguel Martínez was 
engaged in activist ethnography in Madrid, mainly between 2007 and 
2013, although he also gathered empirical information by conducting 
more than one hundred personal interviews and tracking mass media 
news from other Spanish cities over three decades. Clarissa Campos had 
been visiting occupations in Belo Horizonte since 2016, and she also 
conducted 16 interviews with activists from December 2018 to January 
2019 and from July to September 2019, in addition to consulting various 
secondary sources about the movement.5
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6.2 Brazil: Beyond housing informality in favelas, 
the right to the city centre
After 21 years of military dictatorship in Brazil (1964–1985), a new con-
stitution was written and came into force during the re- democratisation 
period. In contrast with a past characterised by state censorship, tor-
tures, murders and arbitrary persecution of individuals and organisa-
tions identified as leftists, the 1988 constitution granted fundamental 
democratic rights and provided legal instruments for their realisation. 
Housing, in particular, was made a constitutional right for the first 
time, through an amendment of Article 6 in 2000. Another key novelty 
was the binding of the right to property to the fulfilment of its social 
function (mainly Article 5, but also Articles 170, 182, 184, 186). This 
notion refers to prioritising the general interests before those of indi-
vidual proprietors, in a fair way. Such a statement implies that unpro-
ductive lands and abandoned buildings may contradict their social 
function. By 2001, all the urban policy instruments called for in the 
constitution were formally brought together and regulated under the 
Estatuto da Cidade (City Statute, Federal Law 10.257), having as one of 
its bases the right to the city.6
Despite such rights and legal instruments being formally guaran-
teed, their efficiency is questionable. According to 2015 estimates, the 
housing deficit in Brazil amounted to 6.4 million households, of which 
87.7 per cent were located in urban areas. Leaving aside the housing 
needs of future generations, the actual deficit affects more than 19 mil-
lion people (around 10 per cent of the entire population, but probably 
higher).7 At the same time, the number of vacant dwellings reached 7.9 
million, 80.3 per cent of which were located in urban areas.8 This sys-
temic contradiction prompts one to ask: why is vacancy not used to house 
the needy?
Property speculation is the obvious answer. Empty units are com-
modities that must secure the greatest possible profit for their owners. 
Three decades of neoliberal policies since the recovery of democracy did 
nothing to alter the hegemony of capitalist interests regardless of the con-
stitutional prescriptions. Even the first progressive government, led by 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2006), was known for implementing aus-
terity measures that were lately balanced with more intense anti- poverty 
and redistributive policies in a favourable context of global economic 
expansion.9 In particular, housing policies were seen as an instrument to 
soften the aforementioned strains.
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For example, the first large-scale public housing construction 
programme in Brazil, Minha Casa Minha Vida – MCMV (My House 
My Life), launched in 2009, was a move in that direction, but it has 
also attracted criticism. According to several reports,  besides not hav-
ing reduced the housing deficit, MCMV presents other serious prob-
lems.10 In sum, these are related to 1) low quality of certain buildings 
(insufficient size of the units and deficient technical–constructive 
characteristics); 2) the high prices residents have to pay for utilities 
or other costs they were not expecting to be responsible for; and 3) 
the peripheral or undesirable location of the housing complexes.11 In 
fact, the most frequent criticism aimed at MCMV was that many of the 
dwellings are built in areas far from the city centres, without proper 
transportation or infrastructure. Under these conditions, people usu-
ally do not have adequate access to schools, health facilities, recrea-
tion spaces or employment, and sometimes they have difficulty keeping 
their jobs. Hence, even with a roof over their heads, their right to the 
city is clearly compromised.
The right to decent housing of the so-called sem-teto (roof-less) 
has been a historical demand of social movements in Brazil, with signifi-
cant impacts on current urban policies. According to the dominant mass 
media, the notion of sem-teto simply refers to people who are living on 
the street, or homeless, which differs from their self-perception as mem-
bers of a squatting movement.12 The activists of the  sem-teto movement 
are generally poor, informal workers in a hyper-precarious situation who 
are also quite politicised.13 One of their most important actions is the 
occupation of buildings and land (for self-construction) and they should 
not be confused with the  favelados (favela residents).14
In the Brazilian context, the formation of favelas began around the 
end of the nineteenth century, in part related to the first regulatory urban 
processes in the country. What social movements call ‘occupations’ are 
a more recent phenomenon that can be traced back only as far as the 
1980s. Although they may occur spontaneously, occupations are usually 
supported from their inception by collective actors such as social move-
ment organisations, leftist political parties, university groups and so on.15 
Furthermore, most occupations are preceded by a long period of careful 
preparation. After the squatting action, in no more than a week, the first 
group of families is able to live in the dwelling and the basic facilities 
are in use.16 It is worth noting the frequent occupation of vacant land 
for self-construction across Brazil, but also the occupation of abandoned 
buildings albeit in less significant numbers. Against this backdrop Belo 
Horizonte provides an exemplary case.
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6.3 Occupations in Belo Horizonte Metropolitan Region
Belo Horizonte is the capital of the Minas Gerais state, in the south-east 
region of the country. With more than 2.3 million inhabitants, it is the 
sixth-largest city in Brazil in terms of population. The Región Metropolitana 
de Belo Horizonte (metropolitan region, known as RMBH) is home to 5.4 
million inhabitants as the third-largest urban agglomeration in Brazil.17
From 1996, through to the first decade of the 2000s, reports point 
to only seven cases of urban occupations in the metropolitan region, all 
of which related to housing, and only one in a building.18 As of 2011, the 
number of occupations increased, reaching a total of 36 registered cases 
in 2018, of which three were evicted, and nine were regularised or are 
currently in the process of gaining some type of legal status or agreement 
with the local, state or federal authorities. The most recent cases include 
building occupations for housing, cultural uses, support for women in 
situations of violence, and other political purposes such as the organisa-
tion of talks, campaigns and protests about topics others than squatting. 
At the same time, they display a crucial spatial pattern of increasing con-
centration in the central areas of the city, intentionally geared towards 
better access to urban infrastructure, public services, leisure facilities 
and so on. According to a recent research report, there were a total of 24 
occupations in the RMBH in 2016 (the vast majority being large plots of 
land), encompassing around 14,000 families, or approximately 55,000 
people.19 A more recent publication20 added a further 10 occupations to 
the list, to which we can add another two from our own observations.
Among the political collectives that usually support the occupations 
in RMBH, two in particular stand out: the Movimento de Luta nos Bairros, 
Vilas e Favelas – MLB (Movement of Struggle in Neighborhoods, Villages 
and Favelas) and the  Brigadas Populares (Popular Brigades). MLB was 
founded in 1999, and urban occupations of lands and buildings are its 
main repertoire of action.21 The Brigadas Populares, on the other hand, 
is a militant movement committed to a broader range of causes such as 
housing, public health, education, transportation, rights of jailed people 
and other issues. It is active in many Brazilian states and it supports and 
helps organise several urban occupations.22 Both organisations are very 
influential in the internal organisational processes of the occupations, 
the public activities promoted by the squatters, and the cooperative ways 
in which some occupations interact with each other, especially concern-
ing housing occupations. Even in the case of other types of occupation, 
formed by more autonomous and independent collectives, the MLB and 
the Brigadas Populares are active participants.
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In addition to providing housing for the squatters, the squatted 
buildings and settlements also hosted public events such as movie ses-
sions, workshops, discussions, music presentations and courses. A com-
munal kitchen and day-care are the main collective spaces set up by the 
squatters, since these are essential for ensuring adequate access to food 
and the well-being of the children, while also facilitating interaction 
between the squatters and the external community.23 Some activities are 
free of charge, but many aim to raise money to support the occupations 
and to contribute to improving the infrastructure of the buildings, along 
with donations and other fundraising campaigns.
As occupations are considered illegal, and therefore are in constant 
risk of eviction, the squatters usually seek agreements with owners and 
with municipal, state or federal authorities, depending on each case. 
Although this is a predominant feature of the occupations in RMBH, 
there is no model or standard procedure to be followed. In most cases, 
‘activist lawyers’ give support to the occupations by fighting repossession 
orders or eviction threats. Activist lawyers are those who, although usu-
ally not living in occupations, provide legal advice to the squatters, often 
free of charge, either individually or organised in collective groups.
As an example, the premises of Espaço Comum Luiz Estrela, which 
offers cultural and political activities, was occupied by a group of artists, 
activists, educators and cultural producers in October 2013.24 The his-
toric state-owned house is located in Santa Efigênia, a central, econom-
ically privileged neighbourhood, and had lain abandoned for 19 years 
before being occupied. After negotiations, the collective became entitled 
to use the property for a period of 20 years.
A different type of squat is represented by Kasa Invisível, also occu-
pied in 2013, by an anarchist collective.25 The house, located in the cen-
tral area of the city, belongs to a local family, but was abandoned for more 
than 15 years. Kasa Invisível, besides housing some of the participants, 
aims to be a space for the propagation of radical and anti-authoritarian 
policies. The collective has been seeking legalisation through the legal 
instrument of usucapião (adverse possession), which grants domain of 
an urban area or building up to 250 m2 to whoever possesses it for hous-
ing purposes – uninterrupted and unopposed – for five years.26
Around three years later, in 2016, the Casa de Referência da Mulher 
Tina Martins was created, when the Movimento de Mulheres Olga Benario 
(Olga Benario Women’s Movement) occupied a building owned by the 
Federal University of Minas Gerais in the central region of Belo Horizonte, 
unused for 10 years.27 The movement intended to shelter women at risk, 
and to deliver activities in support of violence prevention and female 
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empowerment and emancipation.28 After the occupation, the collective 
managed to negotiate with the federal and state governments, secur-
ing a two-year agreement on another property in Funcionários, a very 
central and economically privileged neighbourhood. More recently, the 
agreement with the state government that guaranteed this project would 
remain on the current property has expired, but the collective continues 
to develop its activities on the same site as an occupation.
The two most recent housing occupations are Carolina Maria de 
Jesus and Vicentão.29 Carolina began in September 2017 with the occupa-
tion by 200 families of an abandoned building in Funcionários, owned by 
a social security company. After months of negotiations, in June 2018 an 
agreement was reached with the state government by which the families 
would receive two plots of land with adequate infrastructure in Barreiro, 
in the peripheral southern region of Belo Horizonte, as well as pecuniary 
assistance for self-construction. Families wishing to remain in the city 
centre would be resettled in another building and also receive monetary 
help. This is a pioneering experience in RMBH and is in the implemen-
tation phase. Elsewhere, in January 2018 around 90 families occupied 
a building in the city centre that had been abandoned four years earlier, 
the property of a local banker. These squatters, of Vicentão, recently 
signed an agreement with the state government to rent a property in 
the city-centre area for two years while they await resettlement to state-
owned land and self-build their houses.
6.4 Spain: Urban and housing activism revived 
by the global financial crisis
A democratic regime was recovered in Spain after four decades of dic-
tatorship (1939–1978). The transitional period (roughly, between 1975 
and 1979) was stirred by large numbers of workers’ strikes and very 
active urban movements.30 The 1978 constitution granted both the right 
to ‘decent and adequate housing’ (Article 47) and the right to private 
property in accordance with its ‘social function’ (Article 33). In addition, 
it explicitly stated that further laws and the regulation of land use should 
make effective the right to housing, ‘avoid speculation’ (Article 47) and 
promote the general interest. Even the right to ‘adverse possession’ has 
been kept in the Spanish Civil Code (Articles 1940–42) and could facili-
tate property titles for squatters if they dwelled for more than 10 (stand-
ard procedure) or 30 years (extraordinary procedure), although it is 
rarely applicable.
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In view of that, the occupation of empty land and buildings, which 
has occurred in various forms since the 1980s, might be seen as a non- 
institutional tool in the hands of lay citizens to meet the constitutional 
dispositions. Squatters can always claim that the constitutional princi-
ples are on their side. Accordingly, far from simply being labelled anti- 
capitalist trouble-makers, squatters may be seen as endorsers of the 
liberal design of the constitution. Above all, this implies that private 
property is respected as far as it is in use according to the general interest. 
Only disused properties are taken over by squatters.
Informal housing takes place against the backdrop of a lack of suf-
ficient social housing and welfare policies related to housing. Most of 
Spain’s ‘social housing’ programmes consist of financial subsidies for pur-
chasing a home. Housing policies have hardly promoted state-owned and 
affordable rental options at all. During the Francoist regime, there was 
an explicit attempt to promote home ownership, and further democratic 
governments consistently undermined the housing stock owned by the 
state, which was meant to mitigate poverty and housing exclusion. ‘Social 
(rented) housing in Spain represents a mere 2% of the total housing stock 
(the EU-15 average is 11.7%).’31 Even with a steady and intense con-
struction pace, housing needs are hardly met. Remarkably, speculative 
vacancy affects not only old houses but also new ones, which are mainly 
bought by transnational investors. The vacancy rate in Spain is currently 
estimated (based on 2011 figures) at between 14 per cent and 28 per 
cent; absolute numbers are between 3.5 and 7.1 million dwellings.32
Despite more than 22 years of various social-democratic central 
governments since 1978, increasing privatisations of all kinds of public 
assets, the rise of financial indebtedness, worsening labour conditions 
(especially for the young, women and immigrants) and austerity poli-
cies with substantial cutbacks in health and education all led the country 
into a massive crisis after 2008, with the housing question at its core.33 
Housing evictions, in particular, amounted to a yearly average of 80,000 
between 2009 and 2015.34
Most people on a low income – who are usually young, immigrants 
(non-European Union citizens), female single parents, workers with 
casual or badly paid jobs and unemployed people – cannot make ends 
meet. Housing prices are higher in cities and demand more than 40 per 
cent of people’s income to cover rentals or mortgage loans.35 For those 
who cannot enter or remain in the housing market, the only available 
options are to live with their parents as long as possible, sit on the waiting 
lists for social housing, live in overcrowded conditions, pay high rents 
for temporary and substandard accommodation, sleep rough, live in 
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squatted settlements or occupy abandoned premises. No official figure 
for ‘housing exclusion’ is provided by the government, but some studies 
have concluded that 1.7 per cent out of the Spanish population (46.5 
million) were subject to ‘severe housing deprivation’, 5.4 per cent lived 
in overcrowded households, and 5.2 per cent were in mortgage or rent 
arrears by 2016.36 These data encompass a current housing deficit affect-
ing at least 2.5 million people (or 1 million households) in Spain.
There are various forms of unauthorised housing in Spain. In past 
centuries, squatters’ settlements on the outskirts of cities were the last 
resort for the gypsy population, who suffered persistent racism, margin-
alisation and social exclusion. Nowadays, most of the Spanish nation-
als belonging to the Roma ethnicity do not live in land occupations or 
shacks, but a significant proportion still occupy buildings without the 
permission of the owners.37 The industrialisation waves in different his-
torical periods also fuelled unauthorised settlements of self-built houses 
in the peripheral parts of the main cities, especially with the intensive 
rural out- migration of the 1950s and 1960s in the decades after the dev-
astation left behind by the so-called ‘civil war’ (in fact, a military coup 
against the democratic Republican government). Since the late 1980s, 
both housing authorities and grassroots movements have endeavoured 
to eradicate such constructions and relocate dwellers to state- subsidised 
housing, which, in general, has proved a very effective policy. One of 
the most salient operations, which involved newly built constructions 
for around 40,000 household units in previously informal settlements, 
took place in Madrid during the 1980s after an exemplary bottom-up 
mobilisation of working-class neighbourhood-based organisations – with 
outstanding participation of women as leaders and activists in higher 
proportions than other social movements.38
Informal housing in Spain also takes the form of scattered and usu-
ally hidden land occupations related to the large flow of international 
migration experienced since the mid-1990s. Immigrants from Morocco 
and Romania (and Roma people from Eastern Europe, in particular) 
became prone to end up living in informal encampments. Apart from 
some religious organisations and NGOs that helped them mediate with 
specialised state agencies, there have been almost no politicised, autono-
mous struggles launched by these dwellers since the 1970s.
Unauthorised occupations of empty buildings for housing purposes 
represent a different phenomenon, and usually happen in a stealth oper-
ation. This condition of invisibility has rendered it difficult to measure. 
Since it became part of the political and media agenda after 2008, some 
attempts to collect data from different official sources have suggested a 
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figure of around 90,000 occupied houses all over Spain. Recently, mass 
media and conservative politicians have been very active in promoting 
a negative image of housing occupations by stigmatising migrants and 
poor people who have squatted,39 and by spreading ‘moral panic’ by 
deliberately focusing on very exceptional cases of drug trafficking, nui-
sance caused to neighbours, occupations of non-fully-abandoned prop-
erties and instances of violence.
Squatting buildings in the context of activism (as part of the 
movimiento okupa) has also occurred in most Spanish cities since the 
mid-1980s. It was originally fuelled by young people with a leftwing– 
libertarian approach, who combined housing and social centres to pro-
mote countercultural activities and autonomous initiatives of various 
social movements. Urban squatters’ movements grew and vehemently 
criticised urban speculation and the shortcomings of housing policies, 
but they were also among the first to oppose global neoliberalism, even 
before the 2000s.40 These squats have been few in number,41 but, together, 
they have been very significant in terms of their persistence as an urban 
movement over the last four decades and as a durable infrastructure for 
autonomous politics at large. Although criminal persecution of squatting 
(usurpation) came into force in 1995, the movement did not decline.
More recently, a new housing movement has risen up since 2011 
around the large anti-austerity mobilisations, known as the 15M move-
ment or the Indignados movement. The main organising collective, known 
as the PAH (Platform for People Affected by Mortgages), contributed to 
politicise housing occupations, too. Despite not being their main tactic 
of protest, they launched a campaign (Obra Social) that is meant to have 
rehoused more than 3,000 people in squatted buildings mostly owned by 
banks. The media attention given to this kind of activism was initially less 
negative compared to that of more radical squatting or okupa movements 
and the aforementioned phenomena of marginality and criminality asso-
ciated with squats. Notwithstanding, its coverage was very superficial 
and shifted to other topics once the most extreme consequences of the 
global financial crisis were apparently overcome in around 2015.42
6.5 Squatting movements in Madrid
Madrid is Spain’s capital city with a population of 3.2 million; it is part 
of a larger metropolitan region encompassing more than 6.5 million 
inhabitants. During the 1990s and 2000s this urban agglomeration also 
became a global hub for transnational trade, investment and tourism.43
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Given the secret nature of most squatted places with the exclusive 
goal of providing shelter, only squatted social centres (many of which 
also house people or are closely connected to housing squats) have been 
historically recorded: 155 cases from 1977 to 2016.44 Around 50 per cent 
of these were located in the city centre, 30 per cent in the peripheral 
neighbourhoods of the Madrid municipality (still very well connected 
with the centre due to an efficient public transit system) and 20 per cent 
were distributed among the other metropolitan municipalities.45 A very 
decentralised and informal network of activism was created among the 
different autonomous groups over the years. The few attempts to set up 
formal structures of coordination were short-lived. However, this squat-
ting movement remained fairly vibrant despite evictions and a fast rate of 
new recruits and withdrawals.
An important turning point was the 2008 global financial crisis, 
which sparked a massive occupation of houses, especially in Madrid 
and other metropolitan areas. Organisations such as the PAH and activ-
ist groups from the squatting movement (for instance, the Oficina de 
Okupación or Squatting Office) delivered workshops, legal assistance 
and textbooks to help people to squat. However, the estimate of 16,000 
housing occupations between 2014 and 2015 indicates that most cases 
fell outside their activist influence,46 albeit not necessarily without polit-
ical motivation. The 2011 Indignados movement gave birth to manifold 
local assemblies, which, in turn, created housing groups. Ultimately, 
these became leading members of the Coordinadora de Vivienda and 
 followed the strategic vision set by the PAH. At least nine full buildings 
were occupied by PAH groups in Madrid up to 2017. These actions were 
public – explicit banners hung from their windows and balconies. The 
PAH activists also helped people to squat in dozens of individual apart-
ments whose owners were banks and big property developers.47
The main difference between the long-standing squatters’ move-
ment, mainly focused on the self-management of social centres, and the 
post-crisis housing movement led by the PAH is their approach to the 
legalisation issue. The former rarely made agreements with the local 
authorities or the private owners to remain in the buildings. Only a 
few cases of legalisation of squatted social centres occurred. In general, 
radical opposition and resistance prevailed among squatters linked to 
leftwing–libertarian social centres, although more internal fragmenta-
tion related to this issue was experienced after the upsurge of squats in 
2011.48 In fact, we visited two cases of recently legalised self- managed 
social centres (Espacio Vecinal Arganzuela and La Salamandra) in which, 
as we found out, some activists were former squatters too. A more 
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centrally located squat seeking a legal agreement with the municipality 
is La Ingobernable, although there have been more tensions than explicit 
negotiations to date.49 In other ongoing squatted social centres with 
whom we also had contacts – EKO, La Dragona and La Enredadera – they 
had no interest in approaching the local government, but at least in one 
case there were prior informal agreements with a private owner.
By contrast, the PAH took a clear stance in favour of legalisation of 
squats from the very beginning. It called for affordable rental accommo-
dation provided by either state institutions or bailed-out financial firms, 
even if this involved moving out from the squat: ‘We defend squatting as 
an emergency measure and a political strategy, not as a final solution.’50 
Affordability means here a rental cost of up to 30 per cent of the house-
hold income, which is close to zero for those homeless and unemployed. 
Therefore, PAH activists became regularly engaged in negotiations with 
banks, private owners and politicians to find housing solutions for each 
individual or family at risk of eviction. Meanwhile, squatting represented 
a tool to immediately house those in need but also to empower people 
during the negotiations to secure legal agreements and political conces-
sions. The unaffordable rent increases that occurred over the last four 
years of economic recovery gave birth to a new wave of activism around 
the Sindicato de Inquilinas/os (Tenants’ Union), which also called for 
the self-occupation of apartments by tenants threatened with eviction if 
negotiations did not bear fruit.
6.6 Conclusions
Brazil and Spain share important constitutional principles and regula-
tions that could mitigate the rule of capital in the housing markets as well 
as the profit-making implications of many urban policies. In particular, 
we have identified: the social function of private property; the right to 
adequate housing; a public mandate to impede property speculation; and 
state powers for exercising requisition and granting adverse possession. 
Both countries left behind dictatorial regimes that had almost entirely 
suppressed social activism and protest movements over several decades, 
albeit these flourished impressively during the transitional and dem-
ocratic periods that followed. However, by then, both Brazil and Spain 
had already advanced their integration in the global economy, but start-
ing from different peripheral positions and historical trajectories – more 
dependent and post-colonial in the case of Brazil before joining the emer-
gent group of BRICS,51 and, in the case of Spain a former colonial power 
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that became part of the European Union and expanded its own multi-
national corporations (formerly state-owned companies), especially in 
Latin America.
Significant periods of economic growth in the two countries did 
nothing to placate the housing question, though. The number of hous-
ing exclusions and vacancy rates presented here reveals the magnitude 
of the societal problems at play. This means, in our interpretation, that 
governments are more prone to meet the needs of global capital than 
those of grassroots movements and the most deprived parts of the popu-
lation. According to our analysis, constitutional dispositions are useless 
if housing speculation is rampant, the inflation of housing prices has no 
public control, vacancy is not subject to state scrutiny and regulation, 
large social groups cannot afford access to a decent home, and there is 
insufficient social housing provision. These circumstances, in turn, are 
the key drivers of unauthorised occupations.
We thus contend that squatting activism crucially challenges these 
tensions of the political economy of both countries, which represents a 
form of mobilisation that is more common to both than it might appear at 
first glance. Squatting activism is fairly limited in terms of its capacity to 
mobilise large parts of the population and to extend its main protest action. 
Notwithstanding, we have observed that it holds a great capacity to reveal 
the contradictions and mechanisms of urban speculation within the (neo)
liberal regimes of both countries. These struggles are particularly efficient 
at disclosing how the construction of new housing units is not, in practice, 
intended to honour basic constitutional rights. This scenario of housing 
injustice is the main motivation of the squatting movements, which fre-
quently justify their actions based on the social function that should be 
assigned to vacant properties – idle plots and empty buildings included.
A second noticeable feature shared by the squatting movements 
in Brazil and Spain is their politicisation. Quite apart from favelas and 
their extensive historical roots, urban land occupations in Brazilian cit-
ies are efficiently organised and capable of securing political support 
from numerous local networks. While the majority of these occupations 
take place in peripheral neighbourhoods, are swiftly self-built and make 
claims for state provision of decent housing, some are located in the city 
centre, on empty land or in buildings left abandoned for several years. 
Among the latter, there are squats for meeting housing needs as well as 
developing social centres. In Belo Horizonte, leftist organisations and 
movements such as the MLB and the Brigadas Populares are engaged in 
the internal organisation of the occupations for housing and also contrib-
ute to strengthening links with other groups and grassroots campaigns.
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In Spain, there are also unauthorised occupations of empty land 
within the boundaries of the consolidated city, but these are only used 
for setting up community gardens and meeting places, which can eas-
ily scale up to strong and politicised networks of activists.52 Land occu-
pations to meet housing needs occasionally pop up in peripheral spots 
of the main cities and host mainly Roma people from Eastern Europe 
and Portugal, or immigrants from Morocco. However, they are seldom 
autonomously struggling for their right to adequate housing, and it is 
the charitable work of some NGOs that provides support for their claims 
and relocation into formal (state-subsidised) accommodation. In con-
trast, the squatting of buildings is a well-established practice in Spain. In 
terms of activism, squatters’ movements had their strongholds in the self- 
managed and squatted social centres, while housing was more a political 
concern of their discursive framing than the visible side of their actual 
struggles. Despite the occupation of houses also being widespread, espe-
cially after the 2008 crisis, most cases remained away from the public 
eye. It was due to the consolidation of the PAH and the new housing 
movement (including the Tenants’ Unions in Madrid and Barcelona) that 
many cases were explicitly publicised and deeply politicised, along with 
other specific claims regarding housing policies and legislation. Housing 
activists, including many with a background in previous squatting move-
ments, confronted politicians across the whole ideological spectrum in a 
bid to change outdated laws and to effectively grant the right to housing.
A third crucial observation is that the right to housing and the right 
to the city are intimately connected, according to the experiences of 
squatting activism in Brazil and Spain. The spatial struggle to appropri-
ate the city centre by all these squatting movements indicates that there 
is no fulfilment of the right to housing without an urban environment 
serviced by adequate infrastructure and transportation, public facilities 
such as schools and health centres, and leisure and job opportunities. 
Living in isolated and badly built peripheries opposes that basic principle. 
Squatters in both countries are aware of this and explicitly call for social 
visibility, political recognition and a broad right to be included in the city, 
which necessarily implies the occupation of the central areas whenever 
possible. This is the pattern followed by at least half of the squatted social 
centres in Madrid, and it has also been a clear trend in Belo Horizonte 
over the last decade. When the squats and even land occupations are 
open to organising public activities, such as cultural events and various 
political campaigns, this move is not only an instrumental tactic to gain 
public support and debunk the stigmatised image that mass media cre-
ate about squatters. It is also a material self-management of everything 
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that is available from the common wealth (and its wasted and disused 
resources as well) that is not easy for the most deprived citizens and 
inhabitants to access and enjoy (especially when this collective includes 
immigrants without formal citizenship status). In other words, the artic-
ulation of the right to housing and the right to the city through urban 
squatting activism challenges the unjust privileges of the elites and the 
affluent citizens.
Finally, the relationship between squatters and state authorities 
shows a range of strategic actions related to the legalisation of occu-
pied land and buildings. Sometimes, the support of the local community 
plays a decisive role in protecting squatters from being violently expelled 
from their venues and settlements. In both Brazil and Spain, the act of 
occupying buildings and land is unlawful (and also a criminal offence in 
Spain), albeit every case must be accurately documented with firm evi-
dence and often with litigation in court. As a consequence, squats and 
land occupations are constantly threatened with eviction. In the case of 
Belo Horizonte, despite the fact that most occupations seek some kind of 
legal agreement, no standard procedure is followed. It is ‘activist lawyers’ 
who provide emergency assistance when eviction threats are imminent. 
In some situations, when it is possible to reach medium- to long-term 
agreements, the deals that can be struck vary both in time and content. 
The legalisation of squats often meant the displacement of the families 
from the city centre, back to self-construction on lands made available 
by the local government (as in the cases of Carolina and Vicentão in Belo 
Horizonte). Surprisingly, these agreements usually include financial and 
technical support from the government.
In Madrid, by contrast, legal agreements were not desirable for 
most politicised activists from the ‘social centres’ scene. But there were 
some exceptions to this trend, and six cases, at least, were legalised. For 
squatters with an anarchist viewpoint, the legalisation of a squat was 
considered inconsistent with their criticism of private property and the 
capitalist commodification of cities and houses alike. A plea for the auton-
omy of the squatting projects was also part of their refusal to negotiate 
with the local authorities. However, when buildings were occupied pri-
marily for housing purposes, most activists sought legal agreements with 
both their public and private counterparts (the authorities and owners, 
respectively). More than an aspiration to achieve a secured private prop-
erty for the squatters, they usually strove for fair and sufficient allocation 
of social housing and affordable rented dwellings. The legalisation of the 
squats was only one among other possibilities to meet the housing needs 
of squatters. Although the PAH sometimes succeeded when it negotiated 
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‘social rentals’ across Spain, these were seldom achieved in the metro-
politan area of Madrid. Therefore, squatting activism was a self-help last 
resort for those evicted from their previous homes and experiencing the 
combined hardships of housing exclusion, unemployment, precarious-
ness and poverty.
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Favela vs asphalt: Suggesting a new 
lens on Rio de Janeiro’s favelas and 
formal city1
theresa Williamson
7.1 Favelas and the widespread view of informal 
settlements as a ‘problem’ to be ‘solved’
With the original ‘favela’ still standing and turning 122 in 2019, Rio de 
Janeiro’s informal settlements are some of the oldest – and most infa-
mous – in the modern world. They also boast a tremendously rich his-
tory, in which their residents increasingly take pride and are committed 
to preserving, reflected in the rapid growth of favela-focused community 
museums (of which there are now 11) in Rio de Janeiro today.2
This vision of favelas as historic communities worthy of recognition 
and preservation starkly contrasts with the negative presumptions com-
monly made about them, whether by media, international development 
organisations, local governments, academics or others. Media outlets 
tend to be the most obvious culprits of such negativity, and are often 
interested only in sensationalist images – as one national US TV producer 
told me as he insisted over and over that I ‘show him good TV’ while pro-
ceeding to gobble up two days of our team’s and partner communities’ 
time. We helped him secure access to notable and even heroic interview 
subjects – known widely as telling victims of police violence  – includ-
ing the widow of the bricklayer Amarildo, whose story had gone viral, 
only three weeks after his brutal assassination by police. Yet, despite 
our best efforts, and despite the fact that the interview was conducted 
in the intimacy of the widow’s home, the production team chose only 
to release a 20-minute segment focused solely on drug traffickers and 
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heavily featuring a dealer telling the interviewer ‘I could kill you at any 
moment’.3
At the other end of the spectrum, academics, though now attempt-
ing to be more balanced and rarely using stigmatising language about 
favelas, nonetheless typically see them, at their essence, as a ‘problem’ 
that needs to be ‘fixed’. That is, scholarly research still tends to focus on 
‘fixing the problem’ of favelas, leaving little opportunity for a fresh look at 
these communities in terms of what they positively offer their residents, 
the city and society at large.
However, I would argue that poor understanding of favelas among 
international development organisations and local governments is the 
most damaging of all, because these are the institutions that actually 
have a real, direct impact on the policies and investments that affect 
residents, their development, their sense of security and their upward 
mobility. And it is precisely these two groups that most bang the drum of 
‘addressing’ favelas by ‘formalising’ them. Peruvian economist Hernando 
de Soto is the most well-known influencer of formalisation policies 
that are heralded by international development institutions. Thanks to 
his 2000 book The Mystery of Capital and his broader work promoting 
land regularisation through individual titles, for two decades it has been 
widely presumed that the most efficient and effective single ‘solution’ 
to informal settlements is to formalise their land markets by giving resi-
dents the same land rights other landowners have.4 The basic argument 
is that, by giving settlers titles, they now have access to credit5 and tenure 
security, which enables them to invest in their homes and businesses, and 
break out of poverty. The underling logic here is: by formally recognising 
them through existing frameworks, they cease to be informal (informal-
ity being understood, at its essence, as the source of the problem), and 
therefore the ‘problem’ has now been solved. Quite simply, as residents 
now have the same rights as those in the formal city and across their 
broader culture, they are thus no longer marginalised.
7.2 The Paes administration: An example of the 
deceptive (and convenient) dichotomy of formal 
vs informal
Similarly, local officials in Rio regularly tout the goal of ‘addressing’ 
favelas by formalising them. This position has been most associated 
with the pro-business administration of pre-Olympic mayor Eduardo 
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Paes (2009–2016) who championed formalising endeavours – includ-
ing electricity and cable provided by private utilities, policing provided 
by public agencies, or resident-run moto-taxi and van cooperatives. He 
argued that such policies were necessary for ‘the exercise of full citizen-
ship’ by residents.6
But this was the same mayor who evicted 80,000 favela residents 
from their homes – most of whom had solid squatters’ rights claims con-
gruent with Brazilian legislation but did not (yet) hold physical titles 
(though some did, and were nonetheless evicted).7 He, like others before 
him, used the fact that these communities were ‘informal’ to justify 
human rights violations, which mainly took place in lesser-known favelas 
(with less political power and largely hidden from the gaze of the press) 
in the city’s up-and-coming inner West Zone.
On the other side of the city, however, well-known and highly 
 visible favelas in central areas (and consequently with high land values) 
were targeted by Paes with formalisation policies, the stated objective 
of which was to ‘integrate’ those communities into the formal city.8 
Formalising these areas, however, led to a significant rise in the cost 
of living, which pushed long-time residents out,9 and even led to Rio’s 
beach-front South Zone favelas being recognised internationally as hubs 
of gentrification.10
In other words, Rio’s mayor ‘solved the problem’ of informality in 
one zone of the city (where it was politically viable to do so) by eradicat-
ing informal settlements11 at great cost to those long-time communities,12 
while he solved the same ‘problem’ in another zone (where eviction 
would be politically unviable) by ‘formalising’ (regulating) its economy, 
which triggered a process of gentrification and market displacement. In 
the former case, he looked like the ‘bad guy’ to human rights organisa-
tions but appeared rational to those (a significant part of the popula-
tion) who believe favelas are, by nature, illegal and therefore should be 
removed. In the latter case, he looked like the ‘good guy’ to most actors, 
for ‘fixing’ the problem of informality, even if the end result was the simi-
lar displacement of residents. Gentrification, after all, is often considered 
a ‘natural’ process.
At the peak of implementing these policies, Mayor Paes declared 
that ‘the city of the future integrates socially its citizens’, in his 2012 
TED Talk.13 TED is a media organisation respected globally for produc-
ing impactful talks by acclaimed individuals whose ‘ideas are worth 
spreading’. His massive marketing budget was often used to promote an 
image of social integration based on what, in fact, was heavy-handed 
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formalisation imposed top-down.14 Paes’ policy (dubbed ‘Shock of 
Order’) was crisply defined by Gareth Doherty and Moises Lino e Silva 
in a 2011 article:
The structural thinking behind the ‘Shock of Order’ rationale in Rio 
de Janeiro seems to be something like:
formal = order = security = generation = increased formal economic 
activity
informal = disorder = insecurity = degeneration = decreased formal 
economic activity.15
The authors go on to point out that, in a typical favela market, the ‘Shock 
of Order’ policy actually resulted in disorder. When the municipal guard 
descended on informal markets, one would see ‘people running with 
DVDs, products scattered on the ground, tears, people congregating to 
watch, others rushing back home’. They reflected, ‘This is the situation 
created by the “Shock of Order” itself’.
‘During most other days’, they contrasted, ‘the market operated 
peacefully and, although it was often very crowded, no major incidents 
happened. This is to say that the so-called informal does not necessarily 
equate with disorder, in fact it carried its own order’.
Which brings us squarely to two questions: are ‘formal’ and ‘infor-
mal’ truly opposites? And is formality truly the goal? In the context of 
urban settlements, is informality really the absence of formality, whereby 
informality is the ‘problem’ that can simply be addressed through formal-
isation (of services, processes and institutions)? The presumption is that 
informal settlements are, by definition, lacking in ‘formality’, with the 
prefix ‘in’ rendering ‘informal’ the antonym of ‘formal’. And the second 
presumption is that formality is the objective in and of itself. It is with this 
logic in mind that the ‘Shock of Order’ policy implemented formalisation 
as a path to increased formal economic activity, and presumed informal-
ity to be the road to decreased activity.
Doherty and Silva, however, with one simple example, make clear 
that things are not so straightforward: a single-pointed focus on regulat-
ing informal enterprises and formalisation policies may, in some cases, 
create greater disarray rather than order – and may consequently harm 
communities. It may even keep them from meeting basic needs.
My intention with the rest of this chapter is to explore this false and 
unhelpful dichotomy – and its negative ramifications – to open a path to 
more productive approaches to addressing the real challenges of infor-
mal settlements and building on their positive attributes.
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7.3 Rio de Janeiro’s particular brand of ‘informality’, and 
the conditions leading to it
Informal settlements in Rio are no longer ‘slums’ characterised primarily 
by squalor and insalubrious conditions, or ‘shanty towns’ characterised by 
precarious construction and makeshift housing. Over decades and gener-
ations, residents of Rio’s favelas have, for the most part, superseded what 
were once minimal living conditions by investing as much as possible in 
their homes and neighbourhoods. Favelas are chronically underinvested 
and their infrastructure is not up to standard, but they are not, generally 
speaking, the desperate places the popular imagination (via the media) 
would have us believe them to be. And though, for the most part, they 
have been left in a state of neglect by the authorities throughout this same 
history, brief stints of investment by a handful of administrations mean 
that over 90 per cent of favela homes have basic infrastructure, including 
electricity, water and indoor plumbing (albeit, again, insufficient).
Nor are they any longer ‘squatter communities’, because favelas have 
acquired strong adverse possession rights. Brazil’s 1988 constitution recog-
nised the right to remain on land occupied for over five years – a right that 
applies in all of the nation’s cities. This recognition came after pressure from 
the defiant housing movements that had formed over the previous nine dec-
ades since the first favela, today known as Morro da Providência, was settled.
Their adverse possession rights do not typically translate into physi-
cal land titles, however. Brazilian laws, often resulting from popular pres-
sure, are quite favourable to favelas. But their implementation leaves much 
to be desired.16 This means that favelas live in a limbo state, in theory rec-
ognised as deserving of rights and investment, but not in practice – bring-
ing us back to the terminology of informality, in this case our local variant.
In Rio de Janeiro, the local term for the serviced (typically middle- 
and upper-class) areas of the city is asfalto (literally, ‘asphalt’), which is 
diametrically opposed to ‘favela’ in local parlance. Within the carioca 
(Rio denizen) worldview, using ‘asphalt’ as a surrogate for the formal city 
implies two things: formal = infrastructure investment; and infrastruc-
ture, particularly asphalt, is inherently good. By their very nature, fave-
las, since they are juxtaposed with asfalto (see Figure 7.1), are seen to be 
characterised by the absence of services, and their residents are condi-
tioned to believe that investment in infrastructure, particularly asphalt, 
is an ideal to be sought, no matter what.
This is why, in 2012, the highly dedicated president of the residents’ 
association representing Asa Branca (a West Zone community facing par-
tial eviction for the widening of a road which already adequately served 
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his community) turned to me and said, ‘we can’t get in the way of pro-
gress!’ Crucially in this case, the road widening was arguably not in their 
interest at all, as the proposed project would take a local neighbourhood 
thoroughfare and turn it into a major road, bringing traffic in close range 
of community homes where children live. And this is also why, in 2011, 
residents of Pavão-Pavãosinho-Cantagalo, a grouping of three favelas in 
the city’s South Zone, initially went along with city plans (although they 
later contested them) to gut the heart of their community to make way 
for a dead-end road,17 which was claimed to be necessary by officials to 
bring ‘greater access’ to residents.18 In reality, this was simply a cynical 
move to reduce the population there. Similarly, it is typically assumed that 
Rocinha, Rio’s largest single favela, in its South Zone, would be better off 
removing families to open up space for roads and cable cars (which they, 
too, came to contest). But in all three cases, as with all favelas, the city has 
failed to provide sufficient access to sewage collection and treatment – an 
infrastructure investment that is truly in great demand by residents.
And it is similarly because of this blind faith in infrastructure and ‘for-
malising the informal’ as a ‘solution’ to favelas (presuming them to be a 
problem by their very nature) that, in the pre-Olympic years, favela organ-
isers were thrilled to see five major government plans to address their 
problems. From the federal Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) – which 
Figure 7.1 Favela and asfalto in Rio de Janeiro. © Clara S. Rueprich. 
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made massive infrastructure investments across Brazil, including in Rio’s 
favelas – to the local Morar Carioca programme that promised to ‘upgrade 
all favelas by 2020’, and the Pacifying Police Units (UPP) programme to 
provide a ‘humane’ police presence in numerous favelas, residents were 
hopeful indeed.19
These programmes all shared the stated aim of formalising – that 
is, normalising – favela infrastructure in relation to the asfalto, or for-
mal city. Residents were delighted with the potential for ‘citizenship’ that 
these programmes were touted to bring. This would happen because 
what was missing from favelas, it was claimed, were these formal invest-
ments and treatments, which were seen as paths towards equality vis-à-
vis the formal city.
Yet, with the implementation of each of these programmes, numer-
ous pre-existing qualities were undermined – community spaces, solidarity 
networks and affordability,20 among others. And the true priorities of res-
idents – typically health, education and sanitation – were not among the 
areas receiving investment (spoiler alert: investments all had one thing in 
common: they primarily benefited construction and property companies).
7.4 Re-examining the discourse around ‘slums’ 
and its analogues
Note that the common translations of favela referenced above – slum, 
shanty town or squatter settlement – all imply that such communities 
are (or should be) temporary in nature. They imply a level of precarious-
ness – in infrastructure, building materials or legal standing – that must 
be overcome. Remember, in the case of Rio’s favelas, that residents have 
superseded these conditions for the most part, simply by persisting over 
time and investing what they could, with occasional (albeit insufficient) 
investment and recognition from the authorities.
However, they have never become the asfalto. Even favelas where 
land titles have been won, or where the city government has opened 
administrative offices and published statements declaring the favelas’ 
official switch to the status of bairros (formal neighbourhoods), have not 
become the asfalto.21 Even where millions were invested in infrastructure 
during the much-lauded Favela-Bairro programme of the 1990s (funded 
by the Inter-American Development Bank), which was tasked with trans-
forming favelas into bairros, all are still referred to as favelas.
The binary of informal vs formal is thus fairly irrelevant in 
Rio. Because what is at stake is something deeper. Rio’s favelas are a 
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territorial manifestation of the determination of Brazil’s elite to maintain 
a slave-holding society’s logic-structure within a democratic state, where 
they represent a small minority.22
Rio de Janeiro is a city of deep divisions that has never, in its 454-
year history, faced this issue head-on. Despite Brazil’s slave trade lasting 
60 per cent longer than that of the US, and the nation importing 10 times 
as many enslaved Africans as the US – descendants of whom account for 
54 per cent of the nation’s population today – Brazil has never instituted a 
policy of inward reflection, as is customary in countries that work to over-
come such brutal legacies.23 Rio de Janeiro alone received five times the 
number of enslaved Africans as the entire US, making it the largest port 
of entry for slaves in world history. Today, as a direct result of this history, 
and given Brazil’s severe land inequality that resulted in a large popula-
tion of freed slaves and their descendants moving to cities after abolition 
in 1888 (of which Rio at the time was the largest and most important), 
some 1,000 favelas shelter 24 per cent of the city’s population. And most 
residents live in favelas that are over half a century old.
As long as it is convenient to the local elite to maintain them as 
such, favelas will remain ‘informal’ (in fact, or in the public discourse), 
at least until empowered residents shift the narrative and reality through 
popular action and pressure. Since only residents are perceived to benefit 
from such a shift, the change in mindset must come from within these 
communities. There are many examples of this changing tide today, and 
though growing and increasingly visible through the efforts of hundreds 
of community media collectives and other strategic groups, it remains a 
small wave, as the following example illustrates.
During the pre-Olympic build-up, innumerable residents of favelas 
were convinced to move to public housing condominiums up to two hours 
away from their communities of origin, thanks to the societal assump-
tion that their neighbourhoods are of no value and that condominiums 
provide the ideal lifestyle.24 One favela resident, a woman who had just 
proudly told me how she, her husband and their two adult daughters 
had been investing in their home for 15 years and had, finally, ‘finished’ 
it, then proceeded to inform me that, if she were given the opportunity 
to move to a gated condominium, she would take it. Confused, I asked 
why. She replied, ‘I can’t stand the way those people in the asfalto look at 
us [favela residents)]’. I then prodded: ‘What if they didn’t see you that 
way?’ She quickly cut me off and said, ‘Then I’d never move!’
There is thus an urgent need to drop the conditioned discourses. 
Rather than view favelas as informal places characterised by what 
they lack (formality), I argue it is more productive to look at the actual 
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neighbourhoods reflected in this discourse, and compare them. If they 
are characterised by informality, then, why are favelas still considered 
favelas (with the associated negative connotations) when investments 
and titles are granted? And if they are so squalid, why do many residents, 
once acquiring the means to leave, prefer to stay?25
7.5 Two different ways of life and how they address 
human needs
At least eight clear differences exist between the logic-structures exhib-
ited by Rio’s informal and formal settlements, as Table 7.1 indicates.
Table 7.1: Rio de Janeiro: A comparison of formal vs informal settlements.
Aspect of 
comparison
Formal settlements Informal settlements
Complexity Regulation limits 
complexity, so formal 
neighbourhoods are 
inherently less complex 
internally and less 
diverse in comparison 
to one another. Less 
complexity means 
quicker deciphering and 
greater comprehension or 
predictability of a given 
place by outsiders, and 
thus helps diffuse fear 
across space within a city.
Lack of regulation leads to 
greater complexity, with 
complexity increasing over 
time as long as a community 
remains unregulated (whether 
by informal internal or formal 
external forces). Two informal 
neighbourhoods in Rio will be 
governed by their own local 
conditions, which may result 
in commonalities that stem 
from their similarly organic 
systems of development, but 
ultimately yield greater diversity 
in relation to one another as 
compared to the diversity of 
formal settlements. The greater 
complexity (which naturally 
leads to reduced decipherability 
by outsiders) may result in a 
sense of fear of the unknown by 
outsiders. On the other hand, it 
may result in a deeper sense of 
belonging among locals who are 
uniquely intimate with a given 
community’s complexity.
(Continued)
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Aspect of 
comparison
Formal settlements Informal settlements
Market entry Bureaucratic and 
financial barriers to entry 
into the formal market. 
To start or maintain a 
formal business, one must 
meet strict and expensive 
government-imposed 
requirements.
Informal businesses can exist 
without much impediment, and 
if problems arise, those with 
strong relationships can use 
them to ease issues. Barriers can 




In theory, the formal 
city is organised through 
centralised master 
planning. In practice, in 
Rio, however, privilege-
based master planning 
dominates (i.e. for 
the most part new 
projects) are developed 
or influenced by elite 
interests.
In favelas, urban planning takes 
place through adaptive, iterative 
planning characterised by 
urbanistic freedom responding 
to present needs and based 
on the creative use of limited 
resources. At times, planning 
is coordinated by resident 




In the formal city, there is 
a large number of possible 
architectural typologies, 
but nonetheless these 
are fairly pre-set and 
meet strict building 
regulations. The scale 
of constructed units is 
limited by zoning rules, 
not by technology. The 
tendency is to build 
vertically as much as 
possible, to maximise 
financial investment. 
Culturally, there is a 
high preference for 
high-security vertical 
condominiums.
In favelas, typologies are entirely 
flexible, though constrained 
and adapted to the conditions 
of the territory (e.g. terrain, 
substrate). Spaces are often put 
to the most intense use possible, 
with shelter being the primary 
need addressed, thus resulting 
in high density. The scale of 
construction is limited by what 
can be done in terms of finances 
and what can be done by human 
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Aspect of 
comparison
Formal settlements Informal settlements
Critical 
services
Virtually all services and 
exchanges are monetised 
or provided by public 
agencies.
Many necessary services, 
including public services, are 
demonetised and provided 
through mutual support or self-
build (e.g. child care). In some 
cases, utilities are siphoned 
(e.g. electricity, water, cable). 
Still others (due to public policy 
failures and lapses) can lead 
to pernicious actors taking 
advantage of residents’ needs 





Logic of privacy, with 
individual and family 
interests dominating.
Logic of proximity, with strong 
solidarity networks dominating. 
This results in a strong sense of 
community and, historically, a 
high degree of collective action.
Addressing 
challenges
Formal means to fix 
and address challenges 
that surface (e.g. legal 
representation, hiring of a 
registered plumber).
Creative responses to 
challenges, ‘hacks’ (in 
Portuguese, gambiarra) (e.g. 
tinkering with existing materials 
to mend infrastructure, informal 
channels for dispute resolution).
Economic 
coordination26
The market, then 
the state, coordinate 
economic activity.
Necessity, then the market, 
coordinate economic activity.
Note: Original observations compiled by the author and generations of teams at 
Catalytic Communities, via observations at over 200 favelas, community resident 
interviews, dialogues with researcher–collaborators and relevant inferences from 
connected fields, compiled between 2000 and 2019.
Note that there is no subjective ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behind any of the items 
listed in Table 7.1. However, it is easy to identify various aspects describ-
ing the logic-structure of favelas as helpful for reducing or attenuating 
the most severe consequences of (financial) poverty. That is, in various 
cases, residents of informal settlements do not need to shoulder signif-
icant financial costs to achieve a positive outcome, such as their ability 
to exercise entrepreneurship, guarantee shelter, repair infrastructures, 
or address basic services. The removal of bureaucratic hurdles and the 
ability to solve problems through mutual support, for example, are both 
Table 7.1 (Continued)
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characteristics of informal systems that enable residents to exercise con-
trol over their outcomes, even in the absence of money.
Psychologist Abraham Maslow depicted human needs in the form 
of a pyramid, starting with our most basic (physiological) needs at the 
bottom – such as the need for air, water, food and shelter. Once these 
fundamental needs are met, moving up the pyramid, the second level 
represents our need for safety and security needs, including property; 
the third level refers to our need for love and a sense of social belonging; 
and the fourth relates to our need for self-esteem. At the top of the hierar-
chy is the human need for self-actualisation. Thus, from the perspective 
of human need, we should separate out the very basic need for shelter 
from the secondary need for property (particularly immovable prop-
erty – that is, land and housing). We could also go on to discuss whether 
the possession of property really is a human need, or whether the actual, 
underlying need is for safety in land tenure, which can arguably be better 
afforded through other instruments such as Community Land Trusts,27 
or as is done in traditional and indigenous cultures around the world.28
These and other assumptions may not ring true for residents of 
informal communities where a strong sense of togetherness and the abil-
ity to respond creatively to need may be an intrinsic quality in their lives. 
Informal settlements and informal ways of being in the world offer peo-
ple in precarious situations flexibility to meet their most basic needs even 
more effectively than they would be able to if they were equally poor, but 
constrained to formal systems. They can also produce greater creativity 
and resilience in communities that depend on these qualities to adapt to 
difficult circumstances and make ends meet.
Many of the assets produced in favelas are generated through the 
practice of commoning. This is a social process whereby individuals bene-
fit conjointly from combining forces and working together. It is associated 
with the pooling of resources by individuals, with the goal of maximising 
advantage while reducing risk to all those who participate. In favelas, 
the pooling of human labour is the most frequent commoning strategy. 
The traditional mutirão, or collective action event – whereby residents 
set aside time to help a neighbour build a room or add a rooftop slab, or 
work together to build a ping pong table or a public square – is largely 
responsible for any early favela development and is also commonly found 
well into a community’s history.
Each informal settlement develops in its own unique way. Over 
generations, residents have built up their homes and communities, brick-
by-brick, often struggling against adverse circumstances, and as a result 
adapting to those circumstances in creative ways. Favela homes there-
fore tend to be highly efficient, taking advantage of every square inch, 
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producing rooms of intense use, such as bedrooms, leisure spaces, rental 
units, shops and entranceways that double as storage spaces. For exam-
ple, the laje, or rooftop, can be developed into a rental unit, sold, used 
for family events, for sunbathing, drying clothes or barbecues, or it can 
be rented out to tourists. Without externally imposed rules and invest-
ment, in some cases a single community leader can determine a whole 
community’s future, for better or worse. The environment changes week-
to-week, with new construction, opportunities, gambiarra and mutirão. 
These latter words are part of the favela vernacular, meaning a quick-fix 
DIY project and collective action, respectively. Every visit to a given com-
munity is distinct from the last.
In this way, each favela evolves as a unique and deeply interwoven 
ecosystem.
Figure 7.2 Randomness and complexity in human urban ecosystems. 
Produced by Theresa Williamson as comparison with diagrams on 
complexity by David Krakauer of the Santa Fe Institute. 
Figure 7.2 is my adaptation of David Krakauer’s representation of the 
positive influence of increasing randomness (that is, low imposition of 
rules and regulations and increasing diversity) in producing the most 
complexity (adaptive, diverse and resilient systems). It illustrates the 
value of increasing complexity in human urban ecosystems, and how the 
very nature of informal settlements (or at least those that find a way to 
self-regulate when they get to the ‘sweet spot’) can be seen as beneficial 
to human resilience and urban development. The ‘sweet spot’ is where 
complexity is maximised before too much randomness, as Krakauer calls 
it, leads to dysfunctional outcomes.29 
 faVELa Vs aspHaLt:  sUGGEstinG a nEW LEns on rio dE JanEiro’s faVELas 143
All varieties and levels of complexity can be found within, and 
across, the communities of Rio de Janeiro’s 1,000-plus settlements. In 
long-established communities with large-scale growth and little regula-
tion, daily changes, personalities and conditions over decades have led 
to incredibly complex human ecosystems. In younger, more internally 
coordinated or smaller communities, the result may be a high-level com-
prehensibility and liveability palpable even to outsiders on a first visit.
Due to decades of developing with little outside regulation, there are 
possibly too many factors at play for any top-down universal policy to be 
effective at improving residents’ lives without undermining community 
assets,30 unless that policy builds in extraordinary community involve-
ment and room for flexible implementation based on community needs.
7.6 A pragmatic ‘middle way’ solution juxtaposed 
with the formal vs informal binary
In the case of Rio’s favelas, among the documented (for the most part) 
non-economic assets are: socio-cultural assets, such as cultural out-
put, sociability, atmosphere of play, sense of community and collective 
action; and urbanistic and economic qualities such as strong community 
ties,31 location, affordable housing in central areas, low-cost, flexible 
and need-based design, pedestrian-friendly design, and a high rate of 
entrepreneurship.32 There is nothing objectively good or bad about Rio 
de Janeiro’s favelas. The four characteristics they all share – as neigh-
bourhoods (1) that develop out of an unmet need for affordable housing; 
(2) with no outside regulation; (3) established by their residents; and 
(4) evolving based on local culture and circumstance, and their access to 
resources such as jobs and leadership – produce widely diverse (neither 
good nor bad) results. Framed another way, favelas are (1) affordable; 
(2) informal; (3) self-built; and (4) unique.
Approaching and measuring favelas’ values strictly through for-
mal approaches, which rely heavily on monetisation as the proxy 
for value, will inevitably leave out significant non-monetary assets. 
Measuring attributes financially is not only difficult to do (perhaps 
impossible), but potentially counter-productive even in cases where it 
is possible. That is because, at the heart of the logic-structure of ‘favelas 
that work’ (those in the ‘sweet spot’ of complexity) is the practice of 
effective commoning.33
Perhaps, then, the most productive response to these settlements’ 
challenges is not in shifting them towards the typical market-heavy and 
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externally regulated ways that formal settlements operate. Perhaps the 
optimum response lies in helping those that have reached the ‘sweet spot’ 
of complexity to remain there, by producing and instituting new, appro-
priate formalising tools that allow communities to officially self-regulate. 
That way, when effectively developed through commoning and the accu-
mulation of non-economic assets, communities can be formally recog-
nised in ways that maintain and strengthen those assets while providing 
them with the recognition and power necessary to institute or advocate 
for the actual improvements they need.
The question then becomes: how can this be done through formal 
institutions in a way that does not inherently cause the dissolution of 
these very non-monetisable attributes? To provide a solid and verified 
example of such a policy, I will briefly describe the case of the Caño 
Martín Peña Community Land Trust of San Juan, Puerto Rico,34 which 
is serving as a model for favela organisers, housing advocates and offi-
cials in Rio de Janeiro today. Rather than opt for individual land titles 
as the stereotypical path to formalising and integrating their settlements 
in the broader city,35 residents there collectively opted to be titled as a 
Community Land Trust (CLT). This move gives residents surface and 
building rights, while the land itself belongs to the community for per-
petuity. The CLT comprises residents (and allies voted in by residents), 
whose job is to manage the community’s land for perpetuity. The system 
allows families to own their homes and buy and sell them, inherit them 
and so on. But, since the land value is removed from the equation, spec-
ulators can neither access the land, nor are they interested in acquiring 
properties since the land underneath is not included. And because the 
community now collectively owns a huge swath of land in downtown San 
Juan, they are now among the city’s largest landowners, resulting in a 
shift in power whereby the community can much more effectively advo-
cate for improvements.
The result is a win–win. Residents are now formally recognised as 
owners (thus enjoying the qualities of formal systems, namely their being 
sanctioned and legally recognised, and ensuring critical services), while 
they own the land collectively (thus preserving the qualities that were 
developed through the years of informality, namely affordability, a pre-
served sense of belonging, solidarity and community ties, and flexible, 
community-determined planning).
The CLT model is just one example. Other common-sense 
approaches to addressing the formal vs informal binary in ways that 
confer the qualities of formal systems without losing the attributes of 
informality need to be developed, not only in developing contexts, but in 
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cities around the world. We desperately need a middle way between the 
over-planned and the under-planned that promotes creativity, inclusion, 
diversity, spontaneity and resilience while guaranteeing safety and pro-
moting sustainable development.
7.7 Conclusion
These reflections on the favelas of Rio de Janeiro lead us to contemplate 
informal settlements through a new lens. Rather than inherently con-
stituting a problem – due to their initial formation through illegal occu-
pation, their uncoordinated development patterns, their potential for 
exploitation by criminals and so on – these settlements can just as easily 
become productive, vibrant, unique and exciting sites of cultural produc-
tion and social well-being. And this is not despite their informal nature – 
but because of that nature.
What we term ‘informal settlements’ are characterised by a 
 logic-structure inherent to them, and not, as is often assumed, by the 
absence of formal structures. And this logic-structure, which is based on, 
and confers, a particular way of life, brings with it a number of benefits to 
residents, particularly those with limited financial means – benefits that 
can lead to consolidated communities enjoying immense qualities that 
have been built over time.
Even though they lead to the challenges with which we are familiar 
(and which must be addressed to ensure their equitable and sustaina-
ble development), consolidated informal settlements – those that have 
established themselves over time with significant assets as recognised by 
residents – are notable for a population that seeks to stay put and improve 
what they have, rather than leave, when given the chance.
The survival needs met by informal settlements constitute the pri-
mary reason for their proliferation historically. This is no doubt why, 
despite over a century of policies to ‘eradicate slums’, the United Nations 
(UN) predicts that some 48 per cent of humanity will live in informal 
urban settlements by 2050.36
Because of the informal, unregulated nature of favelas, they only 
grow in complexity day by day. This complexity will only be attenu-
ated and contained when, and if, settlements engage in a community- 
coordinated or externally imposed regulatory process. It is thus essential 
that we nuance our understanding of such settlements and shift our lens 
to recognise and build on their assets, addressing their challenges from 
the springboard of those assets, rather than continuing with policies of 
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dismissal, ‘integration’, or ‘formalisation’ that disregard (and lead to the 
loss of) community qualities.
Asset-Based Community Development (ABCD) is one exemplary 
tool that needs to be instituted, I believe, as core policy in working with 
established and historical informal settlements like those in Rio. It offers 
a practical approach to development whereby community assets are 
framed as the foundation from which challenges can be addressed, rather 
than solutions assumed to be located outside a community because it is 
deemed deficient.37
If we first shift our perspective, and then seek out policy options 
like CLTs and approaches such as ABCD, we are more likely to tackle the 
real challenges posed by informal development, while recognising all 
that their residents have suffered and achieved over time.38 The fact is I 
strongly believe that, until we understand the underlying nature of infor-
mal settlements, their qualities and their limitations, and compare this on 
an equal footing with the underlying nature, qualities and limitations of 
formal settlements, we will not be able to effectively improve the former 
without eroding their assets and qualities. And, perhaps equally impor-
tantly, we will fail to realise the potential of drawing on the qualities of 
informality in formal environments. That is, informal settlements have a 
lot to teach us about how to balance the formal and informal in our cities.
For upgrading to effectively take place, then, building on favelas’ 
natural qualities without compromising their assets – and thereby ulti-
mately providing a much greater depth and variety of human urban 
experiences and options – this systematisation and recognition must 
happen first. Some cities in Latin America, for example, are making a 
mad push to upgrade their informal settlements and bring them into the 
formal realm, on the assumption this is inherently ‘better’ than what they 
had before. There is insufficient understanding of the innately different 
logic-structure that underlies an informal settlement, and what inhabit-
ants may be losing in this process. I hope this thought-piece helps push 
forward an urgent discussion.
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Between informal and illegal 
in the Global North: Planning 
law, enforcement and justifiable 
noncompliance
rachelle alterman and inês Calor
8.1 Introduction
The phenomenon of the construction on or use of land without legal per-
mission is a prevalent reality for most inhabitants of the globe. This is 
especially true for developing countries (also called the Global South). A 
burgeoning body of scholarly and practical knowledge about developing 
countries has enhanced our understanding of how ‘informal’ develop-
ment (as many call it) of housing, shops, industries and other buildings 
fulfils essential human needs.1 Unregulated initiatives can also unleash 
human ingenuity and creativity, as Turner’s analysis of ‘vernacular archi-
tecture’ taught us long ago.2
Some scholars have argued that planning and land policy in the 
advanced-economy countries (the Global North) have much to learn 
from the Global South.3 We agree. However, in advocating for knowledge 
transfer from the Global South to the Global North, insufficient atten-
tion has been paid to the ‘elephant in the room’: the vast differences in 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the rule of law. Noncompliance with 
regulatory planning and related laws therefore calls for much broader 
rethinking of the relationship between planning and law.
Our focus in this chapter is on the laws and regulations pertain-
ing to the built environment, sometimes called ‘regulatory planning’. 
That would include regulatory tools such as zoning, statutory plans 
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and building/development control.4 We do not directly address related 
legal  areas, most  notably housing law (occupancy, rental rules, health 
and so on).
This chapter begins by scoping current knowledge about noncom-
pliance and enforcement in planning, showing a major gap. We then 
focus on linguistic usage of ‘informal’ versus ‘illegal’ (and ‘noncompliant’ 
and ‘unauthorised’). The main argument of this chapter attempts to con-
struct a conceptual basis for reconciling ‘informality’ with the rule of law. 
To illustrate the complex challenges faced by planning when it meets the 
law, we recount two complex stories. One is a hypothetical story about 
the processes of change that occur in a rather nondescript neighbour-
hood when noncompliance with planning regulations gradually becomes 
rampant. The second is a dramatic story – which happens to be a real-life 
account – in which situations at the extremes meet in one place. These 
two stories are intended to highlight the complexity of the challenges 
faced by planners, enforcement agents and – sometimes – the courts. The 
readers are challenged to decide what and when to tag as ‘informal’.
The chapter then turns to the neglected zone between planning 
regulations and enforcement practices. We outline a set of six situations 
where noncompliance with planning or land laws may indeed be justifi-
able. Each situation is illustrated with one or more cases, based on our 
prior studies. From these situations, we attempt to distil six criteria for 
determining ‘justifiable noncompliance’. In the concluding section, we 
call on planners and planning theorists to engage much more with the 
parallel universe of law and enforcement. It is up to planners to learn 
from noncompliance and incorporate the lessons into more responsive 
planning, so as to minimise the need for enforcement in the first place.
8.2 Current knowledge about noncompliance 
and enforcement: The neglected linchpin
It is not easy to build a bridge between planning, law and noncompliance, 
because there is not a solid platform of knowledge on which to anchor 
it. Existing international knowledge about noncompliance with planning 
rules and about enforcement and sanctions is scant, both in planning the-
ory and in planning law. One even wonders how these areas of  knowledge 
have evolved without this linchpin. One good thing about the recent 
attention to ‘informality’ is that it should force scholars to start filling in 
this mammoth gap.
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The problem is that, unlike planning theory, which is generic and 
conceptual, planning and related laws are concrete, heavy-bodied institu-
tions. Moreover, they vary significantly from one jurisdiction to another.5 
To date, there has been no broad systematic comparative research on the 
relationship between legal structures, enforcement practices and degrees 
of compliance. The recent evidence from the literature about ‘informal-
ity’ does not contribute much to filling in this specific knowledge gap, 
because it usually addresses only specific cases, and rarely the broader 
legal contexts.
informality, noncompliance and enforcement
Much of the scholarly literature on built-environment  ‘informality’  – 
whether in the Global South or in the Global North – is still far from 
addressing its relationship with the law. Even crucial differences between 
land-related and other types of informality are left vague. For exam-
ple, researchers sometimes address informal/illegal street vending in 
the same breath as the illegal/informal construction of buildings. This 
non-distinction is appropriate for many Global South countries, where 
the rule of law may be weak and dysfunctional both for regulating urban 
development and for economic transactions. However, conceptually, the 
two forms of noncompliance (and interim categories) should be distin-
guished, especially by urban planners. Vending is often fully or partially 
transient, and thus has relatively small long-term impacts on the built 
or open environment. By contrast, construction of permanent buildings 
creates long-range externalities, whether positive or negative.
Enforcement is the administrative and legal mechanism that any 
planning/development control laws would stipulate, at least on paper. 
This is the zone where planning, law and human needs and behaviour 
should meet. Sadly, enforcement is neglected not only by planning schol-
ars, but even by legal researchers on planning law. American planning law 
texts usually skip the enforcement topic altogether. The technical ration-
ale may be that enforcement is classified as a separate legal field, but the 
outcome is that planning students and practising planners are discon-
nected from the enforcement function. British literature on planning law 
devotes somewhat more attention to enforcement,6 and there are several 
dedicated texts (including Harwood, and Travers, Grant and Lambert).7
Empirical research on enforcement of development control is 
also  scant. Even in the UK (with the world’s oldest national planning 
law – 1909) there are only a few scholars who have delved into the topic 
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empirically.8 This is more than could be said for most other countries. 
Comparative research is equally scarce. Our own comparative evaluation 
of Portugal and Israel is a rare example.9 By contrast, the enforcement of 
building regulations (the technical engineering aspects of construction) 
has attracted more attention, perhaps because noncompliance may lead 
to direct health problems or loss of lives. Several scholars have surveyed 
building regulations in selected European countries.10 In the US, Burby 
and others extensively address enforcement of building codes.11
Overall, the many questions – empirical and normative – concern-
ing enforcement of planning laws and how these relate to patterns of 
noncompliance constitute virtually uncharted research territory.
the predicaments of enforcement
To understand the meaning and implications of noncompliance with plan-
ning regulations, planners should become more familiar with the crucial 
arena of enforcement. Unlike planning regulatory policies and plans, 
which have quasi-legislative characteristics, enforcement is an executive 
(or administrative) government function. It depends on  available finan-
cial resources, on policy priorities and on politics. Enforcement prac-
tices necessarily entail discretion about what, how much and when to 
enforce.12 The courts will consider this fact; but, at the same time, this fact 
exposes the authorities to petitions in many situations of  noncompliance – 
 justifiable and non-justifiable alike.
Comparative research on the de facto exercise of discretion in enforce-
ment of planning law is extremely lean. Smart and Aguilera’s chapter in 
this volume is a pioneering contribution, and our own empirical study of 
Portugal and Israel touches on this issue to some extent.13 From our inter-
views with enforcement agents in several local governments we learned 
that their reports reflected recurring predicaments about how to prioritise 
their work, given the limited human and financial resources available.
We doubt that many OECD countries have indeed enunciated prior-
ities or have instructed local governments to do so. Even the UK took its 
first steps in this direction only in 2012, and the process of adoption was 
still incomplete in 2019.14
planning law, noncompliance and planning theory
Theories about justice in planning have made much headway in recent 
years.15 If we compare textbooks on planning theory from the 1990s 
with more recent texts (compare Alexander and Brooks with Gunder, 
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Madanipour and Watson, for instance),16 we can observe much greater 
awareness of the role of power and the ‘dark side’ of planning. But this 
scholarship has yet to bridge planning theory with planning law, and to 
address the many sides of the rule of law. The legal realm provides tools of 
legitimacy for planning policies and tools for implementation, but it also 
constrains citizens’ behaviour. Planning regulations (zoning, local statu-
tory plans and building permits) restrict many actions that individuals 
may wish to carry out, vis-à-vis the use of land, construction or alteration 
of built structures. These regulations may be good or bad – depending on 
the point of view of those involved. Violations of these rules can entail 
sanctions – sometimes economically or personally severe. At the same 
time, some actions are not controlled and thus left to self-initiative.
In extreme situations of noncompliance caused by deprivation, 
planners or NGOs can try to draw on (rather vague) norms of inter-
national human rights law such as those regarding the right to housing.17 
These norms are also anchored in the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). Some books on UK planning law devote a special sec-
tion to examining how human rights impinge on planning powers.18 As 
noted by Harwood, the ECHR could have a direct bearing on planning 
enforcement.19 However, international human rights law is not a pan-
acea. It leaves considerable room for interpretation. Its adjudication is 
usually left to local jurisdictions. Most cases are unlikely to make it to the 
highest- level courts, and even if they do, winning is not assured.
The duty to address the topic of noncompliance and what it should 
signal lies at the doorstep of planners and planning theory. Most planning 
theory is directed at the planning process (such as visioning, public par-
ticipation, communication and negotiated development) or to the con-
tents of plans. There is little discussion of what messages noncompliance 
with planning law convey for planning modes and norms. In surveying 
the literature, we found only a few contributions in this direction. Among 
the more relevant is Alan Prior’s discussion of problems in the theory 
and practice of enforcement of environmental regulations.20 Britnell and 
Sheppard shed light on the issue of the public interest and social justice 
behind enforcement practices, noting ‘it is often the impact of unauthor-
ized development upon citizens’ sense of well-being and their perception 
of justice that lead them to complain in the first instance’.21 Neil Harris’s 
paper22 draws on Foucault’s philosophy,23 unveiling an interesting fact: 
the major source of information about violations – even in the era of 
remote sensing – is neighbours’ complaints. According to Harris (for the 
UK) and our own findings (based on interviews in Israel and Portugal),24 
neighbour reporting is more prevalent among middle- or higher-income 
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neighbourhoods where social cohesion is not strong. Some  jurisdictions – 
national or local – have established a dedicated web page to communicate 
a statement promising full confidentiality for those who report planning 
violations.25
What do these findings mean for planning theories such as collab-
orative planning? This is just one example – a teaser – of potential 
insights that could contribute to the understanding of the interrelation-
ships among planning, law, enforcement and noncompliance. But we 
have barely taken the first steps.
In this chapter, we do not attempt to take on the big mission of fill-
ing in the gap between planning theory and law.26 More modestly, we 
seek to demonstrate that, without considering the attributes and con-
straints of the legal system, the research on ‘informality’ will not be able 
to contribute broadly to better planning and regulation. Moreover – from 
the other side – without better understanding of the reasons for noncom-
pliance with regulatory planning and its implications, planners will not 
be able to achieve more just and effective planning.
8.3 Language matters
The knowledge gap is reflected in terminology. When do violations of 
land-related laws and regulations merit the term ‘informal’ and when 
would it be more appropriate to call them ‘illegal’ or other similar terms? 
We did not find in the literature any thorough distinction between infor-
mality and illegality. Drawing such a distinction should be especially rel-
evant for Global North countries, but our impression is that there is, in 
fact, an accelerated trend to blur the distinction among these concepts.
The evolution of terminology from ‘illegal’ to ‘informal’ can be 
observed if we look at the titles of books. One of the earlier books about 
our topic in the Global South, published in 1998, was titled ‘Illegal Cities: 
Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries’.27 Today, similar books 
about the Global South prefer the term ‘informal’.28 In very recent years, 
one can observe increasing use of the term ‘informal’ regarding planning 
violations in Global North countries too – including the title of this book 
volume. Some authors use the term with the specific intention of con-
veying that the reported types of noncompliance merit special consid-
eration. In this vein, ‘informality’ is widely used by authors who focus 
on special ethnic–cultural groups, to show how their needs are grossly 
unmet by modern planning and legal systems.29 The term is also used in 
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a distinctive context of ideologically motivated noncompliance, such as 
Low Impact Development30 or the historic Plotlands in the UK.31
However, some very recent publications regarding the Global North 
have been using the term ‘informal’ interchangeably with ‘illegal’, with-
out any attempt to argue that noncompliance in the cases described is 
justified due to some special circumstances, needs or wrongdoing by 
government. Some US authors have used ‘informal’ to refer to the phe-
nomenon of illegal accessory housing in relatively well-off neighbour-
hoods, where noncompliance is largely motivated by economic profit.32 
Similarly, the massive illegal construction all over Greece – a long-time 
member of the EU and the OECD – has been called ‘informal’, with no 
distinction made according to need, socio-economic level or other spe-
cial circumstances.33 A leading scholar in the field, Francesco Chiodelli, 
indirectly conveys a degree of malaise regarding the overly broad use of 
‘informality’. In a recent paper discussing corruption and the illegal con-
struction of mansions and other lucrative properties in Italy, he does use 
‘informality’ in the main title, but only to retract in the subtitle: ‘Housing 
Illegality and Organized Crime in Northern Italy’.34
The dictionary definition of ‘informality’ or ‘informal’ has nothing 
to do with the rule of law. This term denotes certain types of human 
behaviour, as distinct from ‘formal’ (or the many in-between shades). For 
example, one can prefer to wear informal clothes, to use informal speech 
or to skip formal table etiquette and eat barbeque-style. Such behaviour 
is usually not illegal – it is simply part of the vast range of human behav-
iour that is not addressed by laws and regulations.
Terminology should matter. In Global North countries, where plan-
ning laws are functioning reasonably well (no planning law is perfect) 
the use of ‘informal’ is inappropriate and self-defeating. When ‘informal’ 
is used as a synonym for ‘illegal’, this delegitimises planning law and 
the rule of law in general. Furthermore, by denoting noncompliance as 
‘informal’, we are diverting attention and possible responsibility from 
the planning laws and regulations and their role in anticipating eventual 
cases of noncompliance, or adjusting the regulatory planning to accom-
modate them ex-post.
In the Global North context, ignoring or bypassing planning law in 
an ad hoc manner undermines the planning system in general and its 
capacity to serve other public interests. Despite their many faults, plan-
ning laws are here to stay, and are even on the rise globally.35 We – citi-
zens, scholars and advocates – need planning laws in many contexts, 
such as to designate land for public services, to ensure public access, 
to enhance environmental sustainability or eventually to implement a 
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minimal portion of affordable housing units in private projects. Just as 
we would not lightly call a major tax evasion ‘informal’, even if we think 
the taxation system is not progressive enough, we should not use the 
term ‘informal’ to refer to violations of planning law in a casual manner.
By contrast, where a legal system is grossly malfunctioning, as in 
many developing countries, the term ‘informality’ is appropriate and use-
ful. Technically, the residents of the world’s huge favelas may be violating 
a battery of rules lurking somewhere in the law books, but these are often 
dysfunctional. Even worse, they are prone to being selectively enforced 
and misused. If the legal system clearly does not serve major parts of soci-
ety for housing, livelihood, mobility or public services, alternative modes 
of social or economic institutions are likely to emerge to serve the public 
needs. They will gradually acquire what Peter Ho calls ‘credibility’ and 
replace the rule of law.36 In the Global South context, the term ‘informal-
ity’ appropriately exonerates the residents of favelas from being tagged 
as violators of the law. At the same time, this term also directs attention 
to the many positive functions of the self-help and spontaneous solutions.
However, the loose use of ‘informality’ in jurisdictions where the 
rule of law, in general, and planning law, in particular, are expected to 
function undercuts the foundations of the very same institutions that 
the critics may wish to repair. Ironically, the use of this behaviour-based, 
rather than institution-based, term implicitly absolves planning law and 
the manner of its enforcement from any responsibility for the types and 
degrees of noncompliance.
8.4 The Global North contrasted with the Global South
Before importing ‘informality’ from the Global South to the Global North, 
one should be aware of some more (generalised) differences between 
these two broad spheres.
the Global south: Land tenure is the focus
In cities of the Global South (and in many rural areas too), informality in 
relation to land – and thus also in relation to building – is the rule, not the 
exception. The converse holds for the Global North.
In the Global South, much of the informality in the built envir-
onment context pertains to land tenure, not to planning law or devel-
opment control. In developing countries, security of land tenure is 
the primary concern, and key international bodies have invested 
large resources in promoting it.37 The very first of the UN Sustainable 
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Development Goals addresses the importance of securing tenure 
rights.38 The priority of land tenure over regulation of building is rea-
sonable: where land tenure is not secure, planning is almost irrelevant. 
Granting of a building permit is predicated on the long-term responsi-
bility of the landholders. Therefore, in Global South countries, plan-
ning regulations (and thus planning law) usually hold a much lower 
priority than land tenure issues. Only recently did UN-Habitat estab-
lish a tiny unit with the mission of introducing working planning laws 
to developing countries,39 whereas land tenure has been UN-Habitat’s 
core mission for decades.
the Global north: planning law is the focus
In the Global North, most references to informality and to illegality 
address planning law rather than land tenure. The reason is that, in 
advanced-economy countries, property rights are usually well estab-
lished and administered. Landowners are aware of their rights, and the 
courts enforce claims against private transgressors. Cases of squatting – 
so rampant in the South – are exceptional.
With stable land tenure, planning law can function. Although viola-
tions of planning law are by no means rare – we all know of some, often in 
our own neighbourhood – they are usually not the main force that shapes 
cities or neighbourhoods. In most Global North jurisdictions, neither 
spontaneous occupations nor self-help housing predominate (although 
here, too, there are special exceptions).
A recent OECD report, in which the planning ‘systems’ of all mem-
ber countries are evaluated, notes that, in general, cities and regions 
are governed according to planning and law. The report also assesses 
the degree of satisfaction with planning enforcement. Two-thirds of the 
countries receive a high score of four or five (out of five), and only very 
few a score of one or two.40 This finding indicates that violations of plan-
ning rules in the North are an island, not an ocean.
There are four other relevant differences between South and North. 
First, construction of structurally dangerous, unsafe and unhealthy hous-
ing is typical of developing countries, but is rare in developed countries. 
This is because the regulation of structures is usually adequate, and build-
ers obey them for fear of endangering lives (and insurance policies …). 
Second, in the North, violations of planning law usually occur on the 
violator’s own land.41 Third, large-scale evictions from housing are less 
frequent in the North. If evictions do occur, there is likely to be at least a 
minimal housing-security system, and governments are obliged to pro-
vide replacement accommodation.
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The fourth difference is perhaps the most pertinent to our discussion: 
noncompliance with planning law in the Global South (if discussed at all) 
is usually viewed as binary and focuses on whether there is a building per-
mit for the entire structure. There is rarely any discussion of smaller viola-
tions. But in most countries of the Global North (with a few exceptions), 
the majority of planning-related violations concern divergences from 
the original permit, such as an addition to a building, an unauthorised 
change of use of the premises, noncompliance with architecture design, 
or inaction – such as non-instalment of compulsory thermal energy.
8.5 A dedicated term for the Global North: Justifiable 
noncompliance
In the Global North contexts, too, there may be unique situations in 
which violations of planning laws could be justified. We propose that the 
term justifiable noncompliance becomes the focus of the planning law dis-
cussion in the Global North.
Among the various synonyms related to illegality, we chose ‘non-
compliance’ over other terms for two reasons. First, ‘illegal’ suggests a 
yes-or-no status, whereas, in the Global North, cases of noncompliance 
are a matter of degree – some are minor, some major. Second, we pre-
ferred noncompliance over unauthorised because the latter pertains 
only to actions, whereas noncompliance encompasses also inaction (for 
example, failure to install a renewable energy element). Unlike ‘infor-
mality’ – which (as we have argued) refers to behaviour, is descriptive 
rather than normative and does not address any institution – noncompli-
ance addresses the legal framework. When we add justifiable noncompli-
ance, we are explicitly normative, and this term suggests that, within the 
broad realm of planning-law violations, a small subset may be justifiable.
Our aim is to develop criteria for determining what types, degrees 
or contexts of noncompliance may be justifiable. This would be a first 
step towards helpfully reforming planning and enforcement practices. 
However, this mission is not simple. The potential justifications have to 
pass through the filters of the legal system. To demonstrate how planning 
and law may react to noncompliance, and some of the complex dilem-
mas involved, we set out two scenarios. The first is a hypothetical story, 
where we simulate events and processes that often occur in real-life 
urban contexts. The second is a real-life case, perhaps more reminiscent 
of a fictional scenario because of the unique and heightened dilemmas it 
presents.
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8.6 A hypothetical story
A well-off middle-income neighbourhood had been planned according to 
the urban standards that prevailed at the time, and it offered satisfactory 
density and a good social fit with the characteristics and desires of the 
inhabitants. The number of infringements was moderate, similar to that 
of other nearby areas. The main source of information about violations 
was neighbour reporting, as is often the case in well-off neighbourhoods.
After a few decades, the neighbourhood lost its prestige and new resi-
dents trickled in, usually with a lower income level. The ethnic composition 
changed gradually, with newcomers mixing in with more well-established 
residents. The average number of children per household increased. Some 
homes were crowded. The number of planning infringements escalated 
significantly. Some residents constructed an illegal annex to their house to 
relieve family crowding, while others extended their homes or converted 
their basements into accessory housing units, offered for market rental. 
Some owners paved over their yards to save on gardening costs, thus ham-
pering water seepage and causing occasional mild flooding.
Some of the households were indeed poor and required the extra 
space to meet basic housing needs or to earn extra income. A few of the 
original home owners noticed their neighbours’ precedents and followed 
suit, building small rental units without a permit. As the neighbourhood 
demographics continued to change, reporting by neighbours reduced 
dramatically.
A similar neighbourhood not far away developed approximately at 
the same time. That neighbourhood did not experience the same demo-
graphic transformation and retained its middle- and upper– middle-income 
profile. The rate of infringements remained moderate, and enforcement 
actions were largely dependent on complaints by neighbours.
The enforcement agents were not prepared for the rise in the num-
ber of violations in the first neighbourhood. For a few years, they con-
tinued their reliance on neighbour reporting and remained relatively 
passive. The number of violations grew steeply and started to affect the 
character of the neighbourhood, for better or for worse (depending on 
one’s point of view). What could the enforcement agents do? If they took 
a light-touch approach and dismissed the violations, they risked legal 
challenges from the direction of the second neighbourhood. Some res-
idents there were angry that enforcement was still being carried out in 
their neighbourhood for the same types of violations that were now being 
tolerated in the lower-income neighbourhood. They decried what they 
perceived to be ‘selective enforcement’ and demanded that the hands-off 
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policy be applied to them as well. At the same time, from the opposite 
direction, some residents in the second neighbourhood wanted the 
enforcement unit to be more proactive, to stem the increase in violations 
that had occurred in the first neighbourhood. Both sides threatened to 
take court action against the enforcement unit.
Simply describing the planning law violations as examples of ‘infor-
mality’, without distinguishing between them, would not be useful in 
this case (as in most cases), as it would not help achieve a better balance 
between planning law, planning policy, and human needs and behaviour. 
To argue that the violations indicate that the planning rules should be 
changed or that the legal rules of enforcement or sanctions should be 
revised, noncompliance should first be shown to be justifiable according 
to some principles. But what should these principles be?
There are some dilemmas involved here. Should the entire lower- 
income neighbourhood as one single spatial unit now be characterised as 
justifiably noncompliant? Or should the justifications apply only to indi-
viduals, according to their personal needs and circumstances? Should 
construction of an accessory unit to contribute to bettering the livelihood 
of poor people also be regarded as justifiable? Should the reduction in 
permeable ground-cover also merit the justifiable noncompliance label, 
and does it matter whether the family is poor or not? What policy regard-
ing enforcement should the authorities adopt? Or should they simply 
continue their enforcement-by-complaint policy? Should the plan (plan-
ning regulations) be amended so that violations would be legalised ret-
roactively? Should any fines or sanctions be imposed, even if legalisation 
is possible? Should the deregulation also hold for future actions, or just 
for the violations to date?
Later in this chapter, we discuss possible criteria for testing whether 
some types of noncompliance can be classified as justifiable. Quite proba-
bly, not all the infringements in our hypothetical story will pass these tests.
8.7 A real-life story
Our real-life story is one of extremes. It takes place amid a set of small 
islands in the Ria Formosa Natural Park, near Faro, on the southern tip of 
Portugal. This modest but paradise-like location has attracted thousands 
of illegal summer homes (Figures 8.1 and 8.2). The degree of illegality 
today is one of the most extreme one could imagine, entailing cumu-
lative breaches of several laws and regulations enacted over the years: 
squatting on coastal public land, noncompliance with environmental 
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regulations, noncompliance with regional and national plans, noncom-
pliance with national coastal protection and, in addition, violation of 
EU-level landscape protection.42 Sea-level rise, too, is gradually threaten-
ing some of the buildings; thus legal building permits cannot be issued. 
However, decades ago, some buildings did receive temporary permits 
from the Port Authority and some are still under its jurisdiction. Many 
local politicians (and academics) have summer homes on these islands, 
alongside the permanent homes of fishermen, whose families have lived 
on the islands for generations, and a few Roma people.
The very context of these islands is likely to generate dilemmas. 
Some of the homes are very modest, while others are more affluent. Yet, 
Farol also has some physical attributes of a spontaneous settlement that 
some scholars regard as ‘informal’.
Today, most people (but not the residents and owners) would prob-
ably agree that the islands should be returned to their original pristine 
state as open public domain. The interests of the islands’ residents are 
clashing head-on with highly consensual environmental norms. What 
kind of public policy is appropriate for these settlements that emerged 
as ‘informal’ decades ago, but currently exhibit multi-layered illegal-
ities? Should the community be left in place, despite the environmen-
tal policies? Should there be a soft strategy of gradual and voluntary 
Figure 8.1 Summer homes on the ‘illegal half’ of Farol settlement 
in Ria Formosa, an environmentally highly protected area in southern 
Portugal. Are these informal? © Inês Calor. 
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phasing-out? Who should bear the costs of replacement housing, if 
deemed appropriate? Should compensation be paid? Alternatively, is 
hard-line demolition justified? If so, should demolition be carried out at 
once or phased according to some priorities? Are there distinguishing cri-
teria, such as long-time owners versus more recent buyers, or permanent 
residents versus owners of secondary homes?
The state authorities have been (somewhat reluctantly) attempt-
ing to enforce demolitions for several years. In practice, this policy has 
turned out to be partial, seemingly random and based on extraneous var-
iables. The story is still evolving and is far from savoury.
The official criteria were concerned with the right to replacement 
housing. Fishermen and others who were able to prove this was their per-
manent residence were eligible for such rehousing – the question remains 
where and when? Some summer homes have already been demolished. 
However, residents with means (financial or political) have gained time 
by accessing the courts to obtain temporary injunctions against demo-
lition. In 2015–2016 an organised group of better-off residents almost 
succeeded in getting a court order to stop demolition regardless of the 
priority status of the residents. How did they accomplish that? They 
recruited a competing public goal – also drawn from the realm of envir-
onmental protection. With the support of one of the municipalities, they 
argued that the demolitions would destroy the preferred habitat of a 
protected species – chameleons. This species’ habitat, so they argued, 
Figure 8.2 Summer homes and fishermen’s houses close to the water 
at the Faro Beach settlement, also in Ria Formosa. © Inês Calor. 
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happens to be the backyards of the built-up areas of these islands (see 
Figures 8.3 and 8.4).
The lower court was indeed convinced and issued injunctions 
against demolition. However, in April 2016, the Portuguese Supreme 
Administrative Court determined that the petitioners had no legal 
standing for species protection and reversed this decision. Meanwhile, 
Figure 8.3 Summer homes of varying levels of quality in the Farol 
settlement. © Inês Calor. 
Figure 8.4 Recruiting the chameleons to petition the courts against 
demolition. Farol settlement, southern Portugal. © Inês Calor. 
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an electoral change in the national government further delayed the 
enforcement activities.43
The unintended consequences of the appeals to the courts were 
socially unjust and disruptive. Under the canopy of the courts, the 
enforcement became, de facto, selective. The homes of some poor or less-
well-connected households were demolished, leaving a scarred, non- 
contiguous built-up fabric. However, due to the court interventions, many 
houses (or homes) remained in place and continued to be used. Because 
court actions cost money, one can assume that some of the better- off or 
better-connected have been able to gain many years of vacationing or 
rental income from paradise.
The overarching dilemma is whether any of the types of noncom-
pliance encapsulated in this story deserve to be regarded as justifiable, 
and if so, on what grounds? To the best of our knowledge, to date, the 
chameleons have not yet been consulted.
8.8 In search of criteria for ‘justifiable noncompliance’
Should any of the violations of planning or land laws encountered in 
our two stories be recognised as justifiable under the rule of law? If so, 
they could merit waiver of sanctions, changes in enforcement policies or 
revision of the regulatory planning rules that triggered the violation in 
the first place. In this section, we seek to identify situations where some 
aspects of planning regulations or some flaws in enforcement practices 
can serve as possible grounds for arguing that certain violations of plan-
ning laws are indeed justifiable and should serve as the basis for reform. 
We have identified six types of grounds.
breach of human rights
The first justification for noncompliance with planning law is, of course, 
breach of a specific human right, such as the right to adequate housing 
(variously defined).44 The violation of the planning or construction regu-
lation is carried out to provide a minimal level of housing that neither the 
government nor the market offers. In advanced-economy countries, such 
situations are less frequent than in the Global South. Thus, in the Global 
North, breach of human rights is likely to apply in unique cases only.
One such example is a case that has reached the highest legal 
 echelons – specifically, the European Court of Human Rights. The case 
concerned ‘travellers’ (Roma people) in the UK who resided in their 
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caravans on their privately owned land, but without planning permis-
sion.45 The Court did recognise the Roma community members’ right 
to their special way of life and the legitimacy of their desire to set up 
a community caravan site. The Court additionally acknowledged that 
there were insufficient sites allocated to meet their housing needs in that 
particular district. However, the Court also addressed the local author-
ity’s argument that it had to consider the negative externalities caused 
by the caravan site on the environment and the public costs of the neces-
sary infrastructure. The majority (in a split court) ruled that the balance 
made by the local authority was not unreasonable and that, in this case, 
there was no breach of the ECHR.
We thus see that, even when breach of a human right is invoked, the 
courts may still weigh this right against other public interests. Still, an 
argument for justifiable noncompliance based on human rights is indeed 
the highest legal norm globally.
A second example – with a more successful decision – is a case heard 
by Israel’s High Court of Justice. It, too, concerned ‘travellers’ (Bedouin 
Arab–Israelis), some of whom still pursue a semi-nomadic tribal way of 
life in the Negev Desert.46 To get to school each day, the children of these 
families had to cross a creek, which was dry most of the year but danger-
ous to cross during winter flash-floods. The authorities commenced the 
application process for obtaining the necessary building permit to con-
struct a footbridge, but the procedures took time. The petitioners argued 
immediate danger. The High Court ordered the Ministry of Infrastructure 
to construct a bridge immediately, without awaiting planning permis-
sion. In this unusual decision, the Court relied on its inherent authority 
to bypass the legislation when necessary, to ensure justice. (The same 
High Court, however, in other petitions, did not halt the demolition of 
illegally constructed makeshift homes and instead accepted the govern-
ment’s position that the families had been offered alternative housing in 
community settings, which they refused.)47
A third example is of noncompliance that is potentially justified 
under the right to housing. The informal settlement community of Cova 
da Moura in Portugal can be regarded as a Global South incision into 
the Global North (see Figures 8.5 and 8.6). Most of its 5,000 inhabit-
ants are immigrants from Cape Verde, Angola and other Portuguese-
speaking former African countries.48 The self-built settlement has grown 
over the past 40 years through squatting on a large, once-agricultural, 
vacant plot of private land (originally, remote from Lisbon). As can be 
seen in Figures 8.5 and 8.6, the neighbourhood, though entirely illegal, 
does receive public services today and looks liveable. Its location is now 
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Figure 8.6 Cova da Moura squatter settlement, Amadora, Portugal. © 
Ines Calor. 
Figure 8.5 Cova da Moura squatter settlement, Amadora, Portugal. 
Mostly inhabited by immigrants from Portugal’s African colonies.  
© Ines Calor. 
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close to the Lisbon metro/transportation network, where property val-
ues are high. The owners argue that their development plan was denied 
back in the1980s due to the administration’s inability to provide alterna-
tive housing for this community. The national and local authorities have 
not yet reached an agreement with the landowners about compensation, 
land exchange or expropriation.49
In view of the special social circumstances and governmental fail-
ure to provide alternative housing, there may be room to argue that this 
case constitutes justified noncompliance on the basis of the right to ade-
quate housing. However, the fact that it sits in a Global North context 
means that the landowners’ rights must be handled through the regular 
rule of law, and the issue of how to find large resources for compensation 
or land exchange remains.
Crisis situations and legal voids due to major regime transitions
The second category of justifiable situations of noncompliance relates to 
crisis situations or major geopolitical disruptions of the rule of law. Cri-
ses include disasters, when emergency rules and behaviour set the law 
aside, and we do not address these situations here. Global North coun-
tries have experienced other types of crises that may affect compliance 
with planning laws. Geopolitical upheavals, for example, have caused 
large-scale migration with which the normal legal regime cannot cope.50 
Major  political–legal regime changes can leave a large legal void during 
the subsequent transition phase. However, such situations do not univer-
sally merit a sweeping classification of all violations as ‘justifiable’. We 
will give two examples.
First, we revisit Portugal, where two crisis-related processes over-
lapped. The Portugal of the 1960s – then one of the poorest countries 
in Western Europe – went through a deep economic transition. This 
entailed migration from rural to urban areas (but neither on the scale of, 
nor with the economic desperation of, rural-to-urban migrants in devel-
oping countries). Many developers subdivided land and sold plots unof-
ficially. This practice, known as clandestine allotment (see Figure  8.7) 
has led migrants to build hundreds of thousands of homes (mostly on 
the outskirts of Lisbon) with no building permits, no environmental 
consideration, and no allocation of land for public infrastructure. The 
practice continued with renewed force after the end of the dictatorship 
in 1974, during a period of political and governmental democratic tran-
sition. There has never been an official count, but Cardoso estimates 
that between 1960 and 1969 about 100,000 houses were built illegally, 
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and that between 1970 and1981 the number grew exponentially, to 
300,000.51 Enforcement was obviously lax.
Although basic planning law had been on the books all this time, 
the transition period was characterised by weak governance.52 Breach of 
planning law was quite tempting, economically, and the owners of the 
buildings were of various socio-economic groups and housing levels. 
How should these infringements be regarded today? Tagging them ‘infor-
mal’ without distinction will not lead to good public policies. Instead, a 
rigorous application of criteria is needed, alongside an assessment of 
alternative modes of enforcement, sanctions or legalisation.
Another example, on a much larger scale, relates to the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the entire East European bloc of regimes in 
1989–1991, which created nothing less than a legal abyss. Pre-collapse, 
in top-down government actions, planning law was either non-existent 
or irrelevant. As the new planning laws that today exist in most of these 
countries were still being drafted or in their infancy, during this time 
most East European countries experienced a high number of violations 
of their embryonic planning laws.53
In such crisis situations, the rule of law in planning is weak – laws and 
regulations may be vague or not yet familiar to the public. Enforcement 
of planning law, as a low-priority arm of government, is likely to be very 
fragile. Noncompliance might be based on genuine ignorance, on dire 
need, or – let us not forget – also on opportunities to make large profits.
Figure 8.7 Houses illegally built in ‘clandestine allotments’ – a 
prevalent phenomenon in Portugal in the 1960s–1980s. © Ines Calor. 
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Many of these cases are indeed candidates for classification as jus-
tifiable noncompliance. They may merit interim measures of incorpo-
ration into the legal regime, either through a special amnesty, through 
retrospective adjustment of plans and regulations or through an offi-
cial, openly declared non-enforcement policy for a prescribed period. 
Unfortunately, all too often, cases where noncompliance may have been 
justifiable are left in legal limbo for many years. Such situations could be 
prey to selective enforcement by the authorities – a weapon in the service 
of neighbour disputes – or could inhibit smooth market transactions in 
housing or businesses. In the meantime, indecision and inaction in cases 
of justifiable noncompliance jeopardise the personal, social and property 
security that citizens deserve.
intractable planning policies: doomed to failure
Planning law empowers planning regulations, and regulations expect 
compliance from citizens and enforcement from the authorities. How-
ever, regulations – and indeed any public policy – may have intrinsic lim-
itations. In their classic text on the implementation of policy, Mazmanian 
and Sabatier present a set of preconditions for successful implementa-
tion.54 A primary precondition is tractability: the degree of behavioural 
change sought by any regulation – especially a regulatory one – should 
be reasonably achievable. Here is an example translated into the plan-
ning regulatory context: where modern planning regulations, especially 
concerning residential areas, clash head-to-head with deeply rooted trad-
itional modes of family or community living, large-scale noncompliance 
should be expected. If governments try to enforce the regulations with 
a tough hand, they will engender serious socio-political conflicts. When 
massive noncompliance persists for a long time despite government 
attempts to increase awareness through enforcement and education, this 
may be an indicator that the regulation is intractable and noncompliance 
is justified.
An example of intractability is the failure of Israeli planning law 
to regulate development in Arab–Israeli villages and small towns. 
Figure  8.8 depicts a typical development pattern for such towns. The 
land is privately and legally owned and passed within the family only 
through parental allocation or inheritance. Planners, trained to seek 
urban compactness, rationalise roads and services, and conserve agricul-
tural land, gallantly insist on good, sustainable planning, and draft regu-
lations to achieve that. However, the deeply entrenched forces of family 
tradition are more powerful. Each new household will usually build its 
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home wherever the family happens to own a plot of land, regardless of 
its location or the availability of infrastructure and public services. In the 
absence of a real land market, there is no premium for density with good 
access to infrastructure and services.55 Many elected local government 
officials naturally identify with their voters, despite the implications of 
sprawl for the local budget.
After 70 years of failed attempts to engender compliance, it would 
appear the Israeli government has not yet come to the realisation that the 
attempt to change land-related behavioural norms through modern plan-
ning regulations will not succeed. This policy is intractable. Thus, tens of 
thousands of homes and many businesses remain officially illegal, with 
thousands of demolition orders yet to be carried out. This gap is a source 
of constant conflict and tension between Israel’s Arab citizens and the 
national government, and has been appropriately tagged by Nurit Alfasi 
as ‘Doomed to Informality’.56 We argue that such situations where regula-
tions are intrinsically intractable could be regarded as cases of justifiable 
noncompliance. One appropriate approach here would be retroactive full 
legalisation in most cases. Future planning policies should aspire to be as 
hands-off as possible.
Figure 8.8 Homes built without planning permission on self-owned 
land, spilling onto agricultural land. An Israeli Arab village/town. © 
Rachelle Alterman. 
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overregulation and its implications for violations and enforcement
When does regulation provide an essential underpinning for good plan-
ning policies, and when is it clearly overregulation that is not only unnec-
essary, but detrimental to the ostensible public purpose? If planning 
controls are excessive, there are likely to be negative impacts of many 
sorts, including an increase in noncompliance.
The line differentiating overregulation and good regulation is, of 
course, contextual. A prominent candidate for being regarded as overreg-
ulation in some contexts is design control of architectural style. We are 
not referring to historic preservation or major landmarks, but to regular 
homes or small shops. Design control might include the compulsory use 
of a certain colour on a building, restrictions on the style of roof permit-
ted, limitations on decorative materials or compulsory design of shop sig-
nage. In some jurisdictions, design control is legally permitted. In other 
jurisdictions, it is not allowed because it is regarded as overregulation 
(and, in some jurisdictions, also as infringement on freedom of expres-
sion).57 Design control is susceptible to noncompliance, especially if the 
public architect’s taste does not resonate with local building traditions or 
is not welcome by the residents. If enforcement agencies do not regard 
such factors as a priority, and residents do not submit complaints against 
their neighbours, violations may run rampant.
Figures 8.9 and 8.10 show an example of overregulation of fences. 
The original style imposed by the statutory design specification was 
apparently not appealing to home owners and, over time, almost all 
replaced them with new designs (often using costly materials). Under 
the letter of the Israeli planning law at the time (revised since), all vio-
lations of planning law were deemed to be of identical severity, and any 
distinctions would be made in practice by enforcement priorities and 
the courts. Quite reasonably, the city’s small enforcement unit did not 
give high priority to such minor violations, which were never legalised 
formally. Even though this was (and still is) an upper–middle- or high- 
income neighbourhood, only a few neighbours ever complained about 
each other. Today, the non-enforcement policy remains, and so does the 
legally ambiguous situation. In our opinion, the neighbourhood looks 
much better than it would have with the uniformly designed fences.
The relevance of overregulation to our discussion here is that it is 
prone to misuse through the legal system. Leaving overregulation intact 
while not enforcing violations may be convenient for the enforcement 
administration and the courts. However, dormant enforcement pow-
ers are not a ‘sleeping beauty’. They might be harnessed for selective 
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enforcement in intergroup or interpersonal conflicts. Regulation without 
a clear public purpose is not likely to promote social justice in the city. It is 
planners’ duty not to remain complacent, and to review regulations on an 
ongoing basis, while learning from experiences of noncompliance. In the 
Figure 8.9 An upper–middle-income neighbourhood, Netanya, Israel. 
One of the few fences in the original obligatory design still standing. © 
Rachelle Alterman. 
Figure 8.10 Next door – an example of an individually replaced fence, 
without a permit and noncompliant with the obligatory design. © 
Rachelle Alterman. 
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context of this chapter, we argue that overregulation and concomitant 
nonenforcement may be one of the justifications for noncompliance.
Lethargic, negligent or unjust enforcement
As a low-priority and under-funded government function, enforcement 
agencies sometimes adopt a hands-off policy, not only in cases of acknowl-
edged overregulation, but simply because they have been negligent in 
enforcement in the past. Now that noncompliance has become so wide-
spread, enforcement would cause too much political or physical turmoil. 
What should governments do?
Many OECD member countries – notably Italy, Greece and Turkey – 
face violations of planning laws on a huge national scale.58 These viola-
tions amassed over decades and now cover major parts of the urban and 
rural population. They do not correlate with poverty or with the needs of 
specific cultural groups: they can be found in rich and poor neighbour-
hoods, in commercial areas, in resort areas and so on.
From time to time, governments attempt to bring such widely 
spread violations into the rule of law. Mass demolition is, of course, 
out of the question. A few countries have taken the extreme legal step 
of adopting an official planning amnesty. Amnesties may differ greatly 
from country to country in their legal and financial impacts. In Greece, 
a recent amnesty involved payment of high fees to the national coffers 
(reflecting Greece’s economic bankruptcy and the European policy of 
replenishing the national coffers).59 In some countries, such as Italy and 
Turkey, amnesties have been repeated several times – a phenomenon that 
does not bode well for the general rule of law.
Where enforcement has been negligent as a government func-
tion, the authorities should be accountable and individual noncompli-
ance could be justified. This means that planning regulations should be 
amended to legalise the violations. If the noncompliance is physically 
reversible without demolition or major costs to individuals, planners 
should consider the use of incentives.
noncompliance serves a public purpose, but planning fails  
to  re-evaluate existing regulations
We now return to illegal accessory dwelling units, as in our hypotheti-
cal story. Such units can take on quite inventive physical forms. Figure 
8.11 shows an illegal, well-hidden backyard staircase leading to an illegal 
accessory dwelling unit on the second floor. Figure 8.12 shows a garage 
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Figure 8.11 Illegal stairs in the backyard of a single-family (detached) 
home. Access to an illegally partitioned accessory housing unit, rented 
out. Location undisclosed. © Rachelle Alterman. 
Figure 8.12 Garage illegally extended and converted into an 
accessory housing unit. Upper–middle-income neighbourhood in 
Netanya, Israel © Rachelle Alterman. 
176 CoMparatiVE approaCHEs to inforMaL HoUsinG aroUnd tHE GLobE
unabashedly turned into an accessory unit. The total number of such ille-
gal units in Global North countries is estimated to be in the millions.60 
They are found not only in single-family homes (that is, detached prop-
erties), but also in partitioned apartments. They are reported in the US, 
Canada, Australia and Israel,61 but are probably spread widely across the 
globe. Some such units are located in low-income neighbourhoods, such 
as in our hypothetical story, where they provide affordable housing plus 
additional rental income to the owners. But many accessory units are 
found in well-off neighbourhoods.
Accessory housing is an example of situations where illegal prac-
tices, in fact, serve to adjust static planning regulations to new public 
policy goals. When many of the suburban American or Canadian neigh-
bourhoods were originally approved, the housing affordability issue was 
less acute. Furthermore, the households may initially have had, on aver-
age, more inhabitants, as there were fewer ‘empty nesters’ at that point 
in the life cycle of the neighbourhood. Today, accessory units are recog-
nised as inherently more affordable than the main housing units in the 
same zone. They also contribute to urban densification, with much lower 
public investment in infrastructure and services than in new housing.
Another example is depicted in Figure 8.13. Garages are a notorious 
source of violations of planning law for a variety of ingenious purposes 
(not only accessory housing units). The picture shows a car parked on a 
Figure 8.13 Fake, inaccessible garage door. The underground space 
designated for a garage has been illegally merged with the main house. 
Location undisclosed. © Rachelle Alterman. 
 bEtWEEn inforMaL and iLLEGaL in tHE GLobaL nortH 177
driveway that should lead to an underground garage, but the flattened 
driveway leads nowhere. The extra floor space has been annexed to the 
main house. According to the planning regulations in that jurisdiction, 
the use of an underground garage area for any other purpose is clearly 
illegal. Any extra floor area in this upper–middle-income area is quite 
lucrative. This violation is easy to spot from the local road, but has not 
been stopped. Could it be that addressing such violations is assigned a 
low priority because the underground garage regulations no longer make 
sense? Planning policy today seeks to minimise the number of parking 
places per household, to reduce reliance on private car ownership and 
encourage greater use of public transport.
In both the accessory-housing and the garage-annexation scenar-
ios, the violation actually resonates quite well with broader planning 
policies today. Perhaps this recognition – whether explicitly articulated 
or  unspoken – partially explains why the enforcement agencies prefer to 
turn a blind eye to the increase in accessory units or to the elimination of 
a built-in parking space.
Are these types of noncompliance justifiable? Probably not, because 
grabbing by stealth contradicts the pillars of the rule of law – transpar-
ency and equality. But this type of violation does point to the serious 
discrepancies between frozen planning regulations and dynamic urban 
needs. An enforcement policy of turning a blind eye is not a valid pol-
icy. Responsibility should sit back with the planners and decision-makers 
whose duty should have been to proactively review current planning reg-
ulations and deregulate where merited. In the contexts described here, 
noncompliance should have been foreseen and either strongly sanc-
tioned to overcome human temptation, or the regulation should have 
been officially relaxed.
8.9 Collating the criteria for justifiable noncompliance 
in the Global North context
While well-reasoned criteria are a necessary condition for enabling jus-
tified noncompliance to coexist with the rule of law, this condition alone 
is not sufficient. Broader changes in the conceptual and institutional 
interrelationship between planning, planning law and enforcement pol-
icies are needed. In this section, we propose criteria for justifiability of 
noncompliance and share some thoughts about broader legal and insti-
tutional reforms.
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Our criteria for distinguishing between unjustified violations and 
justifiable noncompliance have been distilled from our hypothetical case, 
the real-life story of the Farol settlement, and our wider research expe-
rience. The proposed criteria are tentative and need further theoretical 
grounding and research.
If justifiable noncompliance is defined too broadly, parts of the 
foundations of planning law will erode away. Planning laws have many 
faults – but we need them more than ever to meet today’s challenges of 
urbanisation, sustainability and social justice. On the other hand, if the 
criteria are too narrow, they will not enable further progress towards 
more socially responsive and just planning and enforcement. Part of 
enhancing social justice entails paying much more attention to the phe-
nomena surrounding noncompliance with planning regulations.
We propose six criteria; to be regarded as justifiable noncompliance 
in the Global North context, violations of planning laws should fulfil at 
least one. The legal or policy arguments may be stronger if two or more 
criteria are at play. The criteria are:
a) Basic human needs or rights are unmet under the planning regulations.
Enforcing compliance with planning law will not enable disadvantaged 
or socially constrained households to have minimally adequate housing 
or livelihoods in the area relevant for their socio-cultural needs. At the 
same time, the violations do not entail serious negative externalities that 
cannot be reasonably contained without jeopardising the equivalent 
rights of other groups. A reasonable and socio-culturally sensitive policy 
balance would indicate that noncompliance is justified.
b) Crisis situations or extreme regime transitions create a legal void.
Since the 1990s, many countries that are today members of the OECD 
have undergone a major crisis or extreme regime change that has left a 
void in planning law. In the interim, even though there may have been 
laws on the books or in the making, there were significant ambiguities in 
the law or its enforcement. These situations call for concerted thinking 
about interim policies that will avoid tagging major populations as legal 
offenders and a large number of structures as illegal.
c) The planning law or regulations are predicated on intractable 
objectives.
Sometimes, planners or governments imagine that planning regulations 
can achieve deeper changes in behaviour than is realistically feasible. 
Regulations may be intractable when they clash with deeply entrenched 
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social structures or economic capacity, leading to extensive noncompli-
ance. If planning laws and regulations clearly do not serve the society 
in question, and no trade-offs are perceived by citizens, noncompliance 
could be justifiable unless it compromises the interests or values of other 
groups or the general public good.
d) There is overregulation or random regulation without a clear public 
purpose.
Violations of minor regulations that have no perceivable purpose can be 
viewed as justifiable if they have no major externalities and are not at the 
expense of others. One indicator is that the enforcement agencies them-
selves regard these violations as low-priority and do not spend resources 
on enforcement.
e) Enforcement is negligent or clearly unjust.
The enforcement agencies do not monitor the violations, and these 
become too rampant to be feasibly enforced. Alternatively, enforcement 
is selective and unjust. This could arise from intentional discrimination, 
but could also be an unintended outcome of lethargic, negligent monitor-
ing and enforcement.
f) Noncompliance serves a new public purpose, but planning fails to  
re-evaluate existing regulations.
Planning regulations sometimes create undesirable path dependency. 
Existing regulation may constrain the capacity to serve new public needs, 
whereas the noncompliant initiatives do serve them. If the enforcement 
agencies knowingly close their eyes to large-scale violations of planning 
regulations, this could signal that the noncompliant actions are justifi-
able. This type of situation indicates negligence or failure by planning 
authorities to re-evaluate the existing regulations and find ways to 
accommodate the new public purpose.
Would any of these criteria be sufficient to justify the violations in either 
our hypothetical or the real-life stories? The application of the criteria will 
rarely be easy, because each would depend on specific factors, and would 
encounter different constellations of competing considerations. In each 
jurisdiction, there are likely to be relevant prior court decisions that will 
construct the span of justifications. We leave it to readers to try to simulate 
the situation and the dilemmas they may encounter in their neighbourhood.
The criteria are all intended to apply to noncompliance after the 
fact. It would be much better, of course, if planning could anticipate 
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noncompliance and be proactive in advance. But planners today are 
barely cognisant of the implications of the regulations they draft with 
good intentions, which have the potential to turn some individuals into 
offenders and render them subject to onerous sanctions. This chapter is 
therefore intended to provoke deeper thinking in planning theory and 
planning law about their interrelationships.
8.10 A new instrument: Noncompliance impact 
assessment
The fact that noncompliance with planning law and regulations may 
sometimes be justified means that planners and lawyers alike should 
take a hard look at the patterns and degrees of noncompliance. These 
hold information that should be highly valued and serve as feedback for 
reviewing both planning and the law. Such rethinking should include 
the potential for deeper conceptual and institutional changes to mini-
mise the need to justify noncompliance. Indeed, noncompliance is the 
untapped goldmine of feedback for assessing the adequacy of planning 
regulations. Such evaluation should include deeper conceptual and insti-
tutional changes to minimise the need to justify noncompliance after the 
fact. Special attention should be paid to the linchpin that should have 
connected all of these functions: enforcement. As we have seen through-
out this chapter, this linchpin is weak, and requires an in-depth review of 
its functions as part of planning regulation.
We would like to see awareness of noncompliance incorporated not 
only for ex-post evaluation, but also deep within forward planning. For 
this, we propose a new instrument: noncompliance impact assessment. 
This instrument calls on planners engaged in forward planning to pre-
pare scenarios of different degrees and types of violations anticipated by 
alternative planning regulations. These scenarios should serve during the 
regular planning process as part of the evaluation of alternatives. After 
approval of the planning policies and regulations, these scenarios should 
fortify the connection between the enforcement unit and the planning 
unit and should feed into proactive revisions of plans and regulations on 
an ongoing basis.
8.11 Conclusions
In the Global North, the land and planning-law systems usually work 
reasonably well (no legal system is without its flaws). Therefore, while 
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the term ‘informality’ may be useful for describing human behaviour and 
initiatives when legal norms are dysfunctional or remote, this term is 
unhelpful in the context of a reasonably well-functioning legal system, 
including planning law and regulations. Planning law is here to stay. In 
this chapter, we have argued that, in the Global North context, the use 
of the loose concept of ‘informality’ should be replaced by the narrower 
term ‘justifiable noncompliance’.
To help us identify situations where noncompliance may be poten-
tially justifiable within the rule of law, we have attempted to simulate 
reality through an unfolding hypothetical case story, a complex real-life 
story and many simpler examples drawn from our past research. From 
these elements we have distilled an initial set of criteria for determin-
ing when noncompliance with planning regulations might be recognised 
as compatible with the rule of law. In some situations, noncompliance 
should even lead to better planning policies.
Beyond justifying noncompliance, planning theory and law should 
devote more thinking to how to minimise planning-law violations, 
through more responsive planning and closer linkages with the enforce-
ment function. We lament the sharp disconnection between planning 
theory and planning law, as if they resided in parallel worlds and each 
needed the other to function well but were separated, both institution-
ally and conceptually. We hope this chapter has contributed somewhat 
towards bringing the two worlds closer together.
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Shanty settlements in nineteenth-




From the beginning of the Industrial Revolution to the early twentieth 
century, urban centres in Europe faced housing shortages, slum condi-
tions, informal settlements with shanty/shack dwellings and overcrowd-
ing.1 These are very much like the conditions in most African cities today. 
Similarities between urban housing conditions in the two continents lend 
themselves to cross-century exploratory comparison. This chapter seeks 
to look across time and space, to draw lessons from the past and find solu-
tions to some of the current challenges associated with informal urban 
housing globally.
The discussion of the severe housing problems that European cities 
experienced from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution to the early 
twentieth century focuses on self-built shanty dwellings and informal set-
tlements at the urban margins of Berlin and Paris. These foreshadowed 
present-day housing conditions in African countries. As the comparison 
will show, the solutions to the housing crisis that was manifest through 
shanty settlements in Europe over a hundred years ago are largely similar 
to those currently applied in Africa. Interventions in Africa are, to a large 
extent, shaped by the modernist approach emerging from European 
countries. The following historical comparison across different periods 
explores similarities and differences, and raises some questions regard-
ing current housing policies in Africa.
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9.2 Berlin’s history of shanty settlements
In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, the population of Berlin grew 
at a high rate, increasing by around 57 per cent between 1860 and 1869. 
Around 20,000 people arrived in Berlin every year in the early 1870s to 
seize economic opportunities in the industrialising city.2 This growth rate 
was then the fastest in Europe.3 But the city was not only growing due to 
industrialisation: it was becoming international. Berlin went from having 
been the capital of Prussia since 1701 to becoming capital of the unified 
German States in 1871, with aspirations to achieve a level of ‘global com-
petitiveness’ on a par with that of cities such as London and Paris.4
In view of massive rural–urban and international migration, new 
housing construction could not keep up with demand from the increas-
ing number of migrants. At one instance during this period, around 
15,000 people were recorded as homeless.5 Dwelling in the unsanitary 
overcrowded tenements in the central parts of the city was a living night-
mare. According to the 1867 census, city-dwellers often lived in cramped 
conditions; for example, over 20 people were found sharing a single 
room, and they had to alternate sleeping shifts.6 There was insufficient 
decent housing, and what was available was unaffordable.7 Poor Berlin 
residents were therefore forced to live in self-built settlements on the 
edge – outside the city’s historic walls. The shanty towns at times referred 
to as Barrackenstadt or Hüttendörfer, were established on vacant publicly 
owned land towards Berlin’s south – in areas that are today part of the 
Kreuzberg borough – and to the east in Frankfurter, Landsberger and 
Tempelhofer Feld.8
In 1872, in the Kreuzberg area, 163 families were living in a settle-
ment of tents outside Kottbuser Tor.9 In May of that year, another settle-
ment contained 92 families living in 52 dwellings; but by late September 
1872, it had grown to a population of nearly 2,000,10 making it one of the 
largest shanty towns in Berlin. Built three decades later, in around 1903, 
the ‘cascade village’ provides another example. The small area contained 
shanties built and inhabited by construction workers who were mostly 
Italian and Polish immigrants.11 The dwellings were constructed from 
scrap materials such as discarded wood and metal components, old fur-
niture (see Figure 9.1) and even ‘overturned rowboats, abandoned train 
cars, rafts, and omnibuses’.12 This form of shelter was neither durable nor 
structurally stable enough to protect dwellers from inclement weather 
conditions in summer or winter. A local newspaper described the dwell-
ings as ‘shabby and miserably constructed wood huts’.13
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Notwithstanding the physical inadequacies of dwellings in these 
settlements, they mirrored their environment in several respects. Shack-
dwellers used local material, and they also reproduced the social and 
cultural norms of the country. Life in these settlements was ‘traditional 
German family life – the productive, employed nuclear family living in a 
freestanding single-family house’.14 The surroundings were surprisingly 
clean. A semblance of order seems to be apparent in the layout of the 
sprawling shanty towns. Each dwelling unit, with its yard, was neatly 
demarcated, separated by twine fences, rope lines or any other suitable 
material. Utilities such as a stove or water point were located outside the 
dwellings and shared (see Figure 9.1). Internal walls were decorated in 
bright paint and the windows with flower boxes. The curtilage (space 
around the dwellings) was cultivated as vegetable gardens by women. In 
what represents a demonstration of patriotism, German flags were flown 
above the shacks while the self-constructed streets bore nationally sym-
bolic names.15
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, shanties were 
again prominent in Berlin thanks to its allotments. Indeed, the shanties 
were known as ‘green slums’, since fruits and vegetables were cultivated 
in the gardens (see Figure 9.2).16 That is, spaces meant to serve as allot-
ments were developed with unapproved, self-built dwellings – one of the 
Figure 9.1 Image from: Georg Koch, ‘Die Baracken der Obdachlosen 
in Berlin’, Über Land und Meer 46 (1872). © Wikipedia Commons. 
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self-help actions taken to address housing problems in the city. They were 
under-serviced – water, which was sourced from wells, was inadequate, 
and connection to electricity was also partial. Outdoor toilets, with soak-
aways, made up for the absence of proper sewerage.
The history of allotment-type gardens in Germany dates back to the 
1860s, when Moritz Schreber planted gardens on land leased by the city of 
Leipzig.17 This practice spread to Berlin, where living in allotments started 
in around 1900. At its peak in the 1930s, after the First World War and 
the subsequent global economic crisis (1929–1933), allotments with shan-
ties covered a total of approximately 6.200 hectares and accommodated 
around 120,000 persons (representing 2.8 per cent of Berlin’s population), 
based on the 1933 census.18 They provided housing for poor Berliners 
(working and retired) as well as Communists and Jews experiencing dis-
crimination and persecution, particularly after Hitler’s rise to power.
Although informally planned, the layout of the allotment shanties 
was patterned. Construction materials used for the allotment shanties 
were generally not dissimilar from those used in the nineteenth century 
for shanty towns located at the city’s periphery, but they also incorpo-
rated new features. The allotment sites included, for example, old rail-
way carriages extended to achieve larger homes (see Figure 9.3). Some 
accommodated home-based enterprises such as foodstores and bakeries 
operated by entrepreneurial residents.
Shanty settlements existed only temporarily in Berlin. In most cases, 
the state intervened rigorously. For instance, in the late summer of 1872, 
after existing for a few months, shacks within some settlements were 
Figure 9.2 Shacks in the Marienthal allotment (now Mariengrund) on 
Südostallee, Treptow district, 1912. © Landesarchiv Berlin. 
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Figure 9.3 Railway car dwelling in Berlin, 1930. © Landesarchiv 
Berlin. 
cleared and the residents forcefully removed under police supervision.19 
Soon, the periphery land they had occupied was taken up by the city’s 
expansion beyond the former walls.20 The Hobrecht Plan of 1862 set the 
framework for Berlin’s urban development. Implementation of this plan 
influenced housing interventions during this period. Contemporaries 
criticised it as authoritarian, partly due to its policies of tearing down 
shacks and clearing the settlements.21
By contrast, the allotment shanties from the late nineteenth to the 
early twentieth century were tolerated in the short term. In exceptional 
situations, in situ upgrading or incremental consolidation of allotment 
shanties were permitted in the 1930s. Individual households in the allot-
ment shanties purchased the land, while ‘the city lifted the building ban 
and established the area as a residential neighbourhood’.22 This interven-
tion approach had limited application and was discontinued after the 
Second World War.
Eventually, most of the allotment shanties were cleared, based 
on the prevailing school of thought that the ‘formally planned city was 
the future, and self-built homes represented residues of undeveloped 
past’.23 Modernist multi-storey housing blocks, including Walter Gropius’ 
Gropiusstadt in Neukölln, replaced many of the shanties. From accom-
modating about 3 per cent of Berlin’s population in the 1930s, only 0.2 
per cent of the city’s inhabitants lived in the allotment shanties by 1982.
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9.3 Shanty towns in a growing Paris
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Paris grew rapidly as 
migrants poured in to seize opportunities in the booming industries.24 
The number of inhabitants increased by 510,000 between 1851 and 
1892 alone, with migration responsible for over half of this growth.25 By 
1901, the population of the French capital had more than doubled com-
pared to 1851. The new arrivals came in search of employment in the 
industries, and in the meantime survived through menial or odd jobs. Of 
note among the casual jobs was the ‘ragpicking’ trade.26 One conservative 
estimate is that at least 9,000 individuals were working as ragpickers in 
Paris towards the end of the nineteenth century.27
The increasing population led to a housing crisis, which mostly 
affected the working poor and under-employed. The low-income class 
lived in the central part of the city, in overcrowded unsanitary, warren-like, 
old townhouses.28 These were ‘subdivided abandoned homes … [where] 
the rooms were continually divided; floors were sometimes added, creat-
ing six-foot ceilings. Stairs were often nothing more than ladders. Water 
was only available in the streets; few had cesspools’.29 Poorer families 
were pushed out to the city’s periphery, particularly towards the north 
and close to industrial sites beyond the 1844 city wall fortifications.30
According to one contemporary writer, they searched for vast open 
land on the edge of Paris and ‘as soon as one discovered a home or a site 
available for rent, all the others came to visit and quickly formed a settle-
ment, a clan, a family’.31 Historian Alain Faure tells how ‘owners of vacant 
sites would divide the area into lots on which the tenants constructed 
their homes’ (see Figure 9.4), ‘leading to unusual urban landscapes that 
featured stark geometric constructions assembled from disparate ele-
ments forming curious combinations’.32 During this period, up to 269 
shanty-like settlements were counted in Paris.33 La Zone, located on land 
extending 250 metres beyond the historic city wall fortifications, was 
a popular settlement on the periphery (see Figure 9.5).34 Cité Dorée is 
another example. It was colonised by a group of ragpickers in 1849 and, 
just two years later, had 270 inhabitants.35
Dwellings in the shanty settlements were fashioned from mate-
rials such as planks, tar paper, tree trunks and thatch roofs.36 The out-
door areas of neighbourhoods inhabited by ragpickers were, at times, 
filled with the sorted or soon-to-be-sorted proceeds of daily scavenging 
(see Figure 9.6). Order was largely absent, and reports of knife fights, 
drunkenness, robbery and mob justice were rife. The settlements lacked 
water,37 and the sanitary and social conditions were a source of concern. 
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Figure 9.5 View of La Zone near Saint-Ouen. From bottom to top, one 
sees the trench of the fortifications, the barren land of the zone and the 
shanty towns pushed up against the city limits. © Wikipedia Commons. 
Figure 9.4 Shanty town awaiting redevelopment, Rue de la 
Champlain, late 1850s. © Wikipedia Commons. 
Urban historian Spiro Kostof described the settlements as ‘squalid belts of 
privately owned shanties’.38 In 1867, Edwin Chadwick, a leading hygien-
ist, claimed that air pollution associated with these living conditions over 
time had killed more people than the sword in the whole of Paris.39
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Figure 9.6 The Zone, Porte d’Ivry, chiffonier (ragpicker), 1912, 
Gallica. Original photograph by Eugène Atget. © Wikipedia Commons. 
Under the autocratic regime of Napoleon III as Emperor, the mod-
ern city concept for Paris developed by the Musée Social reformers (which 
notably included Baron Haussmann) proposed the elimination of these 
settlements. As a result, the shanty settlements began to decline. From 
the 1880s, they were demolished and gradually replaced with new 
housing, roads and public spaces for recreation and leisure activities. 
For instance, as part of the official campaign by the Musée Social’s new 
‘Section on Urban and Rural Hygiene’, it was proposed that shanty towns 
of La Zone be replaced with a ring of public parks and playing fields by 
1908.40 In 1879, photographer Charles-François Marville (1813–1879) 
depicts the gradual replacement and (re)development process in the city, 
noting ‘a shanty town, and in the distance is new Paris … [an] evocative 
presentation of the emergence of two cities: bourgeois Paris and the poor 
banlieue’.41
By the 1930s, up to 40,000 new modern housing units had replaced 
some of the shanty settlements.42 Between 1923 and 1933, no fewer 
than 120,000 units of social housing (habitation bon marché) had been 
built by local authorities in Paris.43 This, however, did not mark the end 
of informal settlements in Paris. After the Second World War, migrant 
squatting again became prominent. Housing scarcity led migrants to 
establish settlements on the outskirts of Paris and other French cities.44 
More recently, Roma migrants have set up shanty settlements in Paris, 
taking up vacant land and spaces (such as buffer zone for bridges, motor-
ways and train lines) for flimsy self-built dwellings.
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9.4 Informal settlements in Nairobi
A high rate of urbanisation, skewed land distribution, urban inequality 
and a legacy of racial segregation in the colonial and post-colonial era 
all led to the emergence of informal settlements in Kenyan cities.45 While 
informal housing was a marginal phenomenon in Europe, it is a key fea-
ture of many African cities. About 2.5 million people, approximately half 
the population, are estimated to live in over 100 areas regarded as slums 
in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital city.46 These informal neighbourhoods are 
dense. The combined area amounts to only about 6 per cent of the city’s 
land. Over 50 per cent of buildings in the informal settlements occupy 
less than 103 m2, at an average density of 39 buildings per hectare.47
Kenya’s iconic informal settlement Kibera is Nairobi’s largest. 
In 2009, it was home to 178,264 persons living in around 13 ‘villages’ 
located on 110 hectares of land.48 Kibera is characterised by bungalows 
and rows of overcrowded single-storey rooms made of wattle, daub and 
corrugated iron sheets, along narrow paths serving as drainage channels 
(see Figure 9.7). In some cases, the dwellings are made from concrete, 
while some walls are plastered with mortar. It is underserviced – access 
to water, sanitation, electricity, waste collection and social amenities is 
absent or inadequate – and the residents live in extreme poverty.49
Improving poor conditions within this and other settlements has 
been of interest to different stakeholders. A summary of notable meas-
ures taken in the past, mainly by the state, to improve Kibera (from the 
pre-independence era to recent times) is presented in Figure 9.8. The tra-
jectory of partial and/or comprehensive intervention in Kibera is based 
on the eliminate (through eviction and clearance) + redevelop approach. 
Across different phases through the 1970s, new housing (such as the Fort 
Jesus Scheme, the Olympic Estate and the Eyang Estate) was developed 
on cleared Kibera land. In 2011, around 1,200 households from Soweto-
East in Kibera were relocated to two-bedroom units in blocks of flats 
located in the Langata area of the settlement (see again Figure 9.7). More 
recently, 822 housing units in 21 blocks of four-storey buildings with 245 
market stalls, costing 2.9 billion Kenyan shillings, have also been com-
pleted in Soweto. The Kenyan government plans to develop over 3,500 
additional units on cleared parts of Kibera over the next few years.50
The ‘elimination of slums’ in Nairobi is driven by a modernist agenda 
and an urban competitiveness vision ‘to be a world class business set-
ting, recognised nationally, regionally and globally’, as expressed in the 
Ministry of Nairobi 2008 Metropolitan Development Plan. To support the 
country’s long-term development (the premise of Kenya Vision 2030), 
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Figure 9.7 View of Kibera settlement showing the shanty dwellings 
and recently developed housing units in the background. © Olumuviwa 
Adegun, 2012. 
Figure 9.8 Notable milestones of intervention in Kibera settlement. © 
Olumuviwa Adegun. 
• Attempts by the colonial government to relocate the growing









• Plans by the national government to formalise Kibera (implementing
   municipal ordinances) were objected to by the Nairobi City Council
• National government built 5 model houses in 1961, 52 in 1966 and 36
   in 1967
• Fort Jesus Scheme was constructed in 1970;New Kibera Village in
   1972; Olympic Estate in 1973 and Ayang Housing Estate (1977 to 1981)  
• First comprehensive initiative announced; involved
   partnership between national government and UN-Habitat
 
• Approx. 700 residents relocated to the 822 
   Kibera-Soweto housing units completed earlier in 2015
•  Launch of Kibera-Soweto housing construction
 
• Phase I and II of high-rise flats were constructed in 1991 and 1994  
•  Completion and relocation of 5,000 residents to Langata
    Decanting site (600 housing units)
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the government is attempting to implement slum prevention nationally 
and aspires to the ‘production of 200,000 housing units annually’.51
9.5 Informal settlements in Johannesburg
Informal settlements are just one of the features evidencing the urban 
inequality and housing crisis in South Africa – problems attributable to 
apartheid and increasing poverty in the post-apartheid era. Statistics 
from South Africa’s Household Survey show that 13.9 per cent of house-
holds, nationally, lived in informal dwellings as at 2016.52 In Johannes-
burg, South Africa’s largest urban agglomeration, there are informal 
settlements providing accommodation for 109,949 low-income house-
holds, approximately 10 per cent of the city’s total households.53 These 
settlements are established in urban or peri-urban locations without offi-
cial approval and are often named after symbolic national/international 
events or political actors. They are generally characterised by poor access 
to basic services and social amenities, uncontrolled population densities, 
inadequate infrastructure and lack of effective administration by the 
municipality.
State-led housing intervention for people living in informal settle-
ments involves the relocation of qualifying households to new subsidised 
houses on a serviced plot in newly established areas, often referred to as 
townships. This is a product-driven approach that first emerged in 1994 
as part of the post-apartheid housing policy. It was initially construed 
as a means to redress the historical disadvantage that poor households 
living in urban and peri-urban informal settlements experienced during 
apartheid. Available statistics show that over 2.7 million households, 
mostly from informal settlements, are currently living in such post-1994 
subsidised houses.54
9.6 From Europe to Africa: Similarities, differences and 
emerging questions in the realm of informal settlements
This chapter has illustrated some of the inherent similarities and differ-
ences between settlements in different historical periods in Paris, Berlin, 
Johannesburg and Nairobi.
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A most striking example of similarity is that of the materials used 
to construct the dwellings across the four contexts. The self-constructed 
shacks are generally made from recycled scrap materials, discarded 
furniture, waste components and disused vehicles (such as old, non- 
working caravans) often sourced from the formal and well-off areas of 
the city. Given the kind of materials used, the construction methods are 
rudimentary. Contrasts prevail between order and disorder in the layout 
of the settlements across all four of the contexts examined here, as this 
appears to be peculiar to individual settlements. Berlin settlements were 
largely orderly, while Paris settlements were not. Within Johannesburg, 
some settlements or parts of it are well laid-out, while others are not. This 
dualism, though subject to specific circumstances, is common to most 
informal settlements in African cities.
The use of local materials is not the only thing indicating that these 
settlements are ‘home-grown’. Though these sites are regarded as unlaw-
ful and informal, life within the shanty towns is reflective; they are influ-
enced by, and instrumental to, the expression of national customs and 
mentality. For instance, signs of an intrinsic nationalism can be observed 
in different shanty settlements, such as flags on dwellings, street names 
in Berlin and politically significant names in South Africa. Another sim-
ilarity of informal settlements in Europe and Africa is the general prac-
tice of a communal lifestyle, reflected in the sharing of utilities between 
households.
Significant differences also exist. Although there was a similarly high 
rate of urbanisation in nineteenth-century European cities and present- 
day Africa, the completely different scale and size of the informal settle-
ments within the growing cities make a world of difference. In Berlin or 
Paris in the nineteenth century, there is no evidence that any single settle-
ment had more than 5,000 residents. The shanty settlements that existed 
in European cities were relatively small. By contrast, most major shanty 
settlements in Nairobi, Johannesburg and many other African countries 
contain thousands of residents. Nairobi’s Kibera settlement contains over 
178,264 persons, Johannesburg’s Kya Sands settlement accommodates 
over 16,000 persons and Cape Town’s Joe Slovo had a population of over 
20,000. The figures are similar for other cities in Africa.
There are also differences in terms of temporality and broader con-
texts. It seems that shanty settlements did appear, on and off, in European 
cities, but they were dismantled quite quickly. Interventions were made to 
eradicate the informal settlements, remove the dwellings and discourage 
squatting. Shanty settlements in Africa, by contrast, are more permanent. 
They often emerge through land invasion for temporary accommodation, 
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but, given the slow pace of formalisation, in situ upgrading and formal 
housing delivery, these informal modes of housing persist for so long 
that they become permanent. The macro-economic environments in the 
two contexts also differ. The nineteenth-century European situation was 
that of rapid urbanisation marked by industrialisation, which led to eco-
nomic growth and rising standards of living. In Africa, the high rate of 
urbanisation has not been accompanied by comparable industrialisation, 
economic growth or, more importantly, equitable distribution of wealth. 
This might be one explanation for the relative permanence of shanty set-
tlements in African cities.
Despite important differences, African cities’ responses and pat-
terns of intervention in informal settlements are strongly influenced by, 
or even modelled on, Europe’s trajectory of intervention. Colonisation 
played a strong role in the transfer of European urban planning and 
informal-settlement intervention ideas to Africa. Scholars have consist-
ently argued that ‘current international policies addressing the African 
city are situated in a longer history going back to the colonial period’, 
imbued with an assertion of European civilising supremacy in terms of a 
modern developmental approach.55
Modernist city planning, which emerged in response to negative 
corollaries of urbanisation and industrialisation in Paris and Berlin 
from the late nineteenth century, involved the eradication of informal 
settlements and massive development of multiple housing units. The 
same policy is implemented in Africa, as the examples from Nairobi and 
Johannesburg show. Informal settlements are being demolished, at times 
through violent forced evictions, by governments in pursuit of modern-
ist city visions emerging from European urban planning traditions. This 
approach also gained traction in response to initiatives such as ‘Cities 
without Slums’ led by Cities Alliance, set up by a coalition of World Bank 
and UN-Habitat. Echoing criticisms of this approach, Vanessa Watson 
described these visions as ‘urban fantasies’ that often attempt to ‘sweep 
the poor away’ from the city.56
With an eye to the differences between the two contexts – Europe 
then and Africa now – the comparison raises questions about the transfer 
of modernist housing solutions for informal settlements. These differ-
ences serve as a basis for argument against a transfer of the modernist 
paradigm. How appropriate is it, given that realities in the African con-
text are so different from those in Europe? How plausible are historical 
European solutions, in the light of complex socio-economic and envi-
ronmental problems experienced in the twenty-first century? The dif-
ferences in terms of the physical scale of the settlements alone require 
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policies to be adjusted. A small, peripheral settlement can be removed 
easily, while a settlement on a massive scale that has persisted over time 
should be treated differently. In view of that, it is time for African coun-
tries to unlearn – to develop home-grown, incremental settlement inter-
ventions that offer alternatives to the modernist mass-housing projects. It 
might also be time to reverse the learning process, by generating lessons 
for Europe and the global North from approaches developed in Africa.
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Squats across the Empire: 
A comparison of squatting 
movements in post-Second World War 
UK and Australia1
iain Mcintyre
In the midst of severe housing crises, a short-lived series of occupations 
targeting disused residential properties took place in England and Aus-
tralia during 1945. In the UK, the movement achieved national promi-
nence following a campaign that began in Brighton in July of that year. 
A subsequent wave of squatting in 1946 would eventually involve more 
than 45,000 participants, many of whom took part in mass occupations 
of military camps. In August 1945, squatting received widespread atten-
tion in Australia, with a larger wave in the following year.
This chapter provides a history and comparison of how squatting 
during 1945 served as a method of informal requisitioning in the context 
of the failure of official wartime regulations in England and Australia to 
fully compel owners to make vacant properties available. In doing so, it 
details how squatting built on, and sought to improve, formal practices, 
and how it was in part legitimised by them. The use of squatting as a 
means of securing housing is also linked here to the rising social expecta-
tions of working-class communities and increased militancy on the part 
of some military veterans’ groups. In both countries, campaigns were 
largely localised, and veterans’ associations, sometimes working with 
communists, unionists and other activists, played a key role in initiating, 
defending and publicising occupations.
The chapter further demonstrates that, beyond the immediate goal 
of ending deprivation, squatters and activists sought to establish ten-
ancy rather than eliminate rent-paying. In prioritising need over profit, 
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and feeding into pressures that were already intensifying a shift towards 
 government-provided public housing, these waves challenged aspects of 
the property market, but largely aimed to regulate it. This would be in 
keeping with the character of some later squatting waves, but differed 
from many in that concerns regarding the protection of heritage val-
ues and the expression and enactment of alternative lifestyles were not 
raised, nor objectives for these issues set.
10.1 No homes for heroes?
In both countries, squatting developed primarily in response to critical 
housing shortages. Housing construction in Australia had come to a 
standstill in the early years of the Depression, and private industry had 
failed to make up for this when the economy improved. Public housing 
schemes were yet to be enacted across much of Australia. Meanwhile, 
the 1930s had seen a property boom in the UK, but this had been largely 
confined to houses for sale rather than rent. Public housing, following 
concerted agitation after the First World War, was more widespread than 
in Australia, but remained underfunded and often beyond the reach of 
the poorest tenants. Well-intentioned, but ill-timed, slum clearance pro-
grammes in Australia and the UK had removed some of the cheapest 
accommodation, while the rerouting of human and material resources 
to the war effort imposed a continuing freeze on private construction of 
homes in Australia and reduced it in the UK by up to 90 per cent.2
An increase in marriages and births, particularly towards the end 
of the war, placed further demand on existing housing stock. Long-term 
demographic shifts from rural areas to cities, coupled with shorter-term 
ones associated with wartime industry, upped the pressure on cities 
such as Sydney, Melbourne, London and Glasgow.3 Wartime provisions 
designed to protect low-income tenants in some cases unwittingly exacer-
bated shortages of affordable rental properties. In Australia, controls on 
prices and measures restricting the ability of owners to evict tenants and 
raise rents resulted in some owners preferring to leave houses empty.4 
While Australia was spared major bombing, the UK was not, removing a 
further 468,000 dwellings due to heavy damage or outright destruction, 
with many more in need of urgent repair.5
In 1944, the Australian government estimated a shortage of 
200,000 dwellings, with a further 82,000 unfit for habitation and another 
155,000 of poor quality. By the following year, the shortfall, not count-
ing substandard housing, was set at between 300,000 and 400,000 – in 
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a country with a total of just 1,618,500 dwellings.6 Regarding the UK, 
housing researcher Alan Holmans estimates that the gap in housing 
need and provision had increased by half a million during the war, with 
around 2.1 million extra dwellings required for 13.2 million households 
by 1945.7
In both countries, residents faced increased rents, homelessness 
and precarity. Many couples and families were forced to crowd in with 
relatives or live in single rooms, garages, caravans and tents, or even on 
verandas. Particularly egregious examples, such as people living in horse 
stables and under floorboards, were regularly covered in Australian and 
British newspapers.8
10.2 The introduction of requisitioning
Housing shortages had been identified as an issue for both territories 
from the beginning of the war. Australia’s federal system of government 
made individual states the key policymakers and providers of housing, 
with local government also having some input into issues such as building 
regulations. Due to the war, the federal government acquired additional 
powers, including the freedom to authorise requisitioning via successive 
War Moratorium and National Security acts and regulations.9
Alongside provisions allowing the military to take over property 
were those enabling service people and their dependent partners, chil-
dren and parents to apply directly to the owners of an empty ‘dwelling 
property’ for a lease. Depending on differing states’ arrangements, if this 
failed, the applicant could then take the owners to the court of petty ses-
sions or a rent board to compel them to let the property.10
In the UK, regulations also initially focused on the use of empty pri-
vate dwellings for military purposes. Over time, powers were extended 
to allow local authorities to assist evacuees, war workers and people who 
had lost their homes due to bombardment. Pressured to help those suf-
fering more broadly, in 1943 the government agreed to widen their use. 
Under the system then functioning in the UK, central government made 
policy and funded housing, with local authorities operating as the pri-
mary point of contact and delivery. As such, some 2,485 local authori-
ties were given the power in 1943 to ‘requisition, repair and adapt empty 
properties for the purpose of providing housing accommodation for per-
sons at present inadequately housed’.11
Unlike in Australia, local authorities rather than individuals took 
the lead in identifying properties. They did not approach owners directly, 
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but passed on recommendations to the Ministry of Health and other 
central government bodies, which would then carry out negotiations. 
Owners could oppose requisitioning on the basis of plans to sell, let or 
use the dwelling. Once requisitioned, the council was to repair the prop-
erty, select tenants and determine rents based on market rates typical for 
the area, with subsidies from the central government available for those 
in need. Housing via these processes was available for a much larger 
swath of the population than in Australia, where requisitioning was lim-
ited to service people, their relatives and essential war workers all the 
way through to 1945. Australia only suffered short-term bombing raids 
that were mainly focused on military targets, so the difference may have 
been due to the regular bombardment and displacement British residents 
faced. It may have also reflected differing ideas regarding the ‘deserv-
ing poor’ and different stages in the development and achievement of 
the idea of housing as a right in each country, as evidenced by the much 
lower level of pre-war public housing in Australia.12
The idea of property owners being forced to rent out their property 
on the basis of need, with the state and its representatives controlling to 
whom it would be rented, had rarely been raised as a demand in either 
country prior to the war, and laws facilitating it would persist for only a 
few years during peacetime. In a situation of total war, requisitioning – 
alongside measures such as the centralisation of planning for much of 
the economy – was deemed not only palatable, but necessary in these 
and other market-based societies.13
In both countries, continuing anger at the poverty of the Depression 
years, and a consequent weakening of support for (and in some cases 
rejection of) the existing order, had forced politicians to recognise that 
appeals to patriotism alone would not suffice. As a result, in what Rowse 
terms a ‘moral contract’, the demands of the war effort were accompa-
nied by assurances that needs would be met and the public given some 
input into how deprivation was managed. Promises regarding ‘equality 
of sacrifice’ were made by governments in both countries. These were 
seen as central to maintaining morale, and the concept was regularly 
deployed by service people and activists in agitation around housing.14
Related to this came pledges that post-war reconstruction would 
avoid a repeat of the conditions that had followed the First World War, 
when many troops returned to poverty and precarity. During the 1940s, 
this fed into a social shift in both countries as housing came to be viewed 
as a human right whose provision could not be solely met by the pri-
vate market and would thus require greater government intervention. 
For Labor (Australia) and Labour (UK), party reformers’ reconstruction 
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plans chimed with a long-held belief in regulation, the welfare state 
and a mixed economy. For right-wing parties they were seen as a way 
to maintain social peace and ensure a healthy workforce.15 The combi-
nation of the White Australia Policy, low population density and atten-
dant wartime anxieties regarding its place as what Dufty-Jones describes 
as a ‘bastion of British racial purity located in the South Pacific’ meant 
that reconstruction in Australia was also seen as a way of building up the 
Caucasian population and extending it across the country.16
Common themes regarding rising expectations, reward for service 
and the belief that exceptional circumstances justified unconventional 
measures supported the implementation and widening of formal requi-
sitioning. These and other factors would also vindicate and spur the sub-
sequent use of squatting to meet its failures, initially in 1945 and again in 
1946. In addition, combat experiences meant many veterans were famil-
iar with far greater risks than those associated with squatting, as well as 
with the need for determined (and at times unconventional) action. The 
existence of the black market and other means of survival also meant 
that the idea of circumventing official channels was far from unknown.17 
Overall, as historian James Hinton notes: ‘The war had unleashed popu-
lar initiative and proved that, when the chips were down, authority could 
be persuaded to abandon red tape and due process.’18
10.3 Requisitioning in practice
Requisitioning alone could not hope to meet shortages, but it was widely 
supported as a means of providing relief. The fact that homes and other 
properties stood empty in a time of crisis was galling for many, as reflected 
in regular articles and letters of complaint in the mainstream media. Despite 
legal and moral pressure, requisitioning was defied by Australian landlords 
from its inception, not least because, once tenanted, the rent level would 
be frozen and eviction made more difficult by other wartime provisions. 
The wording of requisitioning provisions assisted resistance, and courts 
complained of a lack of clarity and direction regarding how to interpret 
what constituted ‘reasonable cause’ for rejecting would-be tenants.19 In 
1941, the Australian provisions were tightened to prevent landlords from 
blocking the process by simply disagreeing with the rent rate offered, and 
were also extended to cover workers whose contribution to the war was 
deemed essential.20 In time, recently discharged service people and veter-
ans receiving pensions and suffering from medical conditions, as well as 
their dependants, would be added to the list of possible applicants.21
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For much of the war, the regulations seem to have been unheard of 
across much of Australia. This is evidenced by calls from veterans’ and 
other organisations to introduce requisitioning years after it already had 
been, by newspaper reports that put their date of introduction incorrectly 
at 1944 and 1945, and by court reports showing they were not used in 
some jurisdictions until 1943 or later.22
Other than a lack of publicity, various loopholes, such as the fact 
that holiday homes and other properties let out for less than six months 
at a time were not covered, allowed owners to avoid requisitioning. 
Conflicting wartime regulations could also be exploited, such as in one 
case where apartments remained vacant because blocks designed for 
30 or more people were required to have air raid shelters and the own-
ers were unwilling, and presumably could not be compelled, to provide 
them.23 In other cases, owners falsely claimed repairs were being done 
and contracts for sale being drawn up, or feigned use by placing furniture 
or moving friends or family into properties temporarily.24
Such strategies were also employed in the UK. Added to owners’ 
opposition was that of local authorities. Although they were swamped with 
people seeking housing via requisitioning provisions, councils were under 
no obligation to apply them. Their willingness and ability to do so were 
affected by various factors. Some lacked the staff necessary for processing, 
while others were hesitant to devote scant resources to repairing proper-
ties that would eventually be returned to owners. As in Australia, elements 
of the provisions were also unclear, and some councils were unwilling to 
act until they were guaranteed they would not be left with financial and 
legal burdens. For their part, central government bureaucracies proved 
reluctant to resolve such issues, claiming they were local matters. In the 
case of Conservative councils, opposition also emerged on political and 
class grounds. Even where councils embraced the regulations, the govern-
ment’s decision to privilege owners’ returns over tenants’ needs by pricing 
rents at market rates, combined with limitations on subsidies, meant that 
requisitioning failed to meet the need for low-cost housing.25
10.4 The lead-up to the 1945 squatting campaigns
Months ahead of major demobilisation, discontent in Australia and the 
UK regarding requisitioning increased and newspapers regularly car-
ried reports of rules being flouted. In line with others around the world, 
each country’s Communist Party had come to support the war after the 
invasion of the Soviet Union. Although they largely opposed strikes, they 
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consistently campaigned to reduce inequalities and inefficiencies. In the 
UK, a key demand came to be for improvements in requisitioning as well 
as its full use by all councils.26
Communists also drew attention to housing issues in Australia, with 
the party’s Victorian newspaper claiming in the wake of squatting actions 
in August that Prahran members had already been working with the local 
council on requisitioning.27 For the most part, however, it was veterans’ 
organisations that took the lead. Following surveys of empty properties 
carried out by 14 sub-branches, the first public calls for direct action 
came at a Returned Sailors’, Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Imperial League of 
Australia (RSL) state meeting in New South Wales (NSW) during April 
1945. The RSL had been founded in 1918 and was the nation’s largest 
veterans’ group. NSW Vice President W.C. Allen, citing a recent case of a 
veteran breaking into a house in Bondi and living there for three weeks 
before being discovered, was reported as saying that ‘houses kept empty 
should be broken into by servicemen’.28 A representative from the North 
Sydney branch, discussing an empty 20-room mansion in the suburb of 
Mosman, suggested ‘homeless families should march on it and open it as 
residential’.29 A month later, it was reported that the organisation was 
assisting a soldier to resist eviction from a squatted holiday house, with 
NSW RSL President J.C. Neagle stating that ‘in the present housing crisis, 
returned soldiers were entitled to occupy them’.30
The threat to occupy properties without first gaining permission 
appears, in this case, to have been primarily inspired by the aforemen-
tioned soldiers’ experiences. Squatting is, to some degree, an obvious 
response to deprivation and one that, in Australia (as elsewhere), dates 
back to the first instances of homelessness. In Australia, the term had 
originally been associated with the practice of British settlers and freed 
convicts moving beyond the official frontier to settle on, and later claim, 
uncolonised – and in the settler mindset ‘disused’ – land following the 
death and forcible removal of indigenous owners.31
From the 1890s to the early 1960s, the main form of squatting for 
shelter in Australia involved people camping in tents or building shacks 
from found materials on disused public and private land in rural areas, as 
well as in towns and cities and on their fringes. Some of these settlements 
could be quite large, with 500 huts estimated to be scattered across the 
Tarragindi hills and gullies around Brisbane in 1946, and one camp in 
NSW estimated to include 750 people in the 1950s. Such settlements 
would long provide shelter for indigenous Australian communities, due 
to their extreme marginalisation; but, for the non-indigenous popula-
tion, they reached their height during the 1930s.32
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Direct action regarding urban housing also had strong precedents. 
Anti-eviction campaigns involving hundreds of properties and thousands 
of community members were carried out across Australia during the 
Depression era. Largely, but not wholly, led by activists associated with the 
communist-dominated Unemployed Workers Movement (UWM), these 
campaigns sometimes involved reoccupying properties to force land-
lords to restore or rehouse tenants. In some cases, UWM militants lived in 
squats, such as disused train carriages occupied in the Melbourne suburb 
of Jolimont. Reports also surfaced of individual families surreptitiously 
occupying disused houses during the Depression and the war years.33
Although occupations in Australia (and England) were often 
referred to as ‘illegal’ in the media, they were not defined so in law. This 
would change in later decades, but during the 1930s and 1940s trespass 
was generally considered a civil matter and criminal charges could not be 
laid for committing it. Property owners’ rights remained paramount, but 
unless other matters concerning forcible entry, criminal damage or the 
like were involved, disputes were usually resolved by the courts, with the 
police only becoming involved when directed to do so.34
In 1932, a proposal put to a Melbourne conference of relief com-
mittees demanding that the state government requisition properties for 
the unemployed was rejected as too radical.35 Despite this call, squatting 
does not appear to have occurred on a formally organised level during 
the 1930s, nor do political activists seem to have made use of it as a tactic 
to highlight waste or demand that disused, luxury and other properties 
be made available to the public. Nevertheless, anti-eviction campaigns 
had established a precedent for direct action in working-class suburbs; 
and, during 1944, Catholic activists, with some support from commu-
nists, resisted evictions on occasion.36
10.5 Squatting in the UK
In August 1945, the first Australian squatting actions to fully involve 
veterans’ and other organisations occurred. These would receive wide-
spread media attention and lead to reform regarding requisitioning. 
Although the practices discussed here provided precedents, it appears 
that the impetus for the Australian actions, and the media’s concerted 
interest in them, was directly related to high-profile occupations that had 
first occurred in the UK during the previous month.
The UK has a centuries-long history of the poor reclaiming disused 
land for food production and shelter.37 Although eviction resistance 
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during the Depression was not as widespread as in Australia, major rent 
strikes following the First World War forced authorities to introduce 
housing reforms. Ongoing lobbying, protests, advice work, anti-eviction 
actions and refusals to pay rent by the unemployed, their organisations 
and communities further demonstrated the power of organised action in 
the decades prior to the Second World War. This work continued during 
the war with communists, Labour Party members and others working 
with tenants to prevent evictions and oppose rent rises.38
National precedents also came from occupations during the war 
itself. During 1940, communists and others cut the locks to underground 
railway stations to make them available as bomb shelters for working-class 
communities. Left with no choice, embarrassed officials authorised such 
use soon after. As part of this campaign, they also occupied a shelter in the 
luxurious Savoy Hotel.39 In Scotland towards the end of 1943, 20 families 
squatted in a tenement in the Clydeside town of Greenock; and in May 
1945, seven families occupied an empty mansion at Blantyre.40
The most important factor in the growth of UK squatting during1945 
was the experience of Brighton activists. Harry Cowley, spokesperson and 
leader of what became known as the ‘Vigilantes’, had a well- developed 
reputation as a ‘fixer’ and agitator in the city’s  working-class communi-
ties. Along with other members of the group, he first became involved 
in grassroots politics after experiencing unemployment following his 
return from military service in the First World War. During the interwar 
years, he and others organised protests, aggressively lobbied officials and 
politicians, ran an unemployed club, disrupted meetings of fascists and 
raised money for community members in need. They also squatted in 
houses for homeless families. Interviewed for a pamphlet about Cowley’s 
life, Alf Richardson claimed that, in 1921, after initially helping an ex- 
serviceman friend and his family move into an empty house, he and oth-
ers had gone on to squat in a further 60 properties around the city.41
In the midst of the 1945 housing crisis, these activists came 
together again and were joined by other women and men, after Cowley 
was approached for help. Initially acting under the name of the ‘Direct 
Action Society’ the group’s first publicly reported action came on 2 July 
when they forced open the door of an empty house and commandeered it 
for the wife and children of a naval petty officer.42
Within a week, three more families were housed and the group 
was helping to connect utilities and negotiate with owners. Although 
English law required a court order, in practice squatters could be evicted 
unilaterally and illegally by the police. Faced with an organised group, 
as well as much media attention, they avoided this tactic in Brighton, 
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instead monitoring empty properties and using informers to warn them 
of upcoming actions. By 9 July, this approach had enabled the police to 
prevent a fourth occupation by securing a property before the Vigilantes 
arrived.43 As would often be the case during the following year’s squat-
ting wave, some police and officials were sympathetic, ignoring Vigilante 
activity if not actively providing assistance.44
The actions attracted widespread media coverage and, although 
reports that Vigilante numbers had rapidly swelled to 1,000 appear 
exaggerated, by the middle of July other occupations had taken place in 
Birmingham and Liverpool. Up to 30 houses were also reported as occupied 
in various parts of London. An action in Lewisham involved Vigilantes from 
Brighton, while a member of a separate group in Paddington told reporters, 
‘We are going on every night putting hard cases into empty places until the 
council acts properly and gives ex-servicemen a square deal.’45 Others, such 
as a group in Acton, issued threats to begin occupying houses if councils 
did not take action. Formal requests for requisitioning also increased. To 
expose the deficiencies of the prevailing system, various councils undertook 
surveys of empty houses and forwarded them to the Ministry of Health.46
The Brighton Vigilantes worked hard to promote squatting, with 
their Secretary, Harold Steer, announcing he had responded to enquiries 
with the advice, ‘If you see a house, take it and let the law do its damned-
est. We have started a movement which we hope and pray will spread 
over the length and breadth of the land.’47 Cowley, by this point dubbed 
‘The Guv’nor’ by the media, addressed a crowd of 2,000 in London in 
mid-July and there were reports of people from London, Sheffield, 
Portsmouth and elsewhere attending meetings in Brighton. Despite this, 
coordination appears to have been minimal and it is likely that indirect 
diffusion via publicity was doing as much as direct contact to spread the 
practice. It is also possible that increased attention had caused the media 
to cover instances that may have already been planned or had occurred, 
regardless of Vigilante activity.48
The practice adopted by the Vigilantes in Brighton and by similar 
groups in London involved members playing a leading role in identi-
fying and securing houses on behalf of others, as well as deciding who 
would move into them. Organised squatting groups from the 1960s 
onwards in the UK, Australia and other Western countries would simi-
larly assist people in squatting houses and dealing with landlords and 
officials. However, as part of their self-help and collectivist ethos, and 
their critique of existing social structures, they generally did not allo-
cate housing. Instead, they took on a support role, aspiring to empower 
individuals, families and others to undertake much of the work involved 
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while creating networks that could defend them, as required. In keeping 
with changing patterns of life, and for some the desire to create alterna-
tives, a wider range of living arrangements than the conventional nuclear 
family were also facilitated via squatting. Although the mass squats of 
military camps, hotels and other large properties that took place in 1946 
would involve coordination and cooperation, life was focused on individ-
ual family units, with collective elements being a by-product rather than 
a core organising principle. In part, the model of organisation used by the 
Brighton Vigilantes probably grew out of Cowley’s long-term role in the 
community as a ‘fixer’, but it was also a reflection of the more hierarchical 
nature of politics and community life during the period.49
The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) gave conditional 
support to the Vigilantes via its daily newspaper. As its focus at this time 
was on minimising social disruption and avoiding outright conflict with 
the government – as a consequence of the war effort and also in the hope 
of forming a coalition with Labour – its members did not undertake 
squatting outside Scotland until 1946. Since the Vigilantes were limited 
in the repairs they could undertake, the CPGB argued that the efficacy of 
their efforts would be judged by their ability to force the government and 
councils to improve requisitioning.50
To a large degree, this position appears to have been shared by the 
Brighton Vigilantes. The group, which publicly eschewed political alle-
giances, made statements to the media about the need to improve requi-
sitioning and extend it into the fast-approaching post-war period.51 Such 
demands were sent to then-Prime Minister Winston Churchill and other 
politicians by letter. And, following a march, a rally and an address by 
the Vigilantes and their supporters, Brighton Council sent its own resolu-
tion to the government outlining the deficiencies of the current scheme 
and calling for the power to directly requisition properties, to ‘obviate the 
necessity of the application of unconstitutional methods’.52
Regardless of its actual potential, the risk of a wider outbreak forced 
central authorities to respond quickly. Churchill, whose government was 
in caretaker mode due to that year’s extended election, advocated press 
censorship and police repression . This course was blocked by cabinet, in 
part on the basis that existing law was not being broken, but also because 
of the popularity of the Vigilantes’ actions.53
Given that any changes would essentially mark an improvement in 
existing policy, rather than a major deviation, the caretaker government 
appears to have decided that the best course was to support councils 
in taking back control of the process. On 20 July, less than three weeks 
after the Vigilantes had first squatted in a house, the Ministry of Health 
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announced changes that would allow councils to directly requisition 
disused, habitable housing, with owners to be given 14 days’ notice. To 
expedite proceedings, central government officials would only become 
involved if owners resisted.54
The Vigilantes believed that these reforms did not go far enough in 
preventing owners and councils from avoiding their responsibilities, and 
vowed to continue squatting. The Brighton police successfully applied for 
court injunctions preventing activists from doing so (as they would in 
similar actions against anti-road campaigners and other activists in the 
coming decades). Cowley was subsequently arrested and fined £31 by 
the Brighton County Court for removing a landlord and workmen from a 
property. Continuing to campaign on the issue, two Vigilantes unsuccess-
fully stood in council elections in November 1945.55
Some councils shared the Vigilantes’ concerns, arguing that the 
changes potentially weakened existing measures, as the notice given to 
owners could enable them more leeway to exploit loopholes. Issues around 
staffing and repairs also remained. Nevertheless, when combined with fur-
ther changes regarding rent controls, reform did result in an expansion in 
requisitioning, with the result that the need for low-cost housing was met to 
a limited degree. Unsurprisingly, it was in Labour-dominated areas that req-
uisitioning was most extensive, with Bristol Council at one point  applying 
for every dwelling advertised for sale in the area.56 The Northumber land 
town of Whitley Bay saw notices sent to 150 owners, while, at the peak of 
Vigilante activity, Brighton Council served 60 notices within two days of 
the new rules being introduced.57 For now, requisitioning had successfully 
been redirected back into formal channels, but in 1946 continuing short-
comings and the emptying-out of military properties would once again see 
direct action play a major role in the politics of British housing.
10.6 Diffusion to Australia
On Friday 3 August 1945, two squatting actions were carried out in Syd-
ney and Melbourne, which, while unconnected, would have a major 
impact on requisitioning. At 8.15pm that night, members of a  previously 
unknown Melbourne group, the Australian Soldiers’ Legion (ASL), met 
up with the Wagglen family, which included a former soldier who had 
been wounded in Papua New Guinea, his wife and two children, in Bell 
St, Hawthorn.58 With the media present, ASL members gained entrance 
to a property and loaded furniture through a window. Although the 
house was in poor condition and filled with hundreds of empty bottles, 
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Mrs Wagglen, who had recently been served with a notice to quit the sin-
gle room her family shared in St Kilda, told journalists: ‘This is the biggest 
thrill of my life. We haven’t had a house to ourselves for four years.’59
As evidenced by the actions undertaken and threatened by indi-
vidual Australian war veterans earlier in the year, forms of contention 
can develop in parallel without the need for direct or indirect diffu-
sion. However, the ASL, whose members maintained their anonymity, 
described themselves in interviews and subsequent correspondence with 
the media as ‘vigilantes’. This indicates that they most probably modelled 
their action on the British campaigns, which, given the close ties between 
the two countries, had received much coverage in Australia.60 For some 
activists, direct action is a preferred method, but it is more commonly 
seen, or presented to audiences, as a last resort only to be used when 
conventional means of appeal have failed. This theme had already been 
present in statements from UK activists, and an ASL spokesperson pref-
aced his assertion that ‘The Government has consistently passed the buck 
on the housing question and now the Vigilantes have accepted it’ with an 
explanation that he had been a member of various committees and pro-
test groups whose lobbying had failed to produce results.61
Prior to undertaking its first public action, the ASL claimed to have 
located 41 empty houses in a habitable condition and to have already 
housed 13 families over the previous three weeks in areas such as Kew, 
Newport, Box Hill, Brighton and Camberwell.62 One member stated on 
the evening of the occupation that the organisation had 1,500 members, 
none of whom knew the leadership’s true identity. A separate interview 
saw another activist more prosaically describe the group as consisting of 
eight, but with plans to grow.63
Regardless of the true extent of its activities and membership, the 
ASL’s action grabbed widespread attention. By inviting journalists and 
photographers to attend the seizure, the group had clearly sought this. 
A statement from a spokesperson reflected and fed into common themes 
regarding reward for service, the view that society had failed veterans 
after the First World War, and the special circumstances of the period:
When Australia was threatened by Japan, red tape was dispensed 
with and all sorts of emergency measures were put through in 
 double-quick time. The housing shortage should also be consid-
ered as an enemy to be met by similar high-speed tactics… . The 
Vigilantes will rise every time the Government fails to do the right 
thing by servicemen… . We are the young soldiers of a generation 
which has learnt by the mistakes of its fathers.64
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On the same day as the Melbourne action, another house was occupied in 
a suburb of Sydney. In this case, the occupation did not involve a collec-
tive approach, but saw one man, an ex-soldier and former member of the 
merchant navy, occupy a house in Marion St, Auburn. Similarly echoing 
the idea of direct action as a last, rather than first, resort, he told the 
Communist Party newspaper Tribune, ‘Forcible possession of homes will 
not solve the housing problem. Only new houses will do that. But what 
other avenue is open to a man in desperate circumstances like me?’65
In contrast to earlier incidents in Sydney, a committee of local 
ex-servicemen was specifically formed to support the squatter in his 
action. The group advised the occupier to stay put, paid for his furniture 
to be transported 80 km from Wollongong and informed the media that 
‘If any attempt is made to evict … we can muster our forces in time to 
oppose any such move’.66 The committee, which included members of 
the Labor and Communist parties as well as various veterans’ organisa-
tions, then assisted him with making a legal application for tenancy. It 
also pledged to undertake a survey of all empty properties in the area.67
The events that followed illustrate the complexities of housing 
during the period as well as the extent of competition for it. After initial 
reports claiming the Hawthorn property was being held onto by a previ-
ous tenant for ‘sentimental reasons’ associated with the loss of his wife, 
it turned out to be rented by an elderly man who had been intermittently 
hospitalised and was currently recovering with relatives. The police, for 
their part, stated that under the law they could take no action unless a 
breach of the peace occurred. Although the previous tenant expressed a 
willingness to work with the new occupiers to find a solution, the owner, 
having firstly stated she would rent the property to a returned prisoner 
of war, issued a letter ordering them to ‘vacate immediately and make 
good any damage caused during the period of occupation’.68 In the case 
of the Auburn property, the estate agent produced a couple to whom he 
claimed he had let the house on the day of the occupation. It is unknown 
how either situation concluded.69
Although only comprising two events, which coincidentally 
occurred on the same day, the issue of veterans occupying disused prop-
erties was covered in at least 165 articles around Australia over the 
course of the following week.70 The situation was also commented upon 
in several newspaper editorials, which consistently expressed sympathy 
regarding homelessness and overcrowding, while also warning of the 
‘anarchy’, ‘jungle law’ and ‘mob rule’ that they asserted would follow if 
occupations were allowed to continue. This was similar to coverage the 
previous month in the UK, where the Observer newspaper had warned, 
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‘The Vigilantes only meant to help unfortunate people get bare justice, 
but if their methods became general, justice would be the first victim.’71
For their part, Australian communist newspapers were supportive 
with the Guardian, which had been running a campaign against attacks 
by sections of the media on migrants, keen to assert that anti- immigration 
statements made by a Melbourne Vigilante spokesperson had not been 
intended to cover those already in the country. Despite a call for readers 
to form support committees along the lines of that in Auburn, Australian 
communists did not publicly engage in further squatting activity until the 
following year.72
As in the UK various levels of government responded quickly in 
Australia to the increased focus on the failures of requisitioning as well as 
the sense, probably overstated, that further vigilante actions were in the 
offing. At the local level the Mayor of Auburn pledged his support for the 
veterans’ committee and ordered the health inspector to make a survey 
of empty properties.73
Two days after the Hawthorn occupation, the ASL issued an ultima-
tum to the Victorian state government threatening to ‘move 3,000 strong 
and force you to act’ if legislation was not introduced ‘to seize all empty 
houses in Melbourne and Bayside areas within seven days’.74 The follow-
ing the day, the government informed the media that it ‘could not and 
would not tolerate threatening acts’ and that police action would meet 
further occupations.75 At the same time, the Premier announced that the 
state government would be introducing legislation to give councils and 
municipal shires the power to install tenants in disused houses, with the 
state government to guarantee the payment of rent. On 4 August, the 
government had announced its intention to order the Victorian State 
Accommodation Officer to send letters to 50 owners of empty houses and 
bungalows in Melbourne seaside districts asking them to let their build-
ings. It is unclear whether this was planned before the Vigilantes’ action, 
but no suggestion of compelling owners to rent out properties appears to 
have been made prior to it. In contrast to the UK, where the media had 
linked reform to direct action, Australian newspapers did not.76
The NSW government’s response was also to threaten squatters with 
police action. On the question of requisitioning, it was more equivocal but 
similarly showed signs of the pressure direct action had exerted. Having 
initially claimed that, outside of law and order, the issue was a federal 
matter, the Acting Premier subsequently announced on 7 August that 
cabinet had devoted most of its weekly meeting to housing matters, and 
was investigating proposals regarding the requisitioning of empty hotel 
rooms and houses.77 Although it had previously rejected temporary public 
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housing solutions, these, too, were now under consideration. Along with 
Victorian government dwellings in former military barracks, other prop-
erties would be set up and requisitioning laws extended during 1946.78
For its part, the federal government admitted that existing provi-
sions were being circumvented through false claims of occupancy and 
announced that the Attorney General’s Department was conferring on 
‘tenancy regulations, with a view to tightening them up’.79 The annual 
Premiers’ conference, which brought together federal and state heads of 
government, was held later in August and, while housing had long been 
on the agenda, various media outlets reported that the issue of ‘vigilan-
tism’ was also discussed.80 Given the widespread coverage of the situation 
in the UK, it is possible that events there influenced Australian authorities 
to adopt these responses. due to the fear that ‘vigilantism’ could spread, 
although a lack of surviving cabinet and other internal documents make 
this impossible to verify.
10.7 Conclusion: A short reprieve before new waves 
of squatting emerge
In Britain and Australia, limited, yet high-profile, outbreaks of squatting 
in mid-1945 had rapidly forced authorities to address issues regarding 
homelessness and disused properties. Squatting was controversial, but 
drew legitimacy from the existence of formal requisitioning processes 
as well as the involvement of service people and their families. In many, 
but not all, cases, squatting was initiated, supported and carried out on 
behalf of homeless families by groups led by military veterans and organ-
ised along committee lines. Action and support for it were encouraged by 
rising expectations and decreasing deference on the part of working-class 
communities as well as widespread experiences of housing deprivation 
and the experience and exigencies of economic and social life during a 
period of total war.
Given these factors, a short burst of informal requisitioning activity 
appears to have been all that was required to stimulate reform. The prom-
ise or enactment of improvements in official processes came within three 
weeks of the first squats in the UK and within a week of such activity in 
Sydney and Melbourne. These responses appear to have been the main 
factor in demobilising further organised squatting activity in the short 
term, although police action against the Brighton Vigilantes, and threats 
of it in Australia, probably played a role. Squatting nevertheless continued 
to occur at a low level in both countries during late 1945 and early 1946.81
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Major squatting waves erupted in both countries during 1946. The 
factors that had encouraged squatting during 1945 were intensified by 
a further population spike and distress at the housing conditions that 
accompanied major demobilisation. Opportunities to meet demand via 
squatting were significantly widened by the emptying-out of military 
properties and the failure of the authorities to immediately reassign 
them. In the UK, tens of thousands of people squatted in rural and peri- 
urban military camps from the middle of the year.82 In Australia, where 
the practice was arguably more contained by state governments mov-
ing quickly to officially designate camps as temporary housing, roughly 
1,000 did so, particularly in and around Brisbane.83
In most cases, the authorities were subsequently forced to recognise 
tenancy via existing requisitioning rules or new processes. In contrast to 
the actions of the previous year, the majority of occupations in the UK 
were undertaken on an ad hoc basis. Although committees would later 
emerge to deal with common issues, people requiring housing generally 
squatted in the camps themselves, with housing generally assigned on a 
‘first come, first served’ basis.84
Opportunities for squatting within heavily urbanised areas also 
expanded, often as a result of the emptying-out of properties that govern-
ments had previously requisitioned for military and industrial purposes. 
The housing crisis also saw holiday homes, hotels and other intermittently 
occupied properties targeted. A campaign in September 1946 that saw 
1,500 people housed in mainly upmarket apart ments in London was initi-
ated and run by Communist Party members, some of whom were squatting 
themselves.85 In Australia, veterans’ and Communist Party groups, some-
times one and the same, also occupied mansions and other city properties 
from March 1946 onwards, before assigning housing on the basis of need. 
The form of organisation involved in squatting in these cases cleaved more 
closely to that used in 1945.86
Expanding need and opportunity, as well as a fresh wave of news-
paper and newsreel reports, undoubtedly provided the main impetus for 
the 1946 waves of action. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that the actions 
of vigilantes the year before, and the widespread and international cov-
erage they had gained, provided a model of action that many adopted. 
In a small number of cases, such as in Brighton in the UK, where Cowley 
and his associates were active from March1946, the same activists were 
involved.87 Various media reports in both countries during 1946 made 
the link between the two periods, and in some cases initially applied the 
term ‘vigilante’ to those involved.88 As the level of activity continued to 
grow, this was soon displaced by the term ‘squatter’, which remains in 
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use today. It is possible in the UK that the term ‘vigilante’ fell out of use 
because of its adoption by former fascists for a new organisation called 
the Vigilantes Action League, whose meetings were disrupted by commu-
nists in March 1946 and from whom the anti-fascist Brighton Vigilantes 
disassociated themselves.89
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Failed takeover: The phenomenon  
of right-wing squatting
 Jakob Warnecke
In Europe, certain preconditions are required for squatting: availability 
of empty buildings that are neither too badly damaged nor too heav-
ily secured; a process of urban restructuring and renewal; a permissive 
state with a not-too-restrictive legal framework and moderate rein-
forcement of the law; and effective connections between the squatters 
and social movements and media coverage.1 In theory, the option of 
squatting is available to all political groups, but it is usually associated 
with left-wing movements. In the last 30 years, we can, however, find 
a few cases of squatting by right-wing supporters. So far, this topic has 
received little attention from scholarly research. This chapter gives a 
tentative overview of right-wing squatting in Europe, and investigates, 
in a historical close-up, how right-wing squatting arose and devel-
oped in the early 1990s in eastern Germany, with a particular focus 
on the appropriation of originally leftist practices.2 The study follows 
a  political-actor-oriented approach and considers the extreme right as 
a collective political actor – as milieu and political movement. The fol-
lowing analysis shows that right-wing squatting developed in relation 
to the left-wing squatter movement, and that the two shared certain 
similarities in their formation, appearance and practices but also gener-
ated marked differences mainly due to a different idea of political order. 
While left-wing movements advocate libertarianism, the extreme right 
pursues the idea of authoritarianism.3 As a result, the adoption of leftist 
practices by right-wing squatters remained limited and mainly restricted 
to rather technical aspects.
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11.1 Right-wing squatting in Europe
The few examples of right-wing squatting have mostly occurred in coun-
tries with a traditionally large left-wing squatter movement. Usually, 
right-wing extremist structures and organisations were behind these 
actions, which tried to emulate a successful subversive practice of the rad-
ical left. Take, for example, the Netherlands: in 2000, neo-Nazis from the 
right-wing extremist organisation Voorpost occupied a barracks in Eind-
hoven to create a venue for meetings and concerts.4 Up to that point, the 
establishment of squatted social centres had been a practice reserved to 
leftist movements in Dutch cities, but now, members of right-wing move-
ments were adopting it. In a crude adaptation of the slogan from Nazi 
concentration camps, ‘Arbeit macht frei’, a right-wing squatter passed off 
the occupation as a liberating strategy: ‘Kraken [squatting] makes you 
free!’5 As Eindhoven had been a regional focus for the activities of the 
right-wing movement since the 1990s, squatting provided it with an 
effective operational base. The right-wing activists of the barracks were 
involved in various national and international extremist organisations.
Another example from the Netherlands also demonstrates the trans-
national character of right-wing squatting, as well as its reference to left-
ist movements. In 2008, several members of the so-called ‘Autonomous 
Nationalists’ (AN) demonstrated against an impending ban on squatting 
(Krak ban), which was publicly discussed in the Netherlands during this 
period. In September of the same year, they occupied a house in the vil-
lage of Monster near Den Haag under the name Autonoom Nationalistic 
Krakersinitiatief.6
The AN had emerged out of Germany’s neo-Nazi scene six years 
earlier. There, members of the AN referenced the left-wing autonomists 
in their appearance and forms of action, and conflated traditional leftist 
symbols and forms with right-wing extremist content.7 This strategy has 
also been adopted by right-wing extremists in other European countries. 
In Italy, for example, there have been attempts to establish right-wing 
social centres since the 1980s.8 However, the most successful occupations 
are associated with the far-right organisation ‘Casa Pound’, which was 
founded in 2003 following a squatters’ occupation by right-wing activ-
ists in Rome. These ‘fascists of the third millennium’ forged a new path, 
with their focus on pop culture, direct action and the establishment of a 
counterculture. Organised from their headquarters in Rome, the activ-
ists of ‘Casa Pound’ set out to occupy more houses and to build a nation-
wide network of groups, centres, libraries and concert venues. Similar 
to leftist squatters, the occupations were legitimised with reference to 
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the shortage of affordable housing. During the campaign, entitled Mutuo 
sociale, Nazi squatters borrowed leftist ideas, such as that each Italian 
should be granted their own living space by the state.9 The activists of 
‘Casa Pound’ see their housing occupations as a counterpart to leftist cul-
tural centres and as part of an emerging ‘Identitarian Movement’.
‘Casa Pound’ found admirers and imitators in the right-wing scenes 
of other European countries. The German new-right journal Sezession 
wrote an enthusiastic article on the neo-fascist squatters in 2010.10 Other 
examples can be found in Spain and France. In 2014, the campaign 
‘Hogar Social’ occupied houses in Madrid to draw attention to the hous-
ing shortage. At the same time, the far-right in Spain linked rather leftist 
ideas of social justice with xenophobic beliefs: the occupations should 
create housing exclusively for native families. Behind this campaign 
was the neo-Nazi group Movimiento Social Republicano or MSR (Social 
Republican Movement).11 In France, activists of the right-wing youth 
organisation Bastion Social occupied properties in Lyon in 2017, with 
similar ideological motives. For Bastion Social, occupations are a means 
of autonomy, identity and social justice against alleged colonisation by 
‘mass immigration and oligarchy’.12
11.2 Squatting in West Germany before 1990
Germany has a long history of squatting, particularly in the context of 
the alternative milieu and the new social movements of the 1970s and 
1980s. There were two main waves of squatting in the Federal Republic 
of Germany (FRG). The first wave emerged in the early 1970s as part 
of the new social movements in the wake of the disintegrating students’ 
movement. The centre of this first wave of squatting was Frankfurt/
Main. In the former stronghold of the student protest movement of 1968, 
so-called Spontis13 took the initiative in the squatting movement, often 
employing militant strategies. The second wave of squatting in the early 
1980s, by contrast, reached a significantly larger scale. There were 595 
occupations of houses in 153 different West German cities. An estimated 
12,900 squatters took part in these actions in various places, including 
Munich, Cologne, Göttingen, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Nuremberg and 
Freiburg.14 The hotspot was West Berlin, with 165 squatted buildings 
accommodating up to 5,000 people.15
Another centre of left-wing squatting in the 1980s was Hamburg, 
where a couple of squatted houses in the Hafenstraße came to fame. 
Here, autonomists were the main players. They established practices of 
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communal life such as holding plenary sessions and sharing a household 
budget. On the outside of their houses they displayed large colourful 
wall paintings illustrating their radical left-wing worldviews. Since 1985, 
Hamburg’s municipality (Senat) had been working towards eviction of 
the Hafenstraße. The first attempts met with massive resistance, and, in 
1987, after the failure of negotiations, the squatters adopted an actively 
threatening position. They announced publicly their determination to 
defend themselves militantly and by all available means, and very vis-
ibly fortified the 11 squatted houses with barbed wire and barricades. 
At demonstration marches, the squatters adopted a military appearance, 
wearing motorcycle and balaclava helmets and forming a ‘black bloc’. 
The threatening stance proved successful. Eventually in a bid to avoid 
a street battle, Klaus von Dohnanyi, Hamburg’s mayor, refrained from 
eviction.16 If nothing else, this designated the Hafenstraße to become the 
main reference point for right-wing squatting in East Germany just a dec-
ade later, in the early 1990s.
11.3 Squatting in East Berlin in the early 1990s
The collapse of the GDR in 1989–90 created the conditions for a third wave 
of squatting in Germany, especially in East Berlin. A high level of vacant 
residential properties, a temporary power vacuum and a large alternative 
scene, this time from both East and West, were the antecedents for this. 
In the eastern part of the city, thousands of apartments had been quietly 
obtained without attracting public attention during the 1980s. These 
occupations served to counteract the individual housing shortage, but 
alternative scenes and sub-cultures also appropriated empty spaces in 
the ruined old buildings of East Berlin.17 Some of the East German polit-
ical actors, who now occupied houses publicly, came from milieus that 
could only develop to a limited extent in the GDR before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, and now experienced a short but intense period of anarchy. 
Among the first political actors were parts of the GDR opposition, such 
as the Autonome Antifa Berlin (Ost).18 East German actors were joined 
by many autonomous activists from the West and took advantage of the 
political vacuum during the last months of the GDR. Since the summer 
of 1990, the centre of the squatter scene had been the Mainzer Straße in 
the East Berlin district of Friedrichshain.19 Here, West German alterna-
tives in particular had occupied a total of 12 houses. Soon, a colourful 
cultural and political scene with pubs, stalls, events and band rehearsals, 
cinemas and Volxküche (free cooking and social events) developed there. 
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In November 1990, the occupied houses were cleared by the police.20 The 
ensuing street battle of the Mainzer Straße was a turning point for the 
East Berlin occupying movement. As a result, most of the house occupa-
tions thereafter were based on negotiated solutions.
11.4 The emergence of the neo-Nazi squat on 
Weitlingstraße
In the shadow of the emerging left-wing occupation movement in the 
Prenzlauer Berg and Friedrichshain districts of Berlin, neo-Nazis in 
the neighbouring district of Lichtenberg also began to initiate squats – 
the most well-known example being the house at Weitlingstraße 122.21 
Here we analyse this right-wing squatting action in detail. To investi-
gate far-right phenomena in a local context, three aspects are consid-
ered: the local context including the economic situation and political 
culture; the structures of the local extreme right groups; and the local 
power gains by right-wing extremists.22
In 1990, East Berlin was a locus for neo-Nazi activities, which was, 
to some extent, a continuation of previous trends. In the latter days of 
the GDR there was already a neo-Nazi scene, which gathered in illegal, 
loosely formed groups and attracted attention by acts of violence against 
migrants, homosexuals and leftist punks. Parts of this scene pursued 
National Socialist ideals and met in secret group foundations.23 The rul-
ing SED (Socialist Unity Party) denied the neo-Nazi problem, because, 
according to state ideology, fascism was a radical version of capitalism; 
and, due to the abolition of capitalism in the GDR, there could be no more 
Nazis in socialism. Yet racism, neo-Nazism and anti-Semitism were part 
of everyday life in East Germany, and they pervaded the whole of society. 
For the entire period of the GDR, more than 8,000 neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic 
and racist attacks had been reported.24 Only a raid by neo-Nazis on a punk 
concert in East Berlin’s Zionskirche in 1987 brought the problem into the 
public eye. This led, on the one hand, to state repression against neo-Nazi 
groups, but on the other hand also to the establishment of alternative 
anti-fascist groups from the left-wing oppositional youth cultures.25
In the transitional situation in the GDR, in the autumn of 1989, the right-
wing youth scenes did not play a significant role, but after the fall of the Wall, 
from about December 1989, neo-Nazis with militaristic Reichskriegsflaggen 
(imperial war flags) and radical nationalist demands participated in the 
Monday demonstrations of the civil movement. At the same time, far-right 
organisations from western Germany poured into eastern Germany to 
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influence the mood of the times and opinion-formation. In the building of 
neo-Nazi structures in the still- existing GDR from the beginning of 1990, 
the West German neo-Nazi network Gesinnungsgemeinschaft der Neuen 
Front (GdNF) played a decisive role, with its Arbeitsplan Ost (a programme 
propagating  ‘foreigner-free cities’ and well-organised right-wing scenes). 
The GdNF was particularly successful in East Berlin. There, West German 
neo-Nazis and individuals from the structures of the two illegal East Berlin 
neo-Nazi groups Lichtenberger Front and Bewegung 30. Januar founded the 
neo-Nazi-party Nationale Alternative (NA) at the end of January 1990. The 
programme of this organisation was fundamentally racist and stood for 
national community and the repatriation of foreigners.
Not least the desire for separate premises for the newly founded party 
led the Nationale Alternative to occupy a house in the Lichtenberg district 
in February 1990.26 However, because this house, on Türrschmidtstraße, 
was in private ownership, the Lichtenberg district administration 
offered various properties, including a house at Weitlingstraße 122, as 
a substitute.27 Its relatively good condition and its particular configura-
tion, which made it easy to defend against unwanted visitors, spoke in 
favour of choosing this property.28 The neo-Nazi squatters who occupied 
Weitlingstraße 122 founded the Bürgerinitiative Wohnraumsanierung e.V. 
(WOSAN). The name should suggest that it was a citizens’ action group 
operating in the interest of the common good and thus pretended a cer-
tain degree of harmlessness. At the same time, the abbreviation bears a 
striking resemblance to Wodan, the Germanic god of war.
The house at Weitlingstraße 122 performed different functions: it 
served as a headquarters for the Nazis; a living community; a contact point 
for Nazi youths; a fortress; a gathering point for actions; a party space; 
and a space for celebrations, for news services such as Anti-Antifa, for the 
production of propaganda, and for training activities. Furthermore, the 
house became a locus for right-wing terrorist activities, developing into 
a centre for the German and international neo-Nazi scene in the first half 
of 1990. Leading neo-Nazis such as Michael Kühnen, head of the GdNF, 
Gary Lauck of the NSDAP-AO and Gottfried Küssel of the Volkstreue 
außerparlamentarische Opposition (VAPO) all resided there. Moreover, 
Ekkehard Weil from West Berlin, who had been known for several acts of 
terrorism since the early 1970s, occasionally lived there.
Leading neo-Nazi, Christian Worch, who was responsible for the 
northern section of the GdNF and thus for Berlin, influenced the activities 
at Weitlingstraße 122. He not only supported the logistical structure of the 
organisation but also wrote part of the propaganda,29 and he was alleg-
edly the mastermind behind right-wing squatting in East Berlin. He later 
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stated that, in retrospect, he had learned a great deal from the ‘anarchos’ 
in the Federal Republic.30 After 1990, he had hoped that a ‘Hafenstraße 
for right-wing extremists’ would be created on Weitlingstraße.
To be precise, neo-Nazis had begun orienting themselves towards 
the practices of autonomists much earlier. Their adoption of protest 
forms of the radical left can be traced back to 1977, when Worch and 
Kühnen, who represented a new generation of neo-Nazis, initiated the 
so-called Eselsmasken-Aktion. These neo-Nazis donned donkey masks 
and denied the Holocaust publicly with a slogan suggesting that only 
jackasses (another meaning of the German word Esel) would believe that 
Jews had been gassed in Germany. Others accompanied them dressed in 
black, wearing leather jackets and motorcycle helmets.
Having said that, it was only after the ban of several neo-Nazi organ-
isations by the German government in 1992 that a deliberate adoption 
of radical left-wing strategies took hold. In reaction to the ban, Christian 
Worch developed his concept of the ‘autonomist right’, which became 
established in the form of Freie Kameradschaften (free comradeships) in 
many places later on. It is important to note that this was a selective adop-
tion mainly focused on technical aspects. Whereas Worch disregarded the 
ideological or cultural aspects of autonomists, he considered the idea of 
‘organising without organisation’ crucial, because such a structure seemed 
to provide a resilient means of resistance against state repression.31
11.5 Reinterpretation and Nazification of leftist practices
A photo taken in the Weitlingstraße in 1990 indicates that Nazi squat-
ters took some aesthetic elements from the radical left-wing autonomist 
squatter movement. Just like the leftist squats, the windows were secured 
with bars. While this can be considered pragmatism – as Weitlingstraße 
was threatened by attacks from political opponents – the right-wing 
squatters presented themselves on the balcony with motorcycle helmets 
in a military clothing style, reminiscent of the threatening posture of the 
autonomists in Hamburg. However, aside from this exceptional photo-
graphic testimony, neo-Nazis tended to distinguish themselves from 
autonomists in their style and clothing. By contrast to the members of 
the alternative scene and the autonomists, who were often influenced by 
punk aesthetics, right-wing squatters attached great importance to disci-
pline and a well-groomed appearance.
Accordingly, their occupied buildings had a different appear-
ance as well. Right-wing squatters also used the façade to propagate 
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political messages. A banner at Weitlingstraße 122 displayed the  slogan 
Dem Kommunismus keinen Fußbreit (‘Not an inch of land for com-
munism’), as well as the abbreviations of two neo-Nazi organisations: 
‘NA’ and ‘Antiko’.32 But the propagation of neo-Nazi ideology was less 
imaginative and vibrant. Colourful redesign of house façades in the man-
ner of the Hafenstraße, where large wall paintings had publicised the uto-
pian ideas of the radical left, did not feature in right-wing squats.
In the summer of 1990, Weitlingstraße 122 received vast media 
coverage. The residents were very open to the press and used it for self- 
promotion in exchange for generous payments. In their statements to the 
media, right-wing squatters referred to their leftist political opponents, 
and simultaneously emphasised traditional virtues such as discipline, 
order and tidiness. In a TV report by the German magazine Der Spiegel, 
the neo-Nazis presented themselves as orderly and clean- living, busy 
sweeping the floors of their quarters. In one scene, the camera focuses 
on a ‘duty comrade’ with a field cap, who is typing out the work plan for 
the day. The only woman in the house is shown cooking at the stove, 
while a young neo-Nazi in a brown shirt combs his hair in the mirror. 
A young neo-Nazi boy speaks to camera about his motives. He directly 
refers to communal life in shared flats, which had been established in 
Germany by alternative youths post-1968: ‘If the left can do that, why 
can’t we? […] In this house, the primary goal is firstly the apartment, 
a large shared flat […] which has probably only been on a left-wing 
basis so far. I think that’s incredibly great if it really works.’33 Such pub-
lic statements indicate that the house, in its widest sense, was to real-
ise the National Socialist ideals of the political movement holistically 
in everyday life and in private life. Daily tasks included craft activities 
and organisation of events. There was a community fund, in which all 
residents were required to deposit money (as mentioned earlier, leftist 
autonomists developed a similar practice of shared budgets). This points 
to a certain overlap regarding anti-capitalist practices. Most neo-Nazis 
in the Weitlingstraße considered themselves followers of Georg Strasser, 
who belonged to the left wing of the NSDAP.34 The right-wing squatters 
sought to put their anti-capitalist ideas into everyday practice, which 
echoed leftist ideas of solidarity and equality. But, beyond such super-
ficial parallels, their male-dominated community followed a command 
structure that clearly stood out from the leftist movement and its eman-
cipatory ideals and grassroots democracy. Moreover, the right-wing 
political response to the ‘social question’ had a completely different 
character, focusing on nationalism and racism. The outward presenta-
tion of the ordinary German community went hand-in-hand with the 
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violent stance of the Nazi squatters. Both were driven by basic National 
Socialist ideas regarding the order of society.
More importantly, the cultivated image of orderly Germans was a 
sham to some extent canvassing the extent of fascist militancy. In August 
1990, the Essen-based neo-Nazi magazine Querschläger, for example, 
printed an interview with a resident of Weitlingstraße 122 indicating that 
right-wing squatters made propaganda for fascist violence. In photo-
graphs, neo-Nazi squatters posed in front of a gallows, making the Hitler 
salute.35 Moreover, many of the ideas that Nazi squatters boasted about, 
such as community, camaraderie and solidarity, were less pronounced 
in everyday life in the Weitlingstraße. Former resident Gottfried Küssel 
acknowledged retrospectively the discrepancy between a minority of 
disciplined ideologues and a majority of unruly youths: ‘most of those 
who lived in it had no reference at all to the possible effects and only 
saw a great, fun commune in the zero tariffs. Those Berlin comrades who 
were trying to advance the entire project were unable to assert them-
selves against the masses’.36 This is corroborated by former resident and 
ex-Nazi Ingo Hasselbach, who reports fundamental internal conflicts 
between the more strictly organised neo-Nazis and right-wing skinheads 
with their sub-cultural lifestyle.37 Hasselbach also comments in detail on 
conflicts caused by violent and unfair behaviour within the living com-
munity and even by the strikingly different standards of hygiene of differ-
ent right-wing comrades.
The nature of life at Weitlingstraße 122 also meant occupying the 
public space in the neighbourhood. This right-wing radical version of 
reclaiming of the ‘right to the city’ was characterised by an openly violent 
attitude. The neo-Nazis tried to control the neighbourhood and marked 
their territory by showing their militancy and committing acts of vio-
lence. Several militant attacks on asylum homes, as well as on houses 
occupied by left-wing residents were organised in the Weitlingstraße. The 
public staging of militancy partly resembled autonomist practices. It was 
directed at the political opponent, it demonstrated strength and it sig-
nalled a readiness to use violence. One marked difference, however, was 
violence motivated by racism and xenophobia; and unlike the informal 
organisation of autonomists, with flat hierarchies, right-wing squatting 
was linked to a hierarchical network of parties and organisations. This 
became evident when, on 27 April 1990, a special unit of the former state 
security and police stormed this and other Nazi-occupied houses and 
arrested the neo-Nazi party leadership. In the apartments, they found a 
weapon and right-wing propaganda, as well as blacklists with names of 
political opponents.38
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As a reaction to systematic assaults on left-wing squatters, Antifa 
groups organised a demonstration against Weitlingstraße 122 in June 
1990. The police stopped the demonstration several hundred metres in 
front of the house, where about 200 neo-Nazis had entrenched them-
selves. For defence purposes, they had flamethrowers, a bazooka and 
400 litres of gasoline at the ready.39 At the same time, militant autono-
mists attacked the East German police with Molotov cocktails and stones, 
but they were not able to break through. At first sight, the situation seems 
to reveal a comparable propensity for violence from both hostile groups. 
However, armed weapons in the right-wing squat and regular paramil-
itary exercises highlight a fundamental difference between radical left 
and right. Several studies from the 1990s have shown that right-wing 
violence is generally more life-threatening than political violence from 
the radical left.40
This event marked a turning point in the history of the house, whose 
decline was now unstoppable because even the city administration was 
forced to act. The municipal housing administration terminated the lease 
agreement with Weitlingstraße 122 in July 1990 and offered to provide 
its residents with alternative apartments located outside the city centre.
11.6 Decay and aftermath
The real demise of the neo-Nazi squats was not brought about by eviction. 
There were also ideological tensions between the East German NA play-
ers and the GdNF cadres, because some of the East German neo-Nazis did 
not share the latter’s worship of Hitler. Political success was also lacking: 
as a party, the NA had failed to participate in the people’s chamber elec-
tions and the local elections in the GDR in March and May of 1990. In 
the elections to the Berlin House of Representatives in December 1990, 
a single applicant in Berlin-Lichtenberg received only 0.2 per cent sup-
port, with 30 votes.41 These failings compounded the disintegration of 
NA and its occupied homes. The connections around the Weitlingstraße 
disintegrated and, by the end of 1990, the neo-Nazis had left the houses 
altogether.
The activities of right-wing squatters in the early 1990s, however, 
left their mark on urban space. In a way, the situation was similar to 
that of the Hafenstraße in Hamburg, where, despite massive tendencies 
of gentrification, the borough of St Pauli still has the reputation of a 
stronghold of leftist and alternative living. Likewise, the Weitlingstraße 
became mythologised, rendering the borough particularly appealing to 
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right-wing radicals. In the following years, many young neo-Nazis moved 
to Berlin-Lichtenberg. Right-wing extremist hegemony lingered there for 
a long time – T-shirts bearing the slogan ‘No-Go Area Weitlingstraße’ 
were very popular in the right-wing scene. When the 2006 Africa Council 
warned against ‘no-go areas’ for foreigners in eastern Germany, the dis-
trict of Lichtenberg was at the top of the list. Here there was right-wing 
street propaganda featuring anti-Semitic logos and swastikas. A number 
of right-wing hangouts and high electoral successes for the far-right NPD 
party underline this. The neighbourhood also remained a focal point for 
right-wing violence for many years. To tackle this dynamic, the action 
plan Aktionsplan Lichtenberg-Mitte was launched in 2006. The Federal 
Ministry of Family Affairs funded the initiative to the tune of 440,000 
Euros. More than 120 projects have been financially supported with 
these funds since 2007.42
The Weitlingstraße experience also made an impact beyond Berlin’s 
city limits, because, in other parts of the republic, neo-Nazis had initiated 
squats in the early 1990s. In Dresden, neo-Nazis who followed the daz-
zling neo-Nazi Rainer Sonntag (who had belonged to Michael Kühnen’s 
inner circle) modelled their activism on the Weitlingstraße approach and 
occupied a house in the Rabenauer Straße in November 1990. The city’s 
Criminal Investigation Department subsequently registered that a large 
number of neo-Nazis had moved from Weitlingstraße to Dresden.43 Since 
autumn 1990, then, Dresden has been considered the ‘capital of the 
movement’ for the German neo-Nazis. In Weimar, the neo-Nazi organ-
isation National Offensive occupied a house in 1990, too. From there, 
attacks were launched on leftists and migrants. In Halle, the neo-Nazi 
organisation Hallesche Deutsche Jugend occupied two houses in the sum-
mer of 1991.44 Most of these and other right-wing occupations in east-
ern Germany in the early 1990s were short-lived. There are hardly any 
examples for the coming years. Not only had the opportunity structures 
for squatting disappeared, but also, in 1992, the German state started a 
wave of repression against neo-Nazi organisations, including a ban on 
many parties and organisations until 1995.
While there were serious conflicts between Nazi ideologists and 
skinheads in squatted houses in 1990, the skinhead sub-culture grad-
ually became fashionable in the right-wing scene during the 1990s. 
Generally, Nazis adopted the styles of other youth scenes. One result 
was the emergence of the aforementioned AN. As early as 1996, the 
Nazi group Thüringer Heimatschutz had occupied an abandoned factory 
in the small city of Saalfeld. Their press statement expressed a similar 
 appropriation of leftist practice as Nazi squatters in Eindhoven in the 
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Netherlands a couple of years later. They claimed to be a National Youth 
Centre with no interest in drugs and no communist ideology, but before 
they could take hold the police evicted the right-wing squat. Years later, 
it turned out that this collective had launched the German terror group 
National Socialist Underground, which had murdered nine people.45 
In 2006, some 20 Nazis squatted in an empty house in Lübeck for 
a matter of minutes, in a symbolic move. In making this protest, they 
were demanding that a National Youth Centre be built, again with clear 
references to leftist practice. On their banners was written ‘Create two, 
three, many alternatives’, which was a modified quote of Che Guevara.46 
Housing occupations have been virtually impossible in Germany in recent 
times. Right-wing housing projects are therefore often realised legally. In 
2017, for instance, the right-wing group ‘Identitarians’ opened a house 
project in Halle. Their goal is to establish a right-wing counterculture to 
fill the pre-political space with their ideas.
11.7 Conclusion
Right-wing squatters mostly originated in countries with a large leftist 
squatting movement, in Germany as well as in other European cities. 
Nazi squatters openly referred to leftist squatters, adopted their forms 
of action and also took on social issues for their own political goals. 
Right-wing occupations often stated a common good, but their concept 
of solidarity and commitment was racially motivated and exclusive. 
The occasional occupations of houses were repeatedly linked to current 
political trends of the extreme right. In most cases, right-wing extremist 
organisations, networks and campaigns were behind the occupations. In 
addition, transnational connections and spheres of influence between 
extremely right-wing national contexts in Europe were evident. Yet 
nowhere did right-wing squatter movements approach the size of their 
left-wing counterparts; they were almost infinitesimal in numbers. Thus, 
there can be no mention of a successful and independent right-wing 
occupying movement anywhere in Europe.
The case of the Weitlingstraße 122 in East Berlin exemplifies these 
general findings. In a particular historical situation with exceptional 
scope for action and availability of resources, hundreds of empty houses 
were occupied in East Berlin in 1990. The opportunity was seized not only 
by political actors of the left-wing alternative milieu, but also by a few 
neo-Nazis. It has been shown that the right-wing squatters considered 
the leftist squats a source of inspiration. They adopted various left-wing 
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practices and topics, and reinterpreted and modified them according to 
their own racist and ultra-nationalist ideas. The ideal of a homogenous 
community, traditional gender relations and clearly structured hierar-
chies in the milieu of Weitlingstraße stands in stark contrast to the lib-
ertarian and anti-authoritarian self-concept of the diverse, alternative 
culture established at the same time in Mainzer Straße and elsewhere. 
The failure of the Weitlingstraße impulse was based on internal tensions 
and conflicts of interest. Counter-strategies by state and non-state politi-
cal actors against Weitlingstraße, which ranged from police repression to 
civic intervention, also contributed to its decline.
Squatting became part of a struggle for hegemony in the public 
space between right- and left-wing groups in Berlin in the early 1990s. 
Although different in many regards, the squatting conducted by both left 
and right created myths and left their mark on the boroughs.
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What is the contribution of the comparative studies in this volume 
to the understanding of informal housing? The diversity of topics and 
approaches does not allow for a universal answer. Whereas some chap-
ters deal with informal settlements, others focus on urban squatting. 
Some parts focus on strategies and forms of informal housing, others 
on state policies, and still others on interactions between squatters and 
authorities. Most studies examine contemporaneous phenomena, while 
a few analyse historical trajectories.
Some authors arrive at far-reaching conclusions. Thomas Aguilera 
and Alan Smart (Chapter 3), for instance, develop a typology of toler-
ation policies, which aims at a nuanced understanding of similar poli-
cies in different settings and can be applied both in the Global North and 
South. Rachelle Alterman and Inês Calor (Chapter 8), somewhat differ-
ently, explore the limitations of concept transfer from the Global South 
to the North, from a legal point of view. They advocate a carefully consid-
ered approach for policies tackling informal housing, particularly in the 
Global North.
Other authors focus on detailed case studies within a local context, 
such as Eliza Isabaeva (Chapter 5), who compares three informal settle-
ments in Central Asia, or Jakob Warnecke (Chapter 11), who analyses 
right-wing political squatting in Germany. In so doing, they corroborate 
Alan Gilbert’s (Chapter 2) statement that specific forms and problems of 
informal housing, and appropriate solutions, are local rather than global.
Despite the diversity of the chapters in this volume, still a few gen-
eral observations can be made.
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12.1 Studying informal housing
First, this book demonstrates that paired comparisons do not necessarily 
enforce dichotomies and clichés. If carried out in a careful and reflec-
tive manner, rather the opposite is the case. One vivid example is The-
resa Williamson’s comparison of housing in favelas and condominiums 
in Rio de Janeiro (Chapter 7). Her analysis challenges the alleged supe-
riority of formal housing and reveals that condominiums do not neces-
sarily, nor in all regards, provide better living conditions than favelas. 
Another case study that challenges a formal dichotomy is the comparison 
of urban squatting in the Netherlands and the GDR (Chapter 4). Several 
striking similarities, particularly in the interaction between authorities 
and squatters, put the political opposition of democracy and dictatorship 
into perspective. Both paired comparisons, which are based on empirical 
findings, highlight the subversive potential of social research in dealing 
with political concepts and debates.
Authors who compare different forms of informal housing in dis-
tinct contexts of the Global South, North, West and East often come 
across surprising similarities. This is the second general insight this 
book has to offer. Take as examples the parallels of squatting activism in 
Brazil and Spain highlighted by Clarissa Campos and Miguel Martínez 
in Chapter 6, or the similarities of urban squatting in Leiden and Leipzig 
(Chapter 4). These and other case studies show that both the practices 
of squatters and policy responses have a lot in common, despite differ-
ent political, social and cultural contexts. Moreover, similarities seem 
to encourage a transfer of concepts such as ‘squatting’ from the West to 
the East, or ‘informal housing’ from the Global South to the North, even 
though (as Alterman/Calor remind us in Chapter 8) an appropriation of 
notions always requires critical reflection and adjustment.
Likewise, and this is the third point I want to make, striking resem-
blances should not mislead us into overlooking intricacies and limitations. 
It is, for instance, no doubt instructive to highlight similarities between 
slums in nineteenth-century Europe and African shanty towns today. 
But, as Chapter 9 shows, there are also crucial differences regarding the 
extent and duration of these informal settlements. Likewise, as Chapter 
11 highlights, right-wing squatters adopted the leftist practice of urban 
squatting to a considerable degree, but there are still fundamental dif-
ferences. For instance, unlike the informal organisation of autonomists, 
with flat hierarchies, right-wing squatting was linked to a hierarchical 
network of parties and organisations.
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Most comparisons reveal a complex mix of similarities and differences. 
In this regard, typologies such as the one developed in Chapter 3 provide a 
precise and comprehensive tool for the analysis of such a complex matter. 
In their comparison of toleration of illegal housing in Hong Kong and Paris, 
Aguilera/Smart demonstrate that types of toleration that can be found in 
both cities at one time or another help identify subtleties and refined distinc-
tions. The challenging of dichotomies based on empirical research, the dis-
covery of surprising similarities and subtle differences, as well as the critical 
reflection on limitations of likeness and shortcomings of conceptual transfer, 
are just a few examples that highlight the great potential of comparisons for 
a better understanding of informal housing as a global phenomenon.
At the same time, there is no doubt that much more is possible. 
Many lacunae remain. Perhaps even more serious than the under-
developed dialogue between scholars of the global South and North is 
the almost complete lack of comparisons between informal housing in 
Africa and Latin America. Hence, we can only encourage colleagues from 
around the globe to take up and continue our initiative.
12.2 Implications for policies
According to Jovana Dikovic, informal housing or squatting is not only one 
of the most universal informal practices, driven by an elementary human 
right to shelter and life. It also represents ‘probably one of the oldest informal 
practices that evolved in conjunction with the institution of property rights’.1 
Solutions such as legalisation or temporary toleration of informal housing 
rely on the Roman law that had provisions for accommodating the interests 
of squatters. As Dikovic’s astute observation underscores, comparison of 
similar phenomena in remote contexts can not only put a new complexion 
on a well-known matter but can also help develop more appropriate policies.
Whereas the approach of this book is predominantly explorative 
and questioning, there are nevertheless a few practical implications. Let 
me highlight three aspects. First, informal housing cannot be properly 
understood without a thorough analysis of the historical context. Several 
comparisons in this volume underline the importance of specific histori-
cal situations. Take as example Iain McIntyre’s meticulous exploration of 
post-war squatting in England and Australia in Chapter 10. On the one 
hand, it analyses local processes such as the fact that informal requisi-
tioning became widely accepted in Britain in a period of extreme need, 
and that this happened after formal requisitioning had already been 
widened during the Second World War. On the other hand, it explores 
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influences over long distances, namely the ‘diffusion’ of squatting prac-
tices from England to Australia.
Second, in this regard it is illuminating to see that interactions 
between squatters and authorities made for policies of toleration or 
even legalisation in many cases. The often quite positive outcome of the 
encounter between housing strategies that are not entirely lawful, and 
state institutions that show some degree of leniency, points to the impor-
tance of social values in the respective contexts. The ‘right to housing’ was 
not only a central value in communist dictatorships, and is still a factor in 
post-Soviet states, but the right to housing is also enshrined in constitu-
tions of West European democracies such as the Netherlands, as well as in 
African and Latin American states such as the Republic of South Africa and 
Brazil. For that reason alone, it is meaningful to compare policy responses 
despite the fact that local practices of informal housing differ significantly.
Moreover, historical comparisons (such as Olumuyiwa Adegun’s dis-
cussion of the history of nineteenth-century slums in Europe through an 
African lens in Chapter 9) suggest a relaxed and pragmatic attitude towards 
shanty towns in the Global South. This brings me to my third point: if we 
conceptualise informal housing predominantly from a normative point 
of view, we risk neglecting the multifaceted experience of it. A focus on 
home ownership, for instance, is not always helpful, as Alan Gilbert aptly 
remarked in Chapter 2: ‘The desire for a secure, safe and comfortable 
home is universal and is not the same thing as home ownership.’ Several 
case studies in this volume have shown that informality can be a problem – 
and a solution, too. This book thus advocates a nuanced and careful way 
of studying it, to identify adequate policies that acknowledge both positive 
and negative aspects of informality. Be it Astana, Belo Horizonte, Bogotá, 
Bishkek, Hong Kong, Johannesburg, Leiden, Madrid, Nairobi, Paris or Rio 
de Janeiro – urban informality is not a bad thing, as such.
A thoughtful and respectful way of dealing with complex situations 
does not solve pressing problems; but developing a deeper understanding 
and a differentiated assessment can be a first step towards more sustain-
able, humane and respectful practices of providing housing according to 
the needs of millions of inhabitants of this planet. A few suggestions are 
being made in this volume. Alterman/Calor’s proposal (Chapter 8) to use 
the yardstick of ‘justifiable noncompliance’ as a criterion for state inter-
vention is one possible solution to reconcile the conflict between law and 
need. Theresa Williamson (Chapter 7), most notably, has made the case 
for the sustainable option of ‘asset-based community development’. Her 
chapter reminds us that a ‘healthy dose of informality’ can be advanta-
geous. More such  pragmatic and considerate approaches are needed.
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Note
1. Jovana Dikovic, ‘Squatting’, in The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality: Understanding Social 
and Cultural Complexity, Volume 2, ed. Alena Ledeneva (London: UCL Press, 2018), 10–13.
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